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ABSTRACT 
In 1996 New Zealand changed its electoral system to a proportional representation 
system known as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). The new electoral system 
affected many areas of New Zealand politics from the number of parties to the type of 
outcomes. Under MMP, single party majoritarian governments are likely to be 
replaced by majority coalitions and minority governments. In light of these changes, 
this thesis focuses on government formation. A theoretical approach is adopted that 
employs existing government formation literature and builds a theoretical framework 
applicable to the New Zealand environment. The framework is then used as the basis 
for a cost/benefit analysis in a hypothetical five party system, where the parties are 
distributed along a left-right continuum comprising two major parties, one centre third 
party and two wing third parties. 
A questionnaire based upon the theoretical framework was presented to 48 
MPs, representing 40% of parliament's membership. This high rate of contact with 
the target group not only assured an isomorphism between theoretical suggestion and 
political reality, but also provided a valuable insight into the opinions of New 
Zealand's decision makers. More specifically the questionnaire's results indicate the 
central importance of the following three variables for government formation: (a) the 
effect of ministerial direction on policy influence maximisation; (b) the possibility of 
inter-caucus alliances within a coalition; and ( c ), the effect of Collective Cabinet 
Responsibility on junior coalition partners. Together with the theoretical framework 
these three insights provide enough detail to confirm and explicate this thesis research 
proposition, that the introduction of MMP in New Zealand is likely to result in an 
increase in the number of single and multi-party minority governments. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
It may be that another cultural tradition of the polity, single - party 
government, proves to be more persuasive than the urge towards 
majoritarianism. Minority, single-party governments might in the long 
term be as frequent a form of party government as majority coalitions or, 
indeed, minority coalitions. 
Jonathan Boston and Elizabeth McLeay1 
1 
The above quote reflects the speculation surrounding future government formation in 
New Zealand caused by the change to a proportional representation system in 1996. 
The new electoral system heralded a significant change within most areas of New 
Zealand politics, from the number of parties in parliament, to the way candidates are 
chosen. Understandably, the change in electoral systems has also caused significant 
changes to the way governments are formed. Before adopting the Mixed Member 
Proportional (MMP) system, government formation was a relatively straightforward 
process normally resulting in single party majoritarian governments. With MMP this 
process has changed: election results do not automatically indicate what type of 
government will form or which parties will be in government. 
Under MMP an election is now but one stage, albeit a very important stage, in 
the government formation process that determines the parliamentary numbers of each 
party. This outcome is then combined with other factors such as a party's position in 
the party system, the level of internal cohesion and incumbency. Collectively, factors 
1 Boston, J. and, McLeay, E., (1997) From Campaign to Coalition, Palmerston North, Dunmore 
Press, p.244. 
2 
such as these interact with parliamentary representation and result in different 
bargaining positions for each party. These bargaining positions, weak or strong, are 
then taken into government formation negotiations where each party attempts to achieve 
its goals. Therefore, under MMP the once decisive election has been reduced to just 
one stage in the government formation process. 
A great deal of material has been written on government formation in 
proportional electoral systems and significantly less on the recent changes in New 
Zealand's political environment. Overall, the literature on government formation tends 
to concentrate on furnishing explanations of majority coalitions without providing 
adequate explanations for minority outcomes. This led Strom to note that, despite 
minority governments being common and comprising a third of all governments in 
European proportional democracies2, "there is no rich literature on minority 
governments per se113 • He also believes one of the reasons for this is that minority 
outcomes challenge the most sophisticated body of work on government formation, 
namely game theoretic/matfatical approaches4. 
The literature on government formation in New Zealand under MMP is not 
bountiful; however, this is to be expected due to the short time that MMP has been in 
place. The body of literature that does exist is largely comparative in methodology, 
more descriptive than theoretical and has not taken a holistic approach to the process of 
government formation. Consequently, more theoretical material is required to 
complement this comparative and descriptive literature. It is only with the addition of 
theoretical research that the value of the existing material can be fully utilised. 
2 Strom, K., (1984 ), "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies", in Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol.17, No.2, p. 200. 
3 Strom, K., (1990), Minority Govemment and Majority Rule, Cambridge University press, U.K, p. 9 
4 Ibid., p.21. 
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In light of these observations this study looks at general and minority 
government formation theory and combines this with the New Zealand situation. 
Additionally, the research proposition bears close resemblance to the speculative 
suggestion by Boston and McLeay (refer p.1) on future government outcomes in New 
Zealand. Therefore, this thesis' research proposition is: 
"That the introduction of MMP in New Zealand is likely to result ill an increase in 
the 1mmber of single and multiparty minority governments". 
Superficially, the response to the proposition appears to be "yes". This is due to the 
increase in the number of parties within the political spectrum, as well as the overseas 
research which indicates that one in three governments formed in proportional liberal 
democracies are minority administrations5. However, balanced against this is New 
Zealand's political culture which has been the very model of majoritarian government: 
public expectations have been majoritarian and governing parties have expected to 
implement their legislative programmes without interference from the Opposition6• 
This predisposition towards majoritarianism was clearly evident in the period following 
the 1996 election, where neither the media nor political parties seriously considered 
minority government options 7. 
In addressing the research proposition this study follows a three-stage process. 
First, those factors which are seen as important for government formation in general are 
identified and evaluated. Second, these factors are organised into a theoretical 
5 Ibid., p. 9. 
6 McLeay, E., (1996), "Forming A Government", paper presented to the Australian Studies of Politics 
Group Ist" Annual Conference, p. 3. 
7 The one minor exception was the Labour party which entertained the possibility of a minority coalition 
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framework and applied to the New Zealand situation, specifically focusing on those 
factors that promote minority outcomes. Third, the theoretical findings are evaluated by 
those individuals who form government, the MPs themselves, in order to achieve an 
isomorphism between theory and reality. 
Methodology 
One of the study's guiding principles was to produce a work that reflects the reality it 
hopes to illuminate. As Browne and Dreijmanis observed, the accuracy and value of 
theories "depends upon achieving isomorphisms between the analyst's ascription of the 
empirical properties of a concept and the perception of those properties by actors in real 
social contexts118 • This observation suggests that many theories do nothing more than 
manipulate mathematical formula or present in-depth empirical analysis that results in 
the identification of obvious correlations. This thesis is mindful of this problem and has 
chosen the methodology and means of data collection accordingly. 
Methodologically, the study follows a comparative European approach but does 
not attempt yet another comparison between two similar countries. What it does is to 
logically model the costs and benefits of certain outcomes based on inductive theory 
leading to a number of general assumptions on government formation. Next, the author 
believes a researcher should, where possible, talk to the people who actually form 
governments - the MPs themselves. Admittedly, some of these individuals may be less 
than candid, but when a significant number of MPs concur on a particular point it 
becomes difficult to dismiss the validity of their combined perceptions. 
with NZF supported by the Alliance. 
8 Browne., E.C., and Dreijmanis, J.,(eds), (1982) Government Coalitions in Western Democracies, 
Longman, London, p. 338. 
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Therefore, the choice of collecting primary data was posited on two reasons. 
First, the literature reviewed revealed that many academic analyses had failed to 
adequately illuminate the subject they were studying. This failure was often caused by 
a reliance on untested assumptions which were then used as the basis of subsequent 
conclusions. This shortcoming is moderated here by testing each assumption in the 
questionnaire. The second reason interviews were selected over other research methods 
was the improved quality and quantity of the data. Other primary data analysis was 
unavailable: New Zealand has experienced less than three years of MMP and there is a 
lack of primary data to analyse. Additionally, secondary sources pose obvious 
problems for reliability of data and interpretation. 
After deciding to gather primary data the next stage was to select the soundest 
collection technique. Methodologically, face-to-face guided interviews provide the best 
results as they allow greater flexibility in the questioning process. This makes it easier 
for additional information to be uncovered through supplementary probing questions. 
Also, any terms that are unclear in the survey can be clarified ( ensuring a high level of 
uniformity in terminological comprehension) and the interviewer can ensure that 
questions are discussed in the same order. If another data collection method had been 
used, such as a mail questionnaire it would have been impossible to assure the integrity 
of the data and the subsequent empirical results might have been weakened. 
6 
The Organising Principle of this Thesis 
The study of government formation is a diverse and voluminous subject. Therefore, an 
organising principle is required to aid analysis and categorise the many areas each 
approach concentrates upon. The organising principle of this thesis divides government 
formation into three interconnected but distinct arenas: the internal party arena, the 
electoral arena and the parliamentary arena. This organising principle ( see Figure 1.1) 
aids in the analysis of existing theories and allows for the organisation of a theoretical 
framework. For example, a theory that explains government formation by post-election 
bargaining would fall within the parliamentary arena, whereas a theory that explained 
government formation as determined by elections would be included within the 
electoral arena. The arena principle is expanded upon in Chapter Three and is an 
important aspect of the theoretical framework. 
Figure 1.1 Arena Organising Principle 
Electoral Parliamentary 
Definition of Terms 
A number of definitions are necessary at the outset of this study. The two primary 
terms used in the thesis are majority government and minority government. In a 
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majority government one or more parties hold a simple majority in parliament9 • If two 
or more parties form a majority coalition government these parties are represented in 
cabinet. A minority government can either be single party or coalition, but it does not 
formally command a simple majority of parliamentary seats10 . In a minority 
government the party or parties that form the executive must rely on support from non-
governmental parties in order to govern 11 . 
The essential difference between a supported minority government and a 
majority coalition, for both this thesis and the vast bulk of government formation 
literature, is participation in cabinet12 . Two theorists who do not follow this definition 
are De Swan (1973) and Laver (1986) 13 • They consider certain minority administrations 
as majority governments because of stable voting alliances between governing and 
supporting parties, which for them implies a sort of de facto coalition. Additionally, a 
minority government may give non-cabinet portfolios to a supporting party which 
further strengthens this informal alliance. However, despite the ability of a party to 
support a government carte-blanche and maybe even administer non-cabinet portfolios, 
this situation is not a coalition because if a party is not in cabinet it is not part of 
government. 
This leads to a classification of government types according to their size and the 
number of parties involved. Figure 1.2 illustrates the types of minority and majority 
9 Boston, 1996, p. 92; Herman, V., and Pope, J., (1973), "Minority Governments in Western 
Democracies", British Journal of Political Science, vol.3, No.2, April, p.192. 
10 Woldendorp, J., Kernan, H., and Budge, I., (1998), "Party government in 20 Democracies: An update 
( 1990-1995)", European Journal of Political Research, vol 33, pp.127-128. 
11 The other situation which allows a minority government to govern would be the lack of organisation of 
the opposition. See Strom, 1990, pp.9-16. 
12 One notable exception to this definition is de Swaan, A., (1973) Coalition Theories and Cabinet 
Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European 
Parliaments After I 9 I 8, Amsterdam; Elsevier. De Swaan incorrectly defines a coalition to include 
supporting parties. This reduces the need to consider minority governments, as all governments 
become majoritarian coalitions of one form or another. 
13 As noted in Pridham, G., (eds), (1986), Coalition Behaviour in Theory and Practice, Cambridge 
University Press; Great Britain. 
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governments 14 . Two terms that require further explanation are Minimal Winning 
Coalitions (mwc) and Surplus Majority Coalitions (smc). A mwc is one where two or 
more parties control a majority of parliamentary seats; it is minimal in the sense that 
they do not include any party which is not necessary in order to reach a majority15 . For 
example the first MMP government in New Zealand was a mwc comprised of two 
parties, National and New Zealand First. A smc is where a coalition has more members 
than it needs to control a majority in parliament. For example, if ACT had joined 




Figure 1.2 Government Formation 
Majority 
Government 





Other terms that require definition are those used to describe party types. Sartori 
conceptualised this definitional problem by asking the question, "What parties are 
14 This is based on Herman and Pope's classification of governments, 1973, p. 192. 
15 Riker, W.H., (1962), The Theory Of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, London, p. 32-46. 
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relevant?" 16. His answer focused on a party's positioning along the left/right scale, its 
size and its ability to become part of government or influence the government17• The 
different approaches to defining parties is reflected in the literature through a multitude 
of terms: large and small18 ; centre and core19; major and minor; and, dominant20, weak, 
strong, merely strong or very strong21 • 
Theorists employ these different but often overlapping terms to indicate the main 
focus of their theories. For example, a small party (i.e. one that is significantly smaller 
than other parties) can be a very strong party in Laver and Shelpse's (1996) theory if it is 
positioned in the centre of the political spectrum and can "dominate the government 
fom1ation process"22 . In this definition the size of the party is not as important as its 
location and negotiating power. Therefore, the type of study the author is undertaking, 
and the message to be conveyed, dictates the definition of terms. 
This study aims to illuminate the process of government formation from a party-
centred approach. Inherent in this type of analysis is an evaluation of a party's power as 
this relates to the goals t~; can expect to attain in any government formation ';.i: 
negotiations. However, the judgement of party power and its subsequent effect on 
outcomes is conceptualised at the end of this study, after inductive theorising and 
empirical research. In one sense, the study makes an evaluation of party power 
differentials within the context of a particular party system as reflected in government 
formation negotiations. 
16 Sartori G., (1976), Party and Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 121. 
17 Ibid., p. 122-123. 
18 Boston, J., et al, (1996) New Zealand Under Proportional Representation , Auckland University Press 
with Bridget Williams Books, p 27 
l9 Laver, M., and Budge, I.,(eds), (1992), Party Policy and Government Coalitions, Mac Millian Press 
Ltd, London, p.427. 
20 Laver and Budge, op.cit. 
2 l Laver and Shepsle A.,(1996), Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in 
Parliamenta,y Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 90-119 
22 Laver and Shepsle, p. 69. 
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Taking into account this consideration, the following definitions of party types 
do not indicate a value judgement on their relative power, but indicate their ideological 
position on the left/right political spectrum vis-a-vis each other in combination with 
their size23 • Figure 1.3 below sets out the hypothetical party system this thesis employs. 
In Chapter Three it is used to analyse the cost and benefits of particular government 
outcomes and as such, it reflects the different types of parties this study is interested in. 
This five point party system was chosen for two reasons. First, it allows for an analysis 
of three groups of parties: major parties, centre third parties and wing third parties. 
Second, it reflects the present party system in New Zealand thereby making it relevant 
and applicable to MPs. 
Figure 1.3 Assumed Party System 
A B C D E 
LEFT RIGHT 
In this Figure there are three distinct types of parties: 
- B and D, are major parties because of their size relative to parties A/C/E. 
- A/C/E are third parties, however an important distinction exists between 
third parties which relates to their position vis-a-vis the major parties. 
- A and E are wing third parties as they exist on the outside of the major parties 
23 This measurement is the most widely used in modern liberal democracies to differentiate between 
parties and is one that still reflects the situation in New Zealand. 
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along the ideological left/right spectrum 
- C is a centre third party as it exists between the major parties. 
The definitions in this section are designed to provide a basis for the following study by 
minimising the confusion caused by inconsistent or subjective use of terms. Too often 
studies define terms in a particular way to reinforce their conclusions or minimise the 
weak points in an argument24 . This thesis uses language it believes is neutral, as it 
results from objective appraisals of empirical realities such as inclusion in cabinet and 
relative size. The te1ms are not intended to indicate any form of value judgement on 
what outcome is preferable or which party is strong or weak. 
Organisation of study 
The second chapter examines the literature on government formation from the formal 
(game/mathematical) and comparative approaches. The first section begins with a 
review of the early formal theorists from the mid 1940s and how they concentrated on 
identifying which units to examine and the motivations of political actors. Next, 
contemporary formal theorists are evaluated, focusing on how they extended and refined 
their methodology. The second section looks at the comparative European approach 
and analyses how it has aided the study of government formation. The next section 
concentrates solely on minority government explanations. The final section comes to a 
conclusion on the literature's overall contribution, and suggests five areas or foci that 
have to be considered when analysing government formation. 
24 For example, de Swaan's definition of a coalition reduces his need t~ consider minority governments 
and makes his theory appear more sound. 
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Chapter Three employs the findings from the literature review and presents a 
broad schema of analysis on government formation. Section one examines the general 
framework for government formation and expands on the three arenas organising 
principle. The next section looks at specific variables that impact on government 
formation processes and is summarised in a Table of General Assumptions (3.1). The 
final section combines the party system framework with the theoretical assumptions, 
resulting in a cost/benefit model which suggests the anticipated effects on each party 
from twelve politically viable government formation outcomes. 
Chapter four transforms the theoretical suggestions into a questionnaire which 
was presented to MPs. The first part of the questionnaire asked general questions on 
MMP and government formation. While part two contrasted which factors MPs thought 
should be important in government formation negotiations with those that were 
important in the actual 1996 negotiations. Following this, questions were asked about 
the trade-offs that occur when considering minority or majority options. A scenario was 
then presented to MPs where they had to indicate their preferred government outcome. 
The concluding, chapter brings together the earlier theorising and re-examines 
these findings in light of the questionnaire results. A review of the major findings 
highlights those factors that the study indicates are of central importance to government 
formation. Finally, it reconciles the empirical findings with the hypothesis, showing 
how this study has added to the body of literature on general government formation and 
government formation in New Zealand. 
In summary, this thesis collected sufficient information to evaluate the hypothesis and 
achieved its goal of reflecting reality by attaining a 40% response rate amongst sitting 
MPs. The empirical evidence indicates that in New Zealand the following three 
13 
variables have a determining influence on government formation negotiations: (1) the 
ability to use ministerial direction to maximise policy influence; (2) the potential for 
inter-caucus alliances and their effect on party cohesion within a coalition; and (3), the 
perceived impact of collective cabinet responsibility and its negative effects on a junior 
coalition partner. The author anticipates that if these variables continue to be perceived 
by MPs as they currently are, then New Zealand is likely to have more single party and 




The focus of this literature review is on government formation and looks at both general 
formation and specific minority government theories. The aim is to find those variables 
that are important in explaining both general and minority government formation from 
within the existing body of literature. To accomplish this, the literature is analysed in 
an attempt to illuminate those trends and maxims that theorists believe are substantively 
important. This analysis considers the two main theoretical approaches: Formal 
(game/mathematical) and Comparative. 
The review focuses on five important components in the analysis of government 
formation. Throughout the literature, explanations by various theorists are analysed on 
their own merits and in relation to the following five components. These were chosen 
after a preliminary analysis of the literature, and then reapplied during the subsequent 
analysis in order to trace the history and development of each subject. These five 
components are: 
(1) Unitary actor and intra-party considerations; 
(2) Policy space modelling; 
(3) Formation arenas; 
(4) Conceptions of the Opposition; 
(5) Time. 
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One aspect of government formation theory that must be addressed before 
looking at each approach is the assumed motivation of parties and individuals within the 
political systems. The debate within government formation literature centres on 
whether parties (and by definition individuals) are office-seeking or policy-seeking 
entities. This is of fundamental importance to any theory as assumptions on an actors 
motivations affects any further conceptualisations on government formation. 
Within formation literature, the office-seeking approach is one of the two main 
assumptions on what motivates a party. This approach assumes that major political 
parties aim exclusively at gaining the largest possible share of office pay-off by 
obtaining 50% plus one of the legislative seats. When this is attained a party can 
maximise its office rewards by forming a government. These rewards are, ideally, 
100% of the cabinet seats and control of important committees. Thus, the office-
seeking approach believes selfish actors play a zero-sum game based solely on material 
rewards25 . 
One early office-seeking approach was Riker's (1962), The Theory of Political 
Coalitions. He suggested that when a party cannot form a single party majoritarian 
government, it would attempt to bring about a minimal winning coalition (nrwc/6, an 
outcome where no superfluous parties are included over the minimum number needed 
for a majority. This model assumes parties are office maximisers, who do not want to 
share the rewards of office needlessly. Therefore, in Riker's mwc model the sole aim of 
the "electoral game" is to win votes in order to gain as many seats as possible, and thus 
maximise office pay-offs27 . 
25 Budge, I.,and Kernan, H., (1990) Parties and Democracy, Oxford University Press, USA, p.11. 
26 Riker, p.40. 
27 Ibid. 
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An alternative conceptualisation to the office-seeking approach models parties 
as primarily policy-seekers. Policy based theories assume that any coalition or minority 
government is in some sense predictable from the parties' policy positions. Leiserson 
(1966) was one of the first theorists to assume that policy as well as office motivated 
some parties28 . He predicted that coalitions would only form between parties which had 
minimal ideological diversity29• 
From these modest beginnings theories with tentative policy-based assumptions 
increased in number. The first occasion where policy was employed as the central 
theoretical feature has been attributed to de Swaan (1973), a formal theorist, who 
believed policy was predominant over selfish office maximising behaviour. He 
assumed that "an actor strives to be included in a winning coalition, that he expects to 
adopt a policy, which is as close as possible to his own most preferred policy. This 
implies that considerations of policy are foremost in the minds of the actors and the 
parliamentary game is, in fact, about the determination of major government policy1130• 
Theories employing policy based assumptions began in the formal approach 
with researchers such as de Swaan, and then gained acceptance in the comparative 
European approach. Two of the early seminal works following this approach were by 
Browne and Franklin (1973) and Lawrence Dodd (1976). Browne and Franklin 
believed that "most political parties have policy goals, such expectations will reasonably 
include pay-offs in the form of policy prerogatives"31 • Browne, Franklin and Dodd's 
28 Van Roozendaal, P .,( 1992) Cabinets In Multi-Party Democracies, Thesis Publishers, Amsterdam, p.11. 
29 Ibid. 
30 de Swaan, A.,(1973) p.88. 
31 Browne, E.C., and Franklin, M.N.,(1973) "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary 
Democracies", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, p.453. 
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works were "bridge building", as they drew heavily upon the concepts and terminology 
of game theory but followed a comparative inductive methodology32 . 
Both formal and comparative theorists now largely agree that policy motivations 
provide a better explanation of the driving force behind political parties. This does not 
mean the office-seeking approach is unimportant in the literature. There are two 
methodological reasons why this assumption is difficult to use. First, the symbiotic 
nature of policy and office motivations makes it problematic to decide which is 
predominant for any given actor, thus it is a difficult variable to identify and measure. 
Second, attributing too much weight to the office-seeking assumption makes it difficult 
to explain other types of government formation, such as minority governments or 
surplus majority governments. 
Before concluding a discussion on party motivations, mention must be made of 
the numerous party and democracy theorists who argue that vote-seeking is a third 
motivation of political parties33 . Surprisingly, within government formation literature 
this motivation is not directly dealt with, as office and policy influence maximisation 
both require vote maximisation. The difference between these two groups is that the 
democracy theorists believe vote-seeking is a normative goal, whereas formation 
theorists feel it is an instrumental process. This thesis follows the reasoning of 
democracy theorists and assumes vote-seeking to be a motivating force for political 
parties and an integral part of government formation 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, all three motivations; vote-seeking; 
office-seeking; and, policy-seeking, are deemed to affect political parties. This is not to 
say all politicians are equally concerned with all three, for in every country some 
32For example, the most frequently cited works in Browne and Franklin are Riker, Gamson and Leiserson. 
Dodd also cites heavily from these formal theorists, but equally as heavily from comparative theorists 
such as Lowell and Blondel. 
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politicians have the reputation of being populist and of openly pursuing office pay-offs. 
However, as long as policy is important to voters and votes to politicians, then parties 
must heed and pursue the policy priorities of their supporters. A pragmatic approach to 
party motivations must acknowledge that all three are relevant and must be considered 
in any analysis of government formation. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
examines the formal (game/mathematical) approach, looking at how the first formal 
theorists ( or primary theorists) explained government formation, and then looks at 
present formal theorists (or contemporary theorists). The second section examines the 
comparative European approach, concentrating on the theorist's use of variables and 
assumptions. The third section looks specifically at minority government formation 
literature and the final section offers a conclusion. 
2.1 Formal Approach: Game Theoretic I Mathematical 
The game theoretic/mathematical method of analysis was founded by van Neumann 
(1947), a mathematician, and Morgenstern (1947), an economist, who collaborated to 
produce a game theoretic model that could be applied to social phenomena34. This 
provided social science with a pure sciences based tool to analyse social phenomena, 
that was deductive in logic and predictive in nature. As such, game theory uses 
mathematical analysis to discover rational outcomes in conflict situations. 
The approach utilises the concept of the rational actor. That is, an actor who 
"chooses from the alternative courses of action open to him the one that leads to the 
33 Informal interviews with A. Lijphart convinced me of the necessity to deal with this point. 
34 Van Neumann and Morgenstern, (1947), The01y of Games and Economic Behaviour, 2nd ed, Pub. 
Princetown University Press, USA. 
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most preferred outcome or the outcome with the greatest utility [i.e. maximisation of 
goods and services]"35 . In its most basic form, these actors participate in a one-off 
conflictual game with the aim of maximising pay-offs. Additionally, they possess 
perfect knowledge (i.e., the ramifications of any decisions are known by all 
participants), and any deals struck between actors are endogenously enforceable36. 
The aims of formal theorists are twofold. First, they seek to provide a general 
explanation of government formation in non-majoritarian situations by demonstrating 
the applicability of game/mathematical modelling. Second, they aim to improve the 
overall understanding of the phenomenon under study. A leading scholar in this field 
confirmed this supposition by saying, "In the long run, I am not interested per se in 
understanding coalition governments. Rather, I believe that the abstract framework 
outlined above can give some specific and intuitively plausible reasons how and why 
the politics of Britain, the USA, Japan, Germany, Russia, Israel and Mexico (to name 
just a few) are so different"37. 
2.1.1 Analysis, Critique and Evaluation of Formal Theories 
Formal theories focus primarily on inter-party negotiation within the parliamentary 
arena. Coalition formation is discussed from the viewpoint of competing entities, 
defined as autonomous parties, in a post-election environment. As Narud (1996) 
observes, "Most formal models of coalition formation treat political parties as unitary 
actors. That is, they have tended to assume a bargaining environment more or less free 
35 d e Swaan, 1973, p.20. 
36 This synopsis of formal theories holds true for most of the literature However Laver, M., and, Shepsle 
(1996) depart from some of the common tenets of game theory, for example by dropping the 
endogenously enforceable assumption. 
37 Schofield, N.,(1997), "Reflections: Coalition politics and representative democracy", European Journal 
20 
from constraints, such as the functional differences of factions within the party or the 
interests and preferences of party followers"38 . 
This methodological flaw has recently been addressed in the work of two 
leading formal theorists Laver and Shelspe (1999) 39. In "How Parties Emerged From 
the Primeval Slime", they "sketch"40 the outlines of a formal model based on their 
portfolio allocation approach that encompasses the effect of intra-party politics on the 
making and breaking of governments. Unfortunately, the gain made by including this 
assumption results in a significant increase in theoretical complexity. This point is 
acknowledged by the authors who say, "now things get really complicated"41 • 
Therefore, it appears that this initial attempt by formal theorists to employ realistic 
assumptions may be a dubious exercise, as formal models cannot adequately handle the 
increase in variables. 
The approach taken by Laver and Shelpse (1999) reflects the most dominant 
analytical framework within formal theory, the "Spatial Theory of Electoral 
Competition" (STEC)42 . STEC conceptualises a two-dimensional policy space where 
each point shows a party's position on two issues. In this model each party's two 
dimensional policy points are plotted and then lines are drawn between each point, 
resulting in intersections that indicate areas of possible agreement43 . The spaces within 
the lines are then analysed to uncover all potential winning coalitions. As Figure 2.1 
shows, STEC results in a core that is an area as in (a), or a point as in (b ). The party 
of Political Research, Vol. 31, No.1-2, Special Issue, p.188. 
3s d Naru ,1995, p.500. 
39 Laver, M., and Shelpse,K.A., (1999), "How Political Parties Emerged From the Primeval 
Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments', in Bowler, S., Farrell, 
D.M., Katz, R.S., (eds), (1990), Party Discipline and Parliamentmy Government, Ohio State 
University. 
40 Ibid., p.46. 
41 Ibid., p.39. 
42 Sened, I.,(1996), "A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence", Journal of Politics , Vol. 
58, No. 2, p.352. 
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that occupies the core position is seen to be in an advantageous position and therefore 
able to move the policy of any coalition towards its own preferences44 • 
Figure 2.1 Two Dimensional Spatial Representations of the Theory of the Core45 
(a) Core is an area (b) Core is a point 
The dominance of STEC leads to another important concept within the formal 
literature, namely the core or pivotal player. This concept suggests particular parties 
have an advantageous position in the bargaining game because of: (a) a party's location 
in ideological/policy space, determined by the position it holds in relation to other 
parties in the party system; and (b ), a party's size, measured in the number of legislative 
votes it controls in relation to the other parties. 
One of the first theorists to employ this concept was de Swaan (1973) and his 
"pivotal player" idea 46 • He defines this actor as one who may swing the vote or hold the 
balance in a coalition situation, thereby controlling the negotiation "game"47 . 
Subsequently, it seems every important theorist in this field employs the controlling 
r 43 Budge and Kernan, 1990, pp.20 - 21. 
44 Ibid. 
45 reproduced from Budge and Kernan, 1990, p.20. 
46 d e Swaan,1973, p.89. 
47 Ibid. 
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player concept. For example, Grofman (1982) calls it a "core party"48 , van Roozendaal 
(1992) a "dominant party"49, Schofield (1993) a "strong party"50, and Laver and Shepsle 
(1996) a "very strong party", or "strong party" or, "merely strong party"51 . 
Overall, formal theorists can be divided into two groups: the primary theorists 
who founded this approach and the contemporary theorists who have extended formal 
theorising to its present level. Riker, Axelrod, and de Swaan are examples of primary 
formal theorists who have contributed to the understanding of government formation in 
multi-party systems. They took the "tool" developed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern and applied it to the area of government formation. From this beginning, 
they identified some important variables such as the centrality of parties, their 
motivations and the nature of political pay-offs. Contemporary theorists such as van 
Roozendaal, Schofield, Laver and Shepsle, have extended game/mathematic modelling, 
and have confirmed one of the formal approaches' most powerful conclusions namely, 
"when only one policy dimension is important, the party controlling the median 
legislator on that dimension is effectively a policy dictator"52 • 
In terms of satisfying the aims of formal theorists, the application of 
game/theoretic mathematical modelling has become a "major academic industry"53 , with 
the boundaries of the approach being continually tested and advanced. For example, 
Laver and Shepsle (1996, 1999) try to work around some of the limiting assumptions of 
formalistic approaches and make their ideas fit closer to the reality under study. 
However, as with many other formal works, these pieces are of more interest for those 
48 Groffman, B.,(1982), "A Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation in Ideological N-Space" in 
Behavioural Science, Vol.27, pp.77-90. 
49 Van Roozendaal, 1992 
50 Schofield, N.,(1993), "Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments", 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1-33. 
51 Laver and Shepsle, 1996 
52 Laver and Budge,1992, p.2. 
53 Ibid. 
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who wish to study formalistic technique rather than those who wish to understand the 
politics of government formation. 
The narrow approach by formal theorists and their failure to produce 
isomorphisms between theory and reality, is reflected in the approach's failure to 
explain minority governments54. For example, theorists such as Riker, Axelrod and de 
Swaan impose a majority winning criterion in all their games55• Therefore, they cannot 
predict non-winning coalitions as rational outcomes, and non-winning coalitions are 
usually equated with minority cabinets56. This led to the belief that minority 
governments were the result of unstable political systems, and consequently they are 
treated as sub-optimal solutions within game theoretic/mathematical models57 . Thus, 
formalistic theories find it difficult to explain any situation that is non-majoritarian. 
Some formal theorists try and overcome this weakness by defining minority 
governments as de facto majority coalitions. For example, de Swaan's (1973) definition 
of a coalition includes most minority governments as, "when evidence is available as to 
the existence of a more or less permanent parliamentary majority coalition that supports 
this minority government, the analysis of such a coalition proceeds as in the normal 
Contemporary formal theorists in responding to this criticism have attempted to 
modify their theories and offer some explanations for minority governments. For 
example, Laver and Shepsle (1996) explain minority governments as occurring due to a 
combination of party strength59 and the lack of an opposing co-ordinated majority6°. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Laver and Budge,1992, p.4. and Strom,1990, p.37. and Herman and Pope, 1973, p.191. 
56 Van Roozendaal,1992, p.18. 
57 Laver and Budge, ibid. 
58 de Swaan,1973, p.144. 
59 Sh·ength is a combination of how many seats a party holds in the legislature and their policy position, 
see Laver and Shepsle, 1996, pp.102 - 117 and p.203. 
60 Laver and Shepsle,1996, p.263. 
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Schofield's (1993) explanation rests on the occurrence of a strong or dominant party, in 
combination with a particular type of party system, i.e., "in unipolar systems ... the large 
party generally dominates coalition politics, and often forms a minority government" 61 • 
Generally, despite these efforts the contribution of formal theorists to the understanding 
of minority government is limited. Their methodology largely precludes the inclusion 
of variables that are dynamic and difficult to quantify such as party cohesion or future 
electoral costs . 
Another methodological weakness in formal theory is caused by the assumptions 
that must be made in order to translate reality into mathematical formula. For example, 
the basic assumption common to all game/mathematical modelling is that of rationality. 
Rationality presupposes that there is "an optimal correspondence between means and 
ends... where the 'actors identity' and goals are established and the rules of the 
interaction are precise and known to the interacting agents"62 . Rationality assumes that 
politics is a complex yet predictable game. This is inconsistent with observable reality, 
as party goals and actions are not always clear and actors have to make decisions based 
on social psychological considerations and imperfect knowledge that lie beyond the 
scope of mathematical analyses. Therefore, an actor's decisions are not just "problems" 
to be settled by the straightforward application of rational behaviour principles63 . 
Overall, formal theories fail to reflect the reality they hope to illuminate. The 
reasons for this are: (a) the inability to achieve an "isomorphism"64 between the 
analyst's ascription of the empirical properties of a concept and the perception of those 
properties by actors in the real social contexts; and (b ), the tendency to, "produce highly 
61 Schofield,1993, p.2. 
62 Wood, S., and McLean, 1.,(1995), "Recent Work in Game Theory and Coalition Theory", Political 
Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp.704 - 705. 
63 Browne, and Dreijmanis, 1982, p.337. 
64 Ibid. 
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complex models of great internal rigour whose results are too closely tied to model-
specific assumptions, and which significantly fail to account for what happens in the 
real world"65• 
Formal approaches have another serious limitation relating to the static nature of 
their theories, which assumes players have a fixed policy position throughout a 
negotiation. This is an unrealistic assumption as policy trade-offs occur and positions 
may change throughout the course of government formation negotiations. For example, 
parties that are future-oriented may be willing to forgo immediate pay-offs for long term 
gains66 . Also, government negotiation is not a one-off game; it is part of a continually 
repeating process in which parties apply knowledge from past experiences to present 
situations and future actions. 
Finally, a general criticism of this approach is derived from the orgamsmg 
schema of this thesis. Formal theories attempt to explain government formation within 
only one arena, the parliamentary arena. STEC may appear to be placed within the 
electoral arena, but the spatial representation of policy merely describes ideological 
constraints on and between parties when they enter into post-election bargaining. 
Overall, formal theorists find it problematic to expand their models to include variables 
from other arenas as it significantly increases the theories' complexity without 
necessarily improving their explanatory power. 
In summary, the preceding synopsis of formal government formation literature has 
suggested a dichotomy between the seminal works of primary theorists and recent 
contemporary explanations. The primary works grappled with the question of 
motivation and the units of analysis. They aimed to increase the understanding of 
65 Wood and Mclean,1995, p.714. 
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government by using formalistic tools to explain a political phenomenon. However, the 
formal approach at some point departed from this path and now it appears government 
formation is a subject employed to extend game/mathematical theorising. Admittedly, 
this maybe a harsh criticism, but one which holds true for much of the current literature. 
With regard to minority and other non-minimal winning government outcomes, 
formal theories are of limited explanatory value due to their methodological rigidity. 
However, they have advanced significantly since Riker and de Swaan and may in the 
future provide a more dynamic, multifaceted explanation. The theories of Schofield, 
and Laver and Shepsle support this suggestion. However, these theorists need to move 
beyond the pivotal importance placed on large/dominant parties and include dynamic 
elements which take into account multiple arenas and non-static time lines. 
2.2 Comparative European Approach 
The comparative European approach has a long history and seeks to bring a greater 
understanding into many areas of politics. Methodologically, it follows an inductive 
path that begins by abstracting general elements from the phenomenon under study and 
forming assumptions. These assumptions are phrased into hypotheses and then tested 
empirically to see how they correspond with reality. This approach has the following 
three broad aims67 . First, to provide a general descriptive context for the subject under 
study; second, to improve classifications; and third, to aid prediction, as the knowledge 
provided by comparative analysis helps actors within politics make decisions. When all 
~ 66 Thus, parties maybe perceived as acting "irrationally". 
67 Hague, R., Harrop, M., Breslin, S., (1994), Comparative Government and Politics, MacMillan Press, 
London, pp.23 - 25. 
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these aims have been attained an explanation of the phenomenon under study 1s 
possible. 
It is in this approach that the five areas of focus are most clearly seen. For 
example, the unitary actor assumption undergoes considerable change which allows 
intra-party variables to be included in explanations. The value of policy space 
modelling is evaluated and placed in perspective. Furthermore, the dynamic 
relationship between formation arenas is highlighted, as is the importance of a non-
static conceptualisation of time. And finally, the role of the Opposition is evaluated and 
recast to go beyond the classical belief that its sole aim is to replace the government. 
2.2.1 Analysis, Criticism and Evaluation of Comparative Theories 
One of the earliest comparative theorists to develop a comprehensive explanation for 
cabinet formation and durability was Lawrence Dodd (1979). His work sought to 
bridge the divide between game theorists and comparative theorists68 . For example, 
Dodd writes, "the theory is not a rigorously deductive, mathematically verified system", 
and "relies on a modification of the general game-theoretic model presented by William 
Riker"69 . Briefly, Dodd's thesis suggested that when parties show a high willingness to 
bargain in combination with information certainty, then winning coalitions will almost 
always form70. When there is a low willingness to bargain (because of polarisation, 
:fractionalisation and instability) combined with information uncertainty, then under-
68 Van Roozendaal,1992, pp.20-21. 
69 Dodd, L.,(1979), Coalitions In Parliamentmy Government, Princetown University Press, 
UK, pp.19 and 34. 
70 Luebbert, G.M.,(1983), "Coalition Theory and Government Formation in Multiparty Democracies" 
Comparative Politics, January, p.238 
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sized or minority cabinets will form. However, when the willingness to bargain is high 
oversized cabinets will appear (see Table 2.1 below)71 • 
Table 2.1 Dodd's Thesis on Government Formation Outcomesll. 
Party System Information Willingness Predicted 
Certainty to Bargain Outcome 
polarised 
fractionalised + uncertainty + low = minority cabinet 
unstable 
depolarised 
factionalised + uncertainty + high = oversized cabinet 
unstable 
depolarised 
defractionalised+ certainty + high 
I • • I 
= mm1mum wmmng 
stable 
On the subject of non-majoritarian outcomes, Dodd believes minority 
governments result from unstable, factionalised and polarised party systems. This 
confirms his perception that any cabinet that is non-winning in terms of commanding a 
legislative majority is "deviant"73• Therefore, Dodd's theory is more complete than 
those of formal theorists as he suggests an explanation for minority situations. However 
in doing so, he believes minority cabinets are not normal or preferred outcomes. Rather 
symptoms of political instability and crisis 74• 
Dodd's theory focuses on negotiation in the parliamentary arena, tempered by 
constraints from the party arena. Within these arenas he assumes that political parties 
71 This summary ofDodd's theory has been derived from Dodd, 1976, pp. 35-53 and from the Table 
complied by Roozendaal,1992,p.22. 
72 • 
adapted from Roozendaal, p. 22. 




are homogeneous units despite acknowledging, "parliamentary parties are not 
homogeneous and monolithic entities, but are themselves coalitions of factions"75 . His 
justification for this is to make "a reasonably realistic theory", and intra-party 
considerations can therefore be attempted later "after a simple framework has been 
constructed and tested"76 • 
Another important contribution to the literature comes from Budge and Herman 
(1978). They criticise existing research for being unrealistic and concentrating too 
heavily on minimal winning coalitions, ideological diversity and size77. Budge and 
Herman sought to overcome this limitation by "modifying assumptions and criteria in 
order to incorporate the substantive considerations that politicians do consciously use 
when they form governments"78 . Unfortunately, their four assumptions are so broad 
that they encompass every type of government formation. For example, assumption one 
is worded to include any size government, minority or surplus, by concentrating on 
legislative majorities in a vote of confidence. Overall, the theory's central variable is 
ideology, i.e., "we posit that where left/right ideological differences strongly affect 
issues, these will be of more importance than all other considerations in the formation of 
a government"79. 
From their assumptions Budge and Herman derive explanatory criteria that are 
then used to classify most government situations. These classifications rely heavily on 
left/right differences and majorities or near majorities. Conceptually, these left/right 
differences are tantamount to ideology, and the use of majorities or near majorities is 
('----- 74 Strom, K.,1984, p.205. 
75 Dodd, p.34. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Budge, I., and Herman, V., (1978) "Coalitions and Government formation: An Empirically Relevant 
Theory", British Journal of Political Science, No.8, p.459. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., p.460. 
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another way of conceptualising size. Therefore, Budge and Herman fail conceptually to 
overcome the weaknesses they perceive in other coalition theories80 . 
Organisationally, Herman and Budge focus on the parliamentary arena, 
tempered with constraints from the electoral arena. They are aware that ideological 
concerns affect bargaining positions, and this is reflected in the reliance on left/right 
differences to explain government formation. Overall, the theory focuses exclusively 
on the parliamentary arena and treats parties as homogeneous units. Because of this, 
the actions of actors and the decisions they make are not illuminated to a sufficient 
degree, undermining the explanatory value of this contribution to the literature. 
The theoretical limitations of Dodd, Budge, Herman and others were addressed 
by a small group of comparative theorists who sought to overcome these deficiencies 
through the "case studies approach"81 • These authors developed a descriptive case 
study, or country specific analysis that focused on individual political systems82 • The 
three most cited works of this group are Browne and Dreijmanis (1982), Bogdanor 
(1983), and Pridham (1986)83• These studies broke new ground in the study of 
government fom1ation by utilising more variables and identifying more causal 
relationships. While each study enriches the contextual understanding through 
description, the conceptual basis underlying the substantive treatments differs across 
these works84 . 
Pridham is one of the approach's best examples, in that he calls for more than 
just a collection of country specific analyses. His criticisms are directed at formal 
80 However, they do achieve a sound match with reality as, "the proportion fitted by the combined criteria 
is a remarkable .85", ibid., p.478. 
81 Browne, E.C. and Franklin, M.N., (1986) "Editors introduction: New Directions in Coalition 
Research", Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, No.4, p.472. 
82 Laver and Budge, 1992, p.xx. 
83 Browne, and Dreijmanis; Bogdanor, V., (1983), Coalition Government in Western Politics, Heineman, 
London; Pridham, 1986. 
84 Browne, and Franklin, 1986, pp.472-473. 
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theorists for unrealistic assumptions, and at comparative theorists for failing to grasp the 
complexity of the phenomenon under study. He believes that in order to gain a proper 
understanding of coalition behaviour an inductive theory is needed that offers 
substantially more scope: 
To mention only some [ of] the very dynamics of coalition relations, as a continuous 
process ... the dynamics of internal relationships within individual parties, such as the 
changing positions of leaders and changing balance between factions; and, 
generally, the dynamics of party development, notably the rising and declining 
fortunes of parties within party systems and changes in their constituencies85 • 
Pridham's work marks an important juncture in government formation literature 
as it goes beyond the constraining outlook of earlier comparative theorists. He suggests 
that a party's internal structure and divisions, together with historical constraints and 
future considerations, play an important part in government formation. Furthermore, he 
expands the number of arenas in which government formation takes place, arguing that 
both the electoral arena and international arena can affect government formation 
outcomes. 
Luebbert, (1983,1984,1986) 1s another comparative theorist who seeks to 
address weaknesses in government formation research. He asserts that both game 
theory and comparative theory are limited in their explanatory power by the use of 
parsimonious models and abstract assumptions86• Unlike Pridham, Luebbert proposes a 
typological-rational approach dominated by system characteristics. His typology is 
built on two key variables, regime legitimacy and the role of the Opposition 87. 
The regime legitimacy variable distinguishes between regimes with established 
legitimacy and those without and is based on whether the party system includes an anti-
democratic party. The role of the Opposition is divided into those systems where 




parties play a classical role (to bring down government), and those where the 
Opposition role is tempered by efforts to participate in policy-making. The bargaining 
relationships within coalition negotiations are classified as either tangental, convergent 
or divergent. For example, in consensual democracies Luebbert assumes negotiations 
will be characterised by convergent or tangenf al preferences, while in conflictual 1\ 
I 
democracies by divergent preferences88 . 
A difficulty with Luebbert's approach is "the rather vague definition of most of 
the key concepts, and in particular his rather ad hoc classification of polities"89 . 
Nevertheless, his theory has made a distinctive and important contribution to the study 
of government formation because of its emphasis on intra-party politics, a heavily 
under-utilised focus elsewhere in the literature90 • Luebbert argues that intra-party 
constraints determine what policies and office party leaders will pursue. He also argues 
that leaders are primarily concerned with maintaining their position, increasing party 
support and maximising party cohesion91 . 
Lubbert's view on bargaining as constrained by intra-party considerations has a 
major impact on the type of government he predicts will form. Minority governments 
are explained as occurring primarily in consensual democracies, such as Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark. These countries are characterised by what Luebbert believes is a 
high degree of "corporatism and an unpolarised party system"92 . Corporatism allows the 
Opposition to influence government policy and this can increase the probability of 
87 Ibid. 
88 Roozendaal, p.24. 
89 Laver and Schofield, 1991, p.109. 
90 Ibid, p.29. 
91 Luebbert,1984, pp.237-238. 
92 Ibid, p.243 and p.261. 
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minority government, as parties do not need to attain office in order to satisfy policy 
goals93 . 
Luebbert's work responds to some of Pridham's criticisms about the narrowness 
of comparative approaches. He clearly believes that intra-party concerns are central to 
any understanding of government formation, and that the standard unitary actor 
assumption is a conceptual weakness. Additionally, the manner in which he discusses 
the role of the Opposition (i.e., classical or non-classical) does illuminate the possibility 
that calling all non-governmental parties "the Opposition" is overly simplistic. 
A more recent attempt to explain government formation is suggested by Budge 
and Kernan (1990) in Parties and Democracy94. This book develops and extends an 
earlier article by Budge and Kernan (1978) and proposes an integrated theory of 
democratic party government in parliamentary systems. The authors take an holistic 
approach and try to explain democratic government by analysing the outcomes of 
succeeding elections, tracing the interaction of party goals, government formation, 
policy outputs and government duration. 
Budge and Keman's expansive approach reflects a dynamic conceptualisation of 
time and an acceptance that government formation takes place in multiple and 
interlocking arenas. This is done in order to redress "an odd aspect of current theory 
that...concentrates attention on the formation of the current government, ignoring the 
possibility that politicians may have somewhat longer time-perspective's extending at 
least as far as the next government... "95 . This conceptualisation of time finds its clearest 
expression in the major implications of the general assumptions number 6.1 which 
93 Corporatism is defined as the pattern of co-operation between interest groups and the executive of the 
central government in the formulation, implementation and administration of public policy, refer Laver 
and Schofield, p.77. 
94 Budge, I.,and Kernan, H., (1990) Parties and Democracy, Oxford University Press, USA. 
95 Ibid., p.60. 
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states that a party will lose future electoral support if it fails to "carry through its 
declared policies in government"96 • 
This assumption presumably covers both majority and minority governments 
and asserts that parties in government have future constraints based on their bargaining 
positions. However, despite Budge and Keman's holistic approach they do not employ 
this assumption widely enough. They apply it to situations with already established 
governments, suggesting that an administration considers future policy costs. It is not 
applied to the period after an election before a government is formed. This is a period 
where parties are aware of the possible policy trade-offs each must make if they wish to 
achieve parliamentary office. 
Another important theoretical development in Parties and Democracy is the 
acceptance that parties are not unified actors. This assumption is justified as the authors 
believe, "within parties, and subject to overall policy agreements and disciplinary and 
procedural constraints, factions seek to transform their own policy preferences into 
government policy"97 . This departure from the unified actor assumption addresses some 
of Luebbert's and Pridham's criticisms, and reflects Budge and Keman's aim to 
incorporate "a view of parties as significant, if not the most significant actors within 
parliamentary democracies"98 . 
Parties and Democracy also offers a more complete explanation of minority 
government, although it does not directly answer the question of why minority 
governments form. Policy considerations are used to explain why parties outside 
government may tolerate those in office, i.e., as policy motivated entities they prefer to 
support a minority government that "offers a better chance of the party's policies being 
96 Ibid., p.50. 
97 Ibid., p.34. 
98 Ibid., p.189. 
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put into effect than any of the other likely altematives"99 • This explanation does not 
extend to answering why a policy motivated entity might prefer to stay outside of 
government. However, Budge and Keman's earlier explanation that minority 
government results from disorganised and factionalised Oppositions does not appear in 
this work. Presumably, the Opposition parties' concerns with policy explain the 
fractionalisation and subsequent disorganisation. 
Overall, Budge and Kernan do not extend the literature on government 
formation to a significant degree. To attain a high level of predictive accuracy they 
over-generalise and make their theory contingent on a variety of situational variables 1°0. 
For example, many predictions rely on loosely defined concepts like "normal parties of 
government11101, and levels of "viable majorities11102 . However, while not offering many 
new insights, Budge and Keman's work does draw the focus back towards parties, and 
supplements (rather than extends) the existing literature. 
A more significant work in the field of government formation is a 
comprehensive cross-national study edited by Laver and Budge (1992), Party Policy 
and Government Coalitions. This study focuses on the connection between the party 
and parliamentary arenas and seeks to explore how the electoral programs of political 
parties relate to the policies of coalition governments. The editors assume that there 
must be some connection between the policies parties promote at election time and 
subsequent government policies, for "if government policy does not respond to the 
policies of elected government members ... then the purpose of having elections is 
obscure" 103 . 
99 Ibid., p.49. 
100 Ibid., pp.74-87. 
tot Ibid., see Table 2.3 p.44. 
102 Ibid., p.40 and p.198. 
103 Laver and Budge, 1992, p.409. 
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Party Policy and Government Coalitions tests ten policy-based models for their 
predictive ability and level of "efficiency"104 . The theories range from defining policy 
space uni-dimensionally, to policy spaces operationalised in twenty dimensions. The 
results led Laver and Budge to conclude, "as often as not, a simple policy-space based 
on the left/right dimension is the best indicator, suggesting that policy has a relatively 
simple impact on coalition bargaining"105 . These findings are important for the future 
direction of research as they highlight how influential policy is to coalition bargaining. 
Conversely, they also reduce its previously assumed explanatory value. This leads to 
the conclusion that future theorists need to be aware that policy based spatial modelling 
is a useful tool, but not necessarily a complete answer. Theory, therefore, must look in 
other directions to increase our understanding of government formation and go beyond 
those variables which reveal commonality between actors, to those which reveal the 
constraints on (and within) negotiating entities. 
A subsequent article by Strom, Laver and Budge (1994) looks at constraints on 
coalition bargaining, as it is a "previously neglected topic in the study of parliamentary 
governments"106 . The primary focus of the article is on institutional constraints, with a 
lesser emphasis on intra and inter-party constraints. Institutional constraints are 
situations where constitutional rules may preclude some governments from forming 
because oflanguage or investiture requirements ( such as Belgium and Israel) 107 . Intra-
party constraints include such variables as constraints on leaders generated by having to 
consider the security of their position and the cohesion of their party. 
104 Ibid., p.415. 
105 Ibid., p.429. 
106 Strom, K., Budge, I., Laver, M., (1994) "Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary 
Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, Vol.38, No.2, May, p.331. 
107 Ibid., pp. 320-321. 
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In relation to the three arenas framework, this article reinforces its relevance in a 
number of ways. First, the areas of constraints are categorised as occurring within 
parliament, electoral systems and within/between parties108 . This fits closely with the 
three arenas organising principle of this thesis. Second, the article defines constraints 
based on a time frame and implies that actors are restricted in making decisions because 
of long-term ramifications. The conclusion the authors reach is that all bargaining 
constraints are critical for theories. Thus, the article is important within government 
formation literature for three reasons: first, it answers some of the criticisms of Pridham 
et al; second, it develops the approach of Luebbert by focusing on intra-party variables; 
and finally, it confirms the assumption that parties are not unified actors. 
Rommetvedt (1994) and Moar (1995)109, reflect this new direction in 
government formation literature. Rommetvedt's article looks at five post-war 
Norwegian coalition governments and focuses on the inter-party and intra-party 
variables to furnish a more in-depth account on coalition relationships110 . His research 
shows that intra-party constraints on government fo1mation are pivotal: 
The coalition leaders' task is two sided. In order to ensure the coalition's ability 
to govern, the coalition parties have to co-ordinate decision making and action. 
At the same time, they try to influence coalition policies in accordance with their 
own peculiar preferences. The coalition partners are also concerned with the 
preservation of party profiles in order to attract voters. In short the coalition 
leaders and parties have to manage unity and difference at the same time 111 • 
The central question Moar seeks to answer is what impact intra-party conflicts 
have on coalition bargaining and the government formation process. Moar presents a 
model which defines intra-party constraints as resulting from "intra-elite as well as elite 
108 Ibid., p.321. 
109 Rommetvedt, H., (1994), "Norwegian Coalition Governments and the Management of Party 
Relations", Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.17, No.3, pp.239-258. Moar, M.,(1995), "Intra-party 
determinants of coalition bargaining" , Journal of Theoretical Politics. Vol. 7, No. I, pp.65-91. 
I IO Rommetvedt, p.242. 
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follower conflict"112• This in tum affects bargaining power by undermining stability, 
cohesion and a party's resources113 . He tests his model through a comparative analysis 
of Denmark, Norway, Italy, France and the UK, and finds that intra-party constraints on 
government formation were of central importance to the outcome of negotiations. 
Narud is another author who looks at intra-party variables. In his article 
"Electoral Competition and Coalition Bargaining in Multiparty Systems"114, he focuses 
on the inter-relationship between the electoral arena and the parliamentary arena and 
poses two questions. To what extent do the parties' electoral strategies constrain their 
coalition potential? And what is the effect of elite strategy on voter attitudes and 
preferences?115 . Narud argues that government formation theorists have "tended to 
assume a bargaining environment more or less free from constraints, such as the 
functional differences of factions within the party or the interests and preferences of 
party followers" 116• Parties are faced with a dilemma between making strong policy 
stands to maximise votes in the electoral arena, and compromising on policy to facilitate 
the optimal bargaining strategy in a government formation situation (e.g., in the 
parliamentary arena). 
To solve this dilemma Narud believes parties must find an acceptable balance 
between their policy positions in the legislative arena vis-a-vis the electoral arena 117 • For 
example, in the 1993 Norwegian general election the Conservative Party's coalition 
strategy was incompatible with its electoral strategy as it had to differentiate itself from 
111 Ibid., p.256. 
112M 6 oar, p. 8. 
113 Moar, pp.69.-70 
114 Namd, H.M., (1996), "Electoral Competition and Coalition Bargaining in Multiparty Systems", 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 8, No.4, pp. 499-525. 
115 Ibid., p.499. 
116 Ibid., p.500. 
117 Ibid., p.505. 
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the Progress Party which held very similar positions on several issue dimensions 118 • 
This led the Conservatives to reject a coalition with the Progress Party, as they 
perceived future problems in maintaining a separate identity with potential voters 119• 
Consistent with Narud a recent article by Volcansek (1999) 120/believes that the f( 
correlation between policy promises and government policies has received little 
attention in the literature. She addresses this by "looking at how coalitions and their 
contours affect actual legislation", and uses coalition formation in Italy between 1983-
94 as a case study. Volcansek's findings indicate that maintaining credibility for parties 
is a key factor in coalition behaviour and that surplus majority cabinets are "often 
critical to maintain cabinet and policy credibility" 121 • Volcansek, like Narud, identifies 
the major problem for parties in multiparty systems as; vote maximisation in the 
electoral arena constrains their ability to negotiate in the parliamentary arena. 
The acknowledgement that political parties are not unitary actors seems to have 
gained a following within the most recent literature, as reflected in Mitchell's (1999) 
article "Coalition Discipline, Enforcement Mechanisms, and Intra-Party Politics"122 . 
This work approaches government formation from two levels. The first looks at inter-
party bargaining and the second looks at how parties are constrained by the nature of 
inter-party politics. Mitchell believes that "obviously, the monolithic actor assumption 
is a stylisation, and in practice, parties sometimes split, backbenchers rebel, and some 
resign or are even expelled" 123 . This leads her to the conclusion that "intra-party 
politics play a greater role during the life of a government than assumed by traditional 
118 Ibid., p.518. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Volcansek, M.L., (1999), "Coalition Composition and Legislative Outcomes in Italy", West European 
Politics, vol.22, No.1, January, pp.95-114. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Mitchell, P ., ( 1999), "Coalition Discipline, Enforcement Mechanisms, and Intra party Politics", in 
Bowler, S., Farrell, D.M., and Katz, R.S., (eds) (1999), Party Discipline and Parliamenta,y 
Government ,Ohio State University Press, Columbus. 7 , 
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coalition theories [and] a delicate trade-off has to be struck between negotiations among 
and within parties" 124. 
Narud, Mitchell and Volcansek go beyond the established focus on policy space 
modelling and reflect the current status of comparative government formation literature. 
In line with Pridham and Luebbert, they assume that political parties are not unitary 
actors and that parties are the most important group to consider when looking at 
government formation. Furthermore, they reinforce the position taken in this thesis that 
parties are active in all three arenas, and that an action in one arena has ramifications for 
the other two. 
In summary, government formation theory has gone through a series of phases and has 
reached a number of conclusions. One of the literature's first conclusions was that 
office, and not policy, primarily motivates parties. This reasoning makes it very 
difficult to explain any government outcomes that deviate from the minimal winning 
criterion. It was also one of the reasons why minority and surplus majority 
governments have been ignored or deemed "deviant" cases. This theoretical limitation 
leads onto the next accepted maxim which assumes that parties with the greatest degree 
of policy overlap or compatibility, will form government (i.e., policy-based spatial 
modelling ). Inherent in this approach was a concentration on the legislative size of a 
party and its ideological positioning, which in turn leads to parties being categorised as 
pivotal or dominant. 
Theories that employ this type of reasonmg are still dominant in both 
comparative and formal approaches because of their predictive power. However, Laver 
and Budge (1992) tested ten policy-based spatial modelling theories and found that 
(--· 123 Ibid., p.277. 
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policy could not sustain the weight placed on it by theorists. This is not to say policy 
distance is unimportant in the study of government formation. Laver and Budge's study 
shows that policy is still a powerful tool in understanding this phenomenon, but that 
other variables are important as well. For example, policy spaced modelling does not 
explain why certain parties go into coalition, but rather indicates which parties can and 
cannot enter into coalition with each other. 
Anqther enduring assumption among theorists was the unitary actor status of 
political parties. This assumption precludes considering intra-party affects on 
government formation, and came under criticism from Bogdanor (1983), Browne and 
Dreijmanis (1982), Luebbert (1984) and Pridham (1986). Luebbert (1984) was one of 
the first to assume political parties were not unitary actors by placing intra-party 
variables at the very centre of his theory. Laver and Schofield (1991) confirmed the 
acceptance of this new direction within government formation literature by saying, 
"there is no doubt ... that some consideration of the impact of politics within parties will 
be one of the directions in which the study of coalitions will develop in the years to 
This prediction about the importance of intra-party effects on government 
formation was well grounded and is reflected in the present literature. For example, 
Strom, Laver and Budge (1994) look at real world constraints which includes intra-party 
considerations. Rommetvedt (1994) also focuses on inter-party and intra-party 
variables. Finally, Narud (1996) and Mitchell (1999) take intra-party considerations one 
step further and suggest the interaction between party leaders, backbenchers and 
grassroots followers is essential to understanding any government formation situation. 
124 Ibid., p.283. 
125 Laver and Schofield, 1991, p.35. 
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Overall, the literature focuses too heavily on the parliamentary arena as theorists 
have "homed in on the moment of coalition formation"126. However, examples from the 
most recent literature indicate that other arenas are gaining more attention, both 
individually and in conjunction with each other. Narud (1996) and Volcansek (1999) 
provide a good example of this new direction by analysing interactions between the 
electoral and parliamentary arenas and seeing how one can constrain the other. 
Lastly, and closely associated with the multiple arenas conceptualisation, is the 
treatment of time within the latest government formation literature. This review 
highlights the time dimension and its importance by suggesting that an action in one 
arena has ramifications for another, both immediately and at a later date. For example, 
Rommetvedt (1994) believes parties have to make decisions keeping in mind party 
profiles and how to attract voters. Thus, government formation is not a continually 
repeating one-off situation, but a situation that takes into consideration what has gone 
before and what will happen after. 
The above discussion has highlighted some of the present and past trends within 
comparative government fom1ation literature. With regard to minority governments the 
literature has developed considerably. Early theorists assumed parties were first and 
foremost office-centred and therefore could not provide any explanation for minority 
government formation. This lead directly to the mis-categorisation by Dodd ( et al) that 
they were "deviant" or abnormal outcomes. However, once theorists assumed parties 
were policy motivated it became possible to explain minority governments as normal or 
preferred outcomes. For example, Budge and Herman (1978) were among the first to 
do this, although their initial explanation was weak. 
126 Laver and Schofield, 1990, p.17. 
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Overall, comparative government literature provides a better explanation of 
general and minority government formation. By expanding the focus of theories to 
cover more arenas and by looking at intra-party constraints on bargaining, a more 
comprehensive understanding of all government formation situations has been attained. 
The following section focuses on minority government formation by analysing those 
theories which directly address the question of non-majoritarian governments. 
2.3 Minority Explanations 
As the previous sections have shown, minority governments are of secondary 
importance within general government formation literature. Additionally, theories that 
focus on providing explanations for minority governments are few, both in the formal 
and comparative approaches. Strom, one of the leading researchers in this field, notes 
"there is no rich literature on minority governments per se"127 , citing the most 
important work (before his own) as Herman and Pope's (1973) "Minority Governments 
in Western Democracies"128. This lack ofresearch has created a gap within government 
formation literature, as minority governments are common in liberal democratic systems 
(accounting for approximately one third of all governments129). The following section 
looks specifically at minority government literature and focus on what variables 
theorists believe are important in explaining this type of non-majoritarian outcome. 
127 Strom, 1990, p.9 
128 Heiman, and Pope, 1973, pp.191-212 
129 Strom, Ibid. 
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2.3.1 Analysis, Critique and Evaluation of Minority Government Formation Theories 
One of the first theories to directly approach the question of minority government 
formation is Herman and Pope's (1973) "Minority Governments in Western 
Democracies". This article follows a comparative approach by building a descriptive 
theory aimed at explaining those situations in which majority governments do not form. 
Their explanation rests on five "reasons" and two "additional factors" 130. The five 
reasons largely fail to explain why minority governments form, but do highlight five 
situations in which they may occur. 
The first reason states that minority outcomes occur because "coalitions are not 
the normal or accepted form of government [ and] a one party minority government is 
preferred by all the parties and the electorate to a multi-party majority government"131 • 
This logic suggests parties form minority governments because they want to, but 
Herman and Pope's explanation is inadequate as no attempt is made to explain why all 
parties and the electorate may prefer a minority government. The second reason for 
non-majority governments is attributed to structural features which prevent an outright 
majority from being formed, such as fringe anti-system parties that are not able or 
wanted in government. Reasons three and four describe "caretaker" situations, or 
situations where a coalition collapses or is being reconstituted132• Finally, reason five 
argues that non-majoritarian governments form where a single party has a near majority. 
The first four reasons Herman and Pope suggest, have limited explanatory 
power due to a lack of further qualification and detailed analysis. However, later in the 
article they do develop reason five, which models a causal relationship between party 
130 Herman and Pope, 1973, p.195. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., p.196. 
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size and government. Their findings suggest that if a coalition or a single party controls 
a near majority "located within the range 45-49 per cent", then that party is able to take 
office, and can expect to receive support from within the legislature from other parties 
d . d d 133 an m epen ents . Unfortunately, the reasons why a party decides to support a 
minority government is only dealt with briefly, but does intimate that the authors are 
thinking in terms of multiple arenas and non-static time frames. For example, they 
believe parties will support a government for ideological reasons and the need to appear 
responsible. This implies parties are concerned with policy in the legislative arena, and 
the need to appear responsible implies future orientated thinking in the electoral arena. 
More than a decade elapsed between Herman and Pope's article and the next 
important work on minority government by Strom (1984). He focuses on minority 
governments in an article "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies"134, 
which he developed later into a book (1990) Minority Government and Majority 
Rule135 . He follows a comparative approach and employs a rational choice framework 
that relates minority government formation to "rational actions by the political parties 
involved" 136• In both these works Strom set out to challenge the conventional 
explanations of minority government 137. 
His thesis employs two variables: ( a) future incumbency costs; and (b ), policy 
influence potential. Depending on the degree of parliamentary power centralisation, 
political parties will not choose to form or be involved in government if there are future 
electoral costs incurred by holding power. This cost is then balanced against the 
perceived degree of policy influence Opposition parties can expect to receive from 
133 Ibid., pp.203-204. 
134 Sh·om, 1984, pp. 199-227. 
135 Strom, K., (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge University press, U.K. 
136 Ibid., p.16 
137 refer preceding sections. 
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within or outside of government. Strom's argument suggests that the more policy 
influence a party has outside government, the less incentives it has in holding power: 
Minority governments form when the benefits of office holding are outweighed by 
the costs for a majority segment of the party system. The costs of governing can be 
counted in votes [ and] government incumbency tends to result in subsequent 
electoral losses ... with these costs in mind, potential government parties may forgo 
the immediate gratification of holding office if doing so promises future benefits 138 • 
The assumptions Strom makes both follow and depart from earlier theorists. 
The most important departure is that majority status is not necessarily the effective 
decision point in parliamentary legislatures, and legislative and executive coalitions 
need not coincide 139. This assumption allows Strom to challenge the importance of the 
size principle (so important to game theorists) which states that only a winning 
majoritarian government is able to command a legislative majority and therefore pass 
legislation. 
Similarly, consistent with other government formation theorists, Strom adopts 
the unitary actor assumption. He believes that there are "strong bargaining and electoral 
incentives for parties to act cohesively, and the act of government formation is one area 
where the need for party unity is particularly pressing and dissent severely punished", 
and "it is therefore not far-fetched to treat the party as if it were an individual" 140. 
However, he weakens this assumption by discussing party leaders as a separate group 
and suggesting that they have a significant impact on formation negotiations. He does 
not discuss the possibility that leaders may be constrained by their own caucu3/ s, or 1 
indeed by the need to satisfy particular factions within their party. 
Strom's policy influence variable draws heavily on Luebbert's work. Luebbert 
conceptualised the Opposition as either classical (trying to defeat the government), or 




non-classical (trying to influence policy) 141 . Strom follows this reasoning by assuming 
"one need not hold office in order to gain policy influence" 142 • Additionally, Strom 
assumes that if there are institutional mechanisms for Opposition parties to influence 
policy (such as a decentralised government and a strong committee system), then the 
benefits of participating in government are devalued 143 • 
Another conceptual link between Strom and recent comparative government 
formation theorists is a dynamic treatment of time in his two central variables. For 
example, "future incumbency costs" involves an evaluation of 11 short and long term 
considerations" 144. Strom goes even further and puts a limit on how far ahead parties 
and party leaders think, saying that "in practical terms, they [parties and leaders] are 
unlikely to look more than one electoral period ahead" 145 . He qualifies this by saying 
elections are unpredictable over the long term and party leaders have limited 
£ . 11· 146 pro ess1ona 1ves . 
Strom's theory focuses on the party acting under constraints within the 
parliamentary and the electoral arena. He states, "voters must be presented with clear 
governmental options prior to the election [as] the electorate must have some way to 
sort out possible coalition configurations among the set of competing parties"147 . By 
ascertaining the costs of holding office, parties have already made some commitments 
which constrain subsequent negotiations. Therefore, Strom believes parties make a 
C-...__ 139 b'd ~- I 1 ., p.38 
140 Ibid., pp. 28-29 
141 see earlier section 
142 Ibid., p.38 
143 Luebbert deals with this idea in the party system arena, describing those systems where the opposition 
has policy influence as consensual (like Norway) and those where the opposition parties have very 
little influence as in competitive or conflictual systems (like Canada and Britain). 
144 Strom, 1990, p.38. 
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cost/benefit analysis, constrained by the outcomes in one arena and the possible 
outcomes in another. 
Overall Strom finds a reasonable correlation between his theory and reality. His 
logistic regression model predicts between 69.2% and 64.4% of all outcomes 148 . More 
specifically, Strom's model has a poor predictive ability in relation to those countries 
with the highest incidence of minority government. For example, his model only 
correctly predicts government formation outcomes 53% of the time in Sweden149 . 
Despite this modest predictive power and the unitary actor assumption, Strom's 
approach is important as it is one of the most comprehensive theories to attempt an 
investigation of minority government formation. Also, Strom's research has 
considerable heuristic value because he identifies variables such as future incumbency 
costs and the policy influence levels of Opposition parties. 
Another theorist who concentrates on institutions 1s Bergman (1993) in 
"Formation rules and Minority Governments". Eschewing a comprehensive theory, the 
aiiicle focuses on the link created between legislative rules and government formation. 
Two types of government formation rules are proposed; positive and negative. 
Bergman attempts to show that minority governments are more frequent in the countries 
with "negative rules" 150 . Parliamentary systems have positive rules if they stipulate that 
a candidate or proposed government must pass an investiture vote and win by either an 
absolute or relative majority151 . The underlying principle is that a government should 
be supported by parliament. In systems with negative rules, a government does not 
have to pass an investiture vote and can take and hold power until it loses a vote of 
148 Ibid., p.83. 
149 Ibid., p.88 
150 Bergman, T.,(1993) "Formation rules and minority governments", European Journal of Political 
Research, Vol. 23, p.55 
151 Ibid., p.56 
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confidence. The underlying principle here is that a government must only be tolerated 
by parliament 152 • 
Bergman found a high correlation for his hypothesis in proportional systems 
with positive rules as only 25% of governments formed between 1945 and 1987 were 
minority status153 . However, in systems with negative rules 75% of all governments 
formed were of minority status 154. These results lead Bergman to conclude "that a 
negatively formulated government formation rule facilitates minority government"155• 
The high correlation between Bergman's hypothesis and findings are impressive, but 
their value in explaining minority government formation is low. Constitutional 
formation rules do not encourage any particular type of government to form; they are 
merely another constraint on bargaining within the parliamentary arena. Bergman is 
aware of this point, and puts his research into perspective by saying, " ... the different 
rules must be linked to the goals of political parties ... even if rules help facilitate certain 
outcomes, in the end the government that is formed is a matter of choice"156 . 
A more recent attempt to explain minority government formation follows a 
game theoretic approach. Crombez (1996) in "Minority Governments, Minimal 
Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems" suggests a formal 
model to explain the emergence of minority governments. He focuses on size and 
ideological placement and believes "that as the largest party becomes larger and more 
central, the government changes from a surplus majority to a minimal winning coalition 
and from a minimal winning coalition to a minority government" 157 . 
152 Ibid., p.57 




157 Crombez, C.,(1996), "Minority Governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities 
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The assumptions Crombez makes are both realistic yet simplistic. For example, 
he makes the realistic assumption that "when the largest party is large and centrally 
located, it has a good bargaining position"158. However, later he assumes that the 
negotiating environment is zero-sum. That is, if the largest party is centrally located and 
large thereby resulting in a good position, "other parties then have a bad bargaining 
position" 159. This assumption tends to ignore the left/right ideological placement of 
parties or the occurrence of small centrist parties that can control the balance of power. 
Also, this model assumes three parties in a unicameral legislature, where no party has 
an outright majority and where they can all go into coalition with each other. 
Crombez's findings indicate "strong and consistent" support for his hypothesis, 
and also indicate that fractionalisation "significantly enhances the formation of minority 
governments" 160. These findings initially seem impressive. However, his empirical 
analysis measures the importance of party size and ideological position, not whether 
government formation shifts from surplus majorities, to minimal winning coalitions, to 
minority governments. The study therefore, does little to further our understanding of 
minority governn1ent other than to confirm what other theorists have already discovered 
namely, that party size and ideological placement are important variables in government 
formation. 
In summary, the brevity of this section reflects the lack of interest minority 
governments have attracted from both comparative and formal theorists. Of the few 
theorists reviewed here it is possible to see certain similarities in reasoning and focus. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., p.2. 
160 Ibid., p.13. 
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For example, Herman, Pope, Strom and Crombez161 all adopt the unitary actor 
assumption, a factor that has been dominant for a long time in general theories of 
government formation. Additionally, Crombez's other assumptions of rationality and a 
zero-sum bargaining environment reveal that game theorists still seem more concerned 
with methodological issues than with the phenomenon under study. 
Another commonality concerns the notion of size. For example, Herman and 
Pope suggest that a near majority of 45-49% is enough to form a viable government. 
Strom follows this logic by assuming that a party or coalition does not need a legislative 
majority to gain executive power. This rationale effectively lowers the critical threshold 
for a party or parties to attain when forming a government. More importantly, the lower 
threshold effectively means an explanation of minority situations is moving away from 
those actors holding office to those opposing and supporting a minority administration. 
This shift in focus indicates that the Opposition label used to describe all non-
government parties within most of the literature is conceptually inadequate. Further 
support for questioning the Opposition label comes from Strom's assertion that a party 
does not need to be in power to gain some policy pay-off, thereby explaining why some 
parties support a minority government. If this belief is combined with Herman and 
Pope's idea that ideology is a motivating factor for party support, then another 
assumption is possible. This assumption suggests a party will provide legislative 
support if it has some ideological overlap with a minority government and can thereby 
achieve some policy pay-offs. 
Strom extends the analysis further by arguing that a party also takes into account 
the future costs of office. This assumption has compelling logic and adds another 
dimension to the accepted bargaining constraints many government formation theorists 
161 Although Crombez does not state that he assumes political parties are unitary actors, his methodology 
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perceive exist. For example, a party will not participate in government if it believes it 
will negatively affect its future electoral chances. Additionally, "future costs" implies a 
dynamic treatment of time and is central to bargaining considerations. Indeed, this one 
consideration challenges those theorists who model government formation as a 
continually repeating one-off game. 
Strom's dynamic treatment of time also brings into consideration the reality that 
minority government formation (indeed all government formation) takes place within 
multiple arenas, namely, the electoral, internal party and parliamentary arenas. Over 
time these ideas may become accepted by theorists just as policy and office assumptions 
are now. Clearly, they affect the rationality and formulation of any theory. Therefore in 
summary, minority government formation reflects some of the advances made within 
general government formation literature, with the important exception of the unitary 
actor assumption and the associated intra-party constraints on negotiation. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This literature review has focused on two main areas, government formation theories 
and minority government theories. It aimed to ascertain which elements are important 
in both bodies of literature and those which are important to the understanding of 
minority situations. Conceptually, both areas require separate but co-ordinated analysis, 
as minority governments are a specific type of outcome within the larger number of 
government formation situations. To concentrate on one without consideration of the 
other results in an inadequate understanding of both. 
model and reasoning all indicates that he does. 
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A significant section of government formation literature has been written by 
formal theorists. The primary theorists applied van Neumann's and Morgenstem's 
mathematical and economic methodology to government formation. This resulted in 
some important theoretical insights, such as the centrality of parties, the nature of 
political pay-offs and the motivation of actors. The contemporary group of formal 
theorists have had a lesser impact in the field of government formation. They have 
become preoccupied by overly complicated methodology, unrealistic assumptions, and 
aims to reveal formalistic technique instead of explaining the subject under study. 
As indicated earlier, comparative methodology provides a better explanation of 
both general government formation and minority government formation. The main 
reason for this is that comparative methodology is not constrained by formalistic 
mathematical technique, which allows it to focus on multiple variables and arenas in 
furnishing explanations. This makes the approach more flexible and increases its ability 
to more accurately reflect reality. 
As a result of this chapter's analysis of existing literature, five areas or foci have 
emerged as the most important factors in the analysis of government formation in 
general and minority government in particular. These are: (1) unitary actor and intra-
party considerations; (2) policy space modelling; (3) formation arenas; ( 4) conceptions 
of the Opposition; and (5) conceptions of time. 
(1) Unitary Actor and Intra Party Considerations. 
Pridham (1986) and Luebbert (1986) were among the first to question the unitary actor 
assumption. Both believed that the internal relationships in a party were of pivotal 
importance. Subsequently, more recent theorists have adopted the assumption that 
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parties are not unitary actors and that intra-party variables are central to any explanation 
of government formation. The five most recent articles confirm this 162 . 
(2) Policy Space Modelling 
Policy-based modelling in the comparative approach has many similarities to STEC in 
the formal approach. They are in essence the same concept studied by different 
methodologies. However, the value of policy-based modelling was undermined in a 
comprehensive study by Laver and Budge (1992). They came to the conclusion that 
policy had a reasonably clear but limited impact on bargaining. The reasons for these 
findings reflect that parties position themselves before an election to maximise votes 
:from their target group. Furthermore, when governments are negotiated into office, a 
party's policy position cannot be static; it needs to change after an election to facilitate 
inclusion in a coalition, or to assure a legislative majority in order to form a minority 
government. 
(3) Formation Arenas 
The most commonly researched aspect of government formation literature is within the 
parliamentary arena. Formal theorists concentrate almost exclusively on this arena as 
their methodology models a game that takes place after an election, where the size and 
position of the parties are static and there are no assumed future constraints on 
bargaining. Comparative theorists also focus heavily on this arena as this is the location 
162 Strom, Budge, Laver (1994), Rommetvedt (1994), Moar (1995), Narud (1996), Mitchell, (1999) 
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where governments are formed. Consequently, many believe it is the most critical 
arena. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that all arenas affect each 
other in a symbiotic relationship. Consequently, a better understanding of the 
phenomenon of government formation requires that all arenas be taken into account. 
This is a complex task and can result in a virtual tautology when attempting to identify 
the beginning of certain trends or the origin of constraints. However, despite the 
difficulties of the task, it should be attempted for its heuristic value alone. 
( 4) Conceptions of the Opposition 
The notion of the Opposition has only been superficially conceptualised in the literature. 
Few theorists have questioned the standard conceptualisation which stipulates that non-
governmental parties are automatically members of the Opposition. Two exceptions to 
this are Luebbert and Strom. Luebbert categorises the Opposition as either classical or 
non-classical, while Strom incorporates the Opposition in his theory on minority 
government fonnation by differentiating between those parties which support and those 
which attempt to bring down the government. This conceptualisation requires further 
development and clarification in the literature. 
(5) Conceptions of Time 
Closely associated with interacting arenas is the concept of time. Theories by Pridham 
(1986) and Strom (1990) confirm the dynamic nature of this dimension by using the 
variables of future constraint and past experiences to explain government formation. 
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Budge and Kernan (1990) considered time in relation to government formation after 
identifying what they believe is an odd aspect of current theory that ignores the 
possibility "that politicians may have somewhat longer time perspective's" 163 . 
The most recent theories conceptualise time as a dynamic concept in government 
formation. Both Rommetvedt (1994) and Narud (1996) discuss decision making as 
taking place under past and future considerations. By doing so they reflect the present 
position of the literature on this subject and make theorising more realistic. In order to 
conceptualise the phenomenon under study, environmental factors such as time must be 
taken into account as they have an important effect on government formation. 
Overall, the explanation of government formation draws on diverse variables 
and focuses on multiple areas. Minority government formation has not been 
approached with similar rigour with the result that there is a lack of understanding in 
this particular type of outcome. However, by applying the areas of focus identified 
from general government formation literature it is hoped a more complete explanation 
of minority government formation can be obtained. 
163 Budge and Kernan, p.60. 
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Chapter 3 
Towards a Theory of Government Formation 
The literature review suggested five areas of focus that are important in 
conceptualisations of general and minority government formation. The purpose of this 
chapter is to employ these five areas in the construction of a framework to facilitate a 
greater understanding of government formation, and in particular a greater 
understanding of minority government. The framework is an attempt to build a broad 
schema for analysis, not to construct a theory: it can however, be seen as a systematic 
attempt at preparing the way for a theory or theories164. This analytical framework is 
subsequently applied to New Zealand's first MMP government from 1996 - 1999. 
Following the general arena framework discussion, a more detailed analysis is 
undertaken of the specific variables which affect government formation. These 
variables are based on the conclusions of the literature review and relate to different 
arenas in the organising schema. The first variable comes from the parliamentary arena, 
and focuses on concepts of the Opposition. A second variable examines the role of 
party leaders in the internal party and parliamentary arena, while a third variable 
discusses incumbency costs and future elections. Following this a table summarising 
the "General Assumptions on Government formation" is presented. Finally, a 
conclusion combines these earlier theoretical elements with particular scenarios in an 
effort to model both general and minority government formation. 
164 Sjoblom, G.,(1968), Party Strategies in a multi-party system, Studentlitteratur Lund, Sweden. 
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The main argument being put forward in this discussion is; that government 
formation is a process that takes place in three arenas and is controlled by political 
parties. These parties carry out certain roles in each arena that affect every decision 
they make. Additionally, within parties there is a tension between leaders and their 
organisations, which is created by the interaction between party goals and leadership 
career goals. When all these variables are considered, it is possible to model their 
effects on specific formation outcomes in terms of the costs and benefits for parties and 
party leaders. 
Setting Some Preliminmy Boundaries 
Before proceeding it is necessary to set some boundaries for the theoretical framework. 
It has already been stated that this analysis hopes to increase the understanding of 
government fonnation in New Zealand; therefore, some primary assumptions need to be 
established regarding the party system. First, the number of parties in the system is 
assumed to be small, specifically, between four and five. Second, the parties are 
assumed to be located across the political spectrnm along a left/right continuum, based 
on a socio-economic cleavage 165 • Third, two of the parties are centrally located major 
parties166 on opposite sides of the left/right continuum. Fourth, the third parties are 
distributed on either side of the large parties (i.e.,wing third parties) with one in the 
centre167 (centre third party), as in Figure 3.1. 
165 Assuming the main cleavage within NZ as socio-economic is consistent with the literature on NZ 
politics, and was reaffirmed to the author by informal interviews with A. Lijphart in the first half of 
1998. 
166 "Major party" means a large party, with long established organisations and a broad base of popular 
support that has been represented through past electoral success. 
167 In reality the "wings" of each party may overlap, and the centre party could be redistributed amongst B 
and C. However, for the purpose of this example, wing parties are set out in order to reflect party 
position and size, along a left/right cleavage. 
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Figure 3 .1 A Diagrammatic Representation of the Party System 
A B C D E 
LEFT RIGHT 
This party system model obviously reflects the 1996 MMP election result in 
New Zealand. However, this does not undermine the following analysis. Much of the 
theorising is applicable to other countries and other systems, especially as this thesis 
focuses to a large degree on the actions of political parties. The above assumptions 
reinforce the commitment of this study to increasing the understanding of government 
formation in New Zealand. 
3.1 A General Framework/or Government Formation 
The Arenas Organising Principle 
The arenas organising framework is widely used in government formation literature by 
both design or by implication168. For example, both Downs (1957) and Dodd (1979) 
168 Peterson, R.L., and de Ridder, M.M.,(1986), "Government Formation as a Policy Making Arena", 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no.4, November, p.572. 
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intimate the presence of a number of arenas. Downs (1957) believes that parties 
formulate policies in order to win elections and therefore gain power in parliament169. 
Similarly, Dodd says, "political parties enter parliament in a quest for governmental 
power [that] originates at the electoral level, where each party articulates a political 
programme designed to attract a political following" 170. 
An analysis of these ideas indicates that three arenas are implied. First, the 
internal party arena is alluded to by the ideas that "parties formulate policies" and "each 
party articulates a political programme"171 . Second, these policies are formulated to win 
an election, against or with other parties. Therefore, parties are competing entities 
trying to win an inter-party competition (i.e., the election) in the electoral arena. 
Finally, after the competition has been completed in the electoral arena, the actors re-
convene in the parliamentary arena. Whereas both Dodd and Downs merely imply a 
number of arenas, others directly employ the arena concept and terminology in a 
number of associated but different ways172. Consequently, the following three 
propositions and their explanations define the arenas organising principle used 
throughout this thesis. 
(l) An arena is a centre of activity or activity in a particular situation or context, where 
a set of actors interact in identifiable patterns according to general rules and 
procedures, within boundaries which do not necessarily coincide with those of formal 
institutions1 73 . 
169 Downs, A., (1957), An Economic Themy of Democracy, Harper and Row, U.S.A., pp.22-31. 
170 Dodd, p.35. 
171 Ibid. 
172 The best four examples of theorists who employ the arenas approach are Sjoblom, G., (1968); Peterson 
and Ridder, 1986; Panebianco, A., (1988) Political Parties: Organisation and Power, Cambridge 
University Press, London, Britain, and; Panebianco (1996). 
173 This definition draws heavily on Peterson and Ridder,1986, Panebianco, 1988, and Narud, 1996. 
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For the purposes of this thesis "the actors" are political parties174, which interact 
according to the rules set down in their own constitutions, past conventions, and the 
constitutional fabric of their political system. These interactions can take place in 
formal institutions, such as parliament and informal settings such as elections. An 
example of interaction which does not coincide strictly with formal institutions would 
be a pre-electoral coalition. There are no formal rules governing the form this should 
take, but it does affect both an election, and the formal institution of parliament. The 
following point expands on this subject. 
(ii) Each arena overlaps and does not work in isolation. Therefore, issues may affect 
more than one arena and have cumulative effects. 
The above rationale to government formation acknowledges that an outcome in one 
arena may become an input for another175 . This conceptualisation bears a great deal of 
resemblance to Easton's well-known input-output schema which he uses to describe the 
political system. He argues: 
In effect, it conveys the idea that the political system looks like a vast and perpetual 
conversion process. It takes in demands and support as they are shaped in the 
environment and produces something out of them called outputs. But it does not let our 
interest in the outputs terminate at this point. We are ale1ied to the fact that the outputs 
influence the supportive sentiments that the members express towards the system and 
the kinds of demands they put on it176• 
When these concepts are applied to the question of government formation they 
show the inter-dependent nature of arenas. For example, the lack of internal cohesion in 
the party arena may affect the ability of a party to negotiate a coalition agreement in the 
174 For the purposes of this thesis other actors will not be looked at in detail, for example interest groups. 
It is the belief of this thesis that despite being important in government formation, their influence is 
via a political party and is therefore not a determining factor in government formation. 
11s d l Naru , p.50 . 
176 Easton, quoted in Sjoblom, p.19. 
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parliamentary arena. Furthermore, when a party goes into an unpopular coalition in the 
parliamentary arena it may flow into the electoral arena with a decrease in voter 
support. Therefore, arenas are connected and issues flow between them impacting on 
goals and resources. Proposition 3 below expands on this theme. 
(iii) Each arena allows the use of different resources, has different rules of actor 
interaction, and has different goals associated with it. 
The literature review in Chapter Two discussed the motivations, or goals of parties, as 
being orientated towards either policy outcomes or attaining office in the parliamentary 
arena. Thus, each arena has a specific goal. These are: vote maximisation in the 
electoral arena, cohesion in the party arena and policy influence/office maximisation in 
the parliamentary arena. Additionally, these goals co-exist, and once attained, must be 
maintained in the other arenas where they become constraints on a party's actions. 
In this conceptualisation, goals are not zero-sum. Rather, they are relative, and a 
party can aim for its own level of attainment regarding any goal. For example, the level 
of cohesion each party aims for varies from party to party. Some parties may take the 
position that those not for us are against us, while other parties may be happy to attain 
and maintain a level of cohesion where factions do not express their discontent publicly, 
but internally act in a divisive manner. Vote maximisation is another good example of 
degrees of goal attainment. A party aims at getting as many votes as it can, but if it fails 
to gain the anticipated amount, it may still be able to influence policy at a re-evaluated 
level. What must be remembered when talking about goals is that parties aim to 
maximise them, but failure to maximise a goal does not necessarily mean complete 
failure. What it does mean is that subsequent goals in following arenas require re-
evaluation. 
63 
Each arena requires the different application of a similar resource or a different 
resource altogether. Panebianco conceptualises arenas and resources as "gambling 
tables at which the party plays and obtains ... the resources it needs [and] resources 
obtained in one arena are spent in another" 177• For the purposes of this 
conceptualisation, resources do not refer to money or personnel, but to the outputs of 
earlier arenas. For example, cohesion in the internal party arena is a resource in the 
electoral arena, and the number of votes gained in the electoral arena becomes a 
resource in the parliamentary arena. 
The different rules of interaction refer to the legal requirements and conventions 
particular to each arena. In the internal party arena, how the groups and individuals 
interact is dictated by party constitutions and accepted practices. In the parliamentary 
arena, the actor's behaviour must comply with constitutional norms and conventions, 
committees, and the division into government and Opposition blocks. In the electoral 
arena, parties are free to campaign how they like, but are: (a) legally regulated by the 
amount of money they can spend; and (b ), obligated to participate in certain activities 
like leadership debates and press interviews. 
The Interaction Between Arenas 
The relationship between arenas is one of co-dependence. The actors cannot make a 
move in one arena without affecting their moves in another. It is a cyclic system where 
goals attained in one arena are transferred into resources and constraints in another. 
Succeeding in one arena lays the foundation for succeeding in another, and a party must 
achieve and maintain all its goals in all arenas to be a viable political force from one 
177 Panebianco, 207 
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election to the next. It does no good to maximise votes in the electoral arena and then 
maximise policy influence if the internal party arena is negatively affected. This may 
undermine the party's viability in the next political cycle and reaffirms that government 
formation is a continuous process and success is measured over long-term and not-short 
term time frames. 
Inherent in the conceptualisation of co-dependent arenas is the notion of political 
cycles. This adds an important temporal dimension to the analysis. The political cycle 
refers to the on-going movement from one arena to the next. One cycle has been 
completed when the actors have moved through all three arenas. Admittedly, to select 
one arena as the beginning or end of any cycle is problematic, as any selected beginning 
will have been influenced by what has occurred in other arenas. However, in order to 
study a particular cycle a decision has to be made where to begin and for the purposes 
of this thesis the political cycle is analysed from one general election to the next. 
The question of time is very important not just for designating start and end 
points, but in how it effects the actors. The "shadow of the future" 178 affects all decision 
making in the long and short-term. The short-term refers to one political cycle, while 
the long-term to anything beyond this. Therefore, parties may make a decision not to 
participate in government in the short term, as they anticipate it will help them gain a far 
more advantageous position in the long term. However, this type of decision making 
must be taken into account with the fairly limited life span of many leaders and their 
steep discount rates, which means they are unlikely to look more than one political 
cycle ahead 179• 
The preceding discussion helps to clarify the arena principle and highlights some 
of its most important elements. More specifically, each arena needs to be examined 
178 Axelrod quoted in Strom, 1990, p.45. 
~ 
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closely in an attempt to establish its particular characteristics and define its specific 
goals. This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive look at each arena. Rather, it 
aims to provide a general explanation and description of the background to the 
variables. These are subsequently used to explain minority government. 
The Internal Party Arena 
The central actors in each arena are political parties, but they are also an arena in their 
own right180. A party can be conceptualised as its own political system where different 
coalitions of forces come together under a single banner and struggle for influence and 
dominance within the organisation 181 • When the party is regarded as an arena in its own 
right, its primary goal becomes cohesion. Cohesion is required if a party wants to be an 
effective "instrument for the aspirations of the party in the external arenas ... " 182. 
Therefore, cohesion is defined as "a rallying of members round the output decided by 
the party" 183 • This does not imply that every matter within a party is agreed upon. 
There will always be disputes within any organisation regarding such matters as 
appointments and allocation of resources. Rather, it implies that a party wants to be 
seen as united and act in a united manner in external arenas. In effect, attaining goals in 
external arenas becomes increasingly difficult when members make policy standpoints, 
or work in ways that do not coincide with the party's line on a particular issue. 
Furthermore, if cohesion is not attained and maintained, resources that could be better 
~ 179 Strom, 1990, p.51. 
180 Sjoblom, p.183, conceptualises the party as being an "arena" and an "instrument" in other arenas . 
This fits closely with the way parties are portrayed in this thesis with the "instrument" being termed 
"actor", which is more consistent with the latest literature. 
181 Katz and Mair quoted in Moar, p.71. 
182 Ibid., p.52. 
183 Ibid., 
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employed in affirming a party's position in parliament or an election will be negatively 
affected. 
Electoral Arena 
The basic goal of parties in this arena 1s to achieve "vote maximisation" 184, by 
influencing the decisions of voters. However, in PR systems another factor must be 
considered; the vote maximisation of all parties that are possible partners. In PR 
systems, it is not enough for one party to maximise its vote if it undermines a potential 
partner because: (a) it may help parties on the other side of the spectrum to win votes; 
and (b ), it may undermine the relationship between potential partners making it 
impossible to work together. In other words, vote maximisation, whilst conceptually 
clear, is a multifaceted goal referring to both individual parties and groupings of parties. 
Within this arena, there are two types of constraints: those imposed by the 
environment (i.e., a cap on spending and similar allocations of TV advertising time); 
and, those a party brings with it, such as maintaining party cohesion. The first type of 
constraint requires little explanation. The second type of constraint is more complicated 
and is interconnected with party resources. A party must maintain cohesion at all times 
in every arena if it is to be an effective actor. If it achieves this, then generating 
resources is an easier task185• Therefore, the promises a party makes during an election 
campaign are constrained by the factions within the party. If they move too far left or 
right they risk decreasing the level of cohesion and undermining their goal of vote 
maximisation. 
184 Sjoblom, p.206. 
185 Ibid. 
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An important element in this arena is the type of PR system and how it affects 
the way parties campaign and interact. For example, in an MMP system where voters 
have two votes, it is possible for them to act strategically by splitting their vote. Parties 
are aware of this and can campaign to promote a possible supporting party, or mm 
policies at buying one vote from another party's supporters. Also, parties must take care 
when campaigning not to attack potential coalition partners too severely, as they "are 
competing for the same voters, what one party gains, another coalition member is likely 
to lose" 186 . Thus, targeting potential coalition partners too strongly may make building 
a future relationship difficult 
The Parliamentary Arena 
The parliamentary arena is the institutional forum for government formation and within 
this arena parties interact and form administrations after and between elections. It is 
here that the bulk of bargaining187 takes place between those parties which believe they 
can form a government, and new governments are officially formed and sworn in. 
Consequently, government formation literature has devoted a substantial amount of time 
to this arena, but it is by no means the most important. It is the outcomes of the other 
arenas that provide the inputs for the parliamentary arena, and these inputs not only 
constrain possible outcomes, but they also dictate which parties ultimately participate in 
government. 
Parties bring previously gained resources and constraints with them into the 
parliamentary arena. In reality, resources and constraints are opposite sides of the same 
186 Rommetvedt, p.253. 
187 This does not ignore pre-election coalition negotiations, but it is after an election that parties form 
governments and decided on the distribution of offices. 
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coin. These resources are a party's size (seats), its level of internal cohesion and its 
ideological placement; the constraints are party cohesion and future vote maximisation. 
These concepts can be expressed diagrammatically in a model derived from Easton's 
outputs and inputs schema (see Figure 3.2 below). 
Figure 3.2 The System of Goal Maximisation in Terms of Inputs and Outputs. 
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The earlier literature review discussed the motivations of parties, and concluded that 
these were vote maximisation, policy outcomes and office. In reality, politicians want 
all three. Possibly, they seek office to further their personal goals while implementing 
policy to satisfy their party's goals, and they need to maximise votes to do either. 
Whichever one comes first will depend on the individual. For the purposes of this 
thesis, a party's primary goal in this arena is called "policy influence" and can be 
measured by: ( a) how much of its own policy it can implement; and (b) how much of a 
partner's policy it can support, amend, or stop. Separate, but closely associated, are the 
assumed goals of parliamentary party leaders, which are: ( a) to remain leaders; and (b ), 
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office maximisation. A leader's goals have the potential to both interfere with the 
party's goals, or to promote them. 
Three characteristics of policy influence as a "goal" need to be discussed. First, 
policy influence may be deferred in the short term, in the belief that it can be maximised 
at a higher level in the long term. This requires a very careful calculation, as it may 
have negative ramifications in the other arenas. Second, while policy influence is being 
maximised, the goals attained in other arenas become constraints upon a parliamentary 
party's actions. It does no good to maximise policy influence if party cohesion and 
future vote maximisation are undennined. 
The third characteristic refers to what policy influence means to parties of 
different sizes and positions. Major parties in government can expect primarily to 
implement their own policy and then amend or stop policies from other parties, even 
those they share power with. A third party can primarily expect to maximise its own 
policy influence by amending and if necessary, stopping its partner's policy. Its 
secondary goal should be to see how much of its own policy it can implement. This is 
not an absolute rule for parties to follow, but if a major party is not able to implement its 
policies then, "tail wagging the dog" criticisms may apply. Furthermore, if a third party 
cannot be seen to have influenced policy then "selling out" criticisms may apply. 
Parties must be seen to have a level of policy influence commensurate with their 
parliamentary size and ideological position. 
In summary, this section has presented the arena organising concept by breaking it 
down into its individual parts and highlighting the inter-dependent nature of the three 
components. Also, it has conceptualised an arena in light of Easton's work by showing 
that outputs and inputs are connected through feedback between resources and 
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constraints in a continuous political cycle. Another important element in this section is 
the identification of arena specific goals, and parliamentary leaders' personal goals. 
This conceptualisation breaks down government formation into a dynamic multifaceted 
schema that not only looks at parties, but also at the individuals that lead them. 
The following section adds more specific detail to the arena organising 
principle, thereby making the subsequent organising schema more complete. First, the 
parliamentary arena is approached by way of a re-conceptualisation of the parties that 
comprise the legislature, and how this affects their bargaining positions as well as their 
goals. Second, the effect on government formation of parliamentary party leaders is 
analysed to a greater degree. This adds another layer of considerations that need to be 
addressed. 
3.2 Specific Variables 
Re-conceptualising Party Positions in Parliament 
Within government fonnation literature there is an acceptance that if a party is not in 
office then it is in Opposition188• By implication, this assumes that a non-governmental 
party's role is to oppose. This entails criticising a government's policies in order to 
weaken the unity and resolve of government, and ultimately, to replace it189• This 
"classical" 190 conceptualisation of non-governmental parties may be suitable for a two-
pa1iy bi-polar system, but does not adequately describe the situation in multi-party 
188 With the notable exceptions ofLebbert (1984) and Strom (1990). 
189 Luebbert (1984), p.231. 
190 Ibid. 
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systems where major and third parties frequently support each other outside the formal 
bounds of cabinet. 
In order to fully appreciate the multi-party environment in the parliamentary 
arena it is necessary to describe the possible positions of parties outside cabinet in more 
detail. Earlier in this chapter a number of core assumptions were outlined: a party 
system with four or five parties spread over a left/right spectrum, that interact in three 
interconnected arenas, each one having specific goals. By using these assumptions and 
applying them to a scenario where each party is given seats, it is possible to create 
realistic examples of parties that clearly function as the Opposition and those that 
perform an alternative function (see Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3 .3 The Assumed Party System with Legislative Seats. 
A B C D E 
13 45 4 45 13 
LEFT RIGHT 
Scenario 1 
In scenario one, it is possible for either maJor party, B or D, to form a 
majoritarian government with the third parties on either side (i.e., A/B/C OR 
D/C/E). In this situation the two parties outside government ( either A/B or D/E) 
would be on the other side of the political spectrum and represent what is 
thought of as the classical Opposition. 
Scenario 2 
In this situation party A and B form a minority government with the support of 
C. In this situation, party C, whilst not in cabinet, cannot be described as the 
Opposition because the minority coalition relies on C's support for confidence 
and supply. Also, it must be remembered that party C, like all parties, is trying to 
maximise its policy influence in the parliamentary arena. However, this position 
does not preclude party C from criticising the government, or voting down 
legislation it disagrees with. In this respect it does fulfil the classical role of the 
Opposition. 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 is where B and C form a minority coalition government with the 
support of A. In this case, A has the same options as C in the earlier situation 
but with caveats. If it chooses to vote with the classical Opposition it will be 
working with those parties that are on the other side of the political spectrum 
(i.e., those parties with which it has the least policies in common). Thus, party A 
is compelled to support a B/C government to a far greater degree than party C is 
compelled to support an A/B government. 
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Each scenario reflects the notion that the standard classification of government and 
Opposition is inappropriate in a multi-party system. Therefore, it is necessary to re-
conceptualise the divisions within parliament to gain a greater understanding of 
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government formation. It is clear from the above analysis that there are three possible 
parliamentary roles for parties in a multi-party parliament: (a) those that form 
government, defined by the composition of cabinet; (b) the classical Opposition, which v\,\ t ~1 1 , I .•,1 ,_,, 
~~~--. 
aims to criticise the government policies and ultimately to replace it; and ( c ), those 
which do not want to replace a government but under certain conditions can support 
and possibly criticise them. 
The above definitions of government and Opposition are clear. However, the 
supporting party typology needs further analysis, as the term "support party" does not 
reflect the level of support a party pledges to a government (see Figure 3.4). For 
example, support must cover at the very least supply and confidence, but could also 
extend to an unequivocal endorsement of all government policy. These two extremes 
reflect the boundaries in which a supporting party can move. They also reflect how 
problematic it is for supporting parties to decide on the most advantageous level of 
support to pledge to a government. 
Figure 3.4 Range of Possible Support a Third Party Can Pledge. 
Supply/Confidence 
( conditional) 
Range of Support 
Full Endorsement 
(unconditional) 
By the time third parties are m a position to make decisions regarding 
governmental support, the formation process has already gone through the electoral and 
internal party arena, having won enough seats to be important to a major party. The 
third party's goals then become: (a) the maximisation of policy influence; (b) 
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maintaining cohesion; ( c) future vote maximisation; and ( d), maximising office pay-
offs. The pursuit of these goals in the light of the situational constraints forms the 
environment in which a decision on the level of support is based. 
The preceding argument may have implied that a supporting party holds all the 
cards in a government formation situation; this is not necessarily the case. The level of 
power a supporting party can expect is based on many factors, some more quantifiable, 
than others. The quantifiable factors are the number of seats it wins and the number of 
alternatives a party has regarding possible partners. This was intimated in the earlier 
scenarios where the supporting centre third party C has more options than wing third 
parties A or E. This has nothing to do with C's size, but with its ability to join with 
parties Band D. Additionally, parties A and E may be placed in a marginalised position 
if the parties on their inside refuse to let them into the policy making process. 
Non-quantifiable factors that influence the power of parties vis-a-vis each other, 
refer to both their previous relationship and their expected future relationship. If two 
paiiies work together over a period of time, then it is likely that an esprit de corps 
develops between them that can be called on again. Alternatively, if two parties have a 
history of conflict, perhaps built around personality disputes, or one being a splinter 
party of the other, then the ability to work together may possibly be affected, and goal 
maximisation for both undermined. These negative and positive factors must also be 
balanced with anticipated future electoral outcomes, which could create a situation 
where two parties need to work together in order to maximise policy influence. 
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Party Leaders and Their Importance to Government Formation 
The importance of intra-party politics has already been discussed in the internal party 
arena. It was shown how important it was for a party to attain and maintain cohesion. 
More specifically, the individuals most concerned with cohesion are party leaders (both 
parliamentary representatives and senior party organisers). Within this elite group, it is 
the parliamentary representatives who have the most power as: (a) they represent the 
party's wishes in the media and are the "human face" behind an image; and (b ), the 
government formation process is almost entirely in their hands as they participate in and 
control negotiations for the party they represent. 
Therefore, the process of cabinet formation is a game played by a very small and 
select set of party leaders 191 , who have to balance their party's goals with their own. 
This does not mean that parliamentary leaders are free to act in any way they choose or 
disregard all policies for personal gain. To some degree, they will be constrained by the 
organisational and hierarchical structure of their party 192 • For example, one party may 
be controlled from the top down with the parliamentary leaders having the ability to 
significantly control their organisation, thus allowing them a broader range of options in 
any negotiation. As a consequence, a party with a strong organisation can impose itself 
upon its parliamentaty leaders and limit their manoeuvrability193 . 
The degree of dominance a party exercises over its leaders, in combination with 
a leader's personal agenda, has a significant effect on government formation and must 
be included within any theoretical framework. To ignore this aspect is to remove the 
19 t Strom, 1990, p.27. 
192 It is beyond the confines of this thesis to discuss the correlations between party structure and the 
differing levels of power afforded to leaders. However, for a discussion on this topic Moar (1995) 
provides a worthwhile article focusing on levels of centralisation and decentralisation and 
the affect this has on government formation negotiations. 
i 
76 
"people" element out of politics and to assume it is a purely rational game. 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to operationalise these variables by measuring the 
degree of party constraints on parliamentary leaders, or whether a leader's office 
preferences were central ingredients in negotiations or merely peripheral concerns. 
Particular outcomes may be indicative of these influences, in that they appear 
"irrational" by undermining policy influence maximisation, or later through intra-party 
conflict expressed through forums like party meetings. 
The Shadow of the Future 
Previously, the question of time was discussed. It was acknowledged that parties look 
ahead when making decisions and that anticipating future consequences plays a large 
part in the course they decide to take in the present. A decision in one arena must 
anticipate the effects in the others. Two of the most important decisions any party can 
make are: (a) whether or not to participate in government; and (b), with which party it 
will be associated. The first decision is probably the easiest, as political parties want to 
influence public policy. Holding everything else equal, rational actors always prefer to 
have their rewards sooner than later194 . However, in some circumstances it may be the 
case that policy influence may be maximised by staying outside government. 
The second question is much more problematic. Parties must anticipate the 
future consequences of any inter-party relationship when in government. The first 
consideration each party's parliamentary leaders must make is how the relationship will 
affect party cohesion, both within parliament and within the overall party. If 
f-t93 Moar, p.68. 
194 Strom,1990, p.46. 
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parliamentary leaders wish to remain leaders, then they must maintain the party 
organisation, keeping not only their faction satisfied, but their opponents as well. 
Another consideration pertinent to both questions is how the relationship will 
affect future electoral prospects. Being in government normally means a loss in 
electoral support. For example, Rose and Mackie (1983) in a study of 300 European 
elections, found incumbency to be a liability in 65% of the cases195• What remains 
unclear is the effect of negative incumbency on individual parties within a coalition 
government, or in a supported minority government. This problem is reflected in Rose 
and Mackie's study, where in 36.5% of elections there is a government reshuffle, which 
is "a partial reinstatement of some but not all of the coalition partners" 196. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis it is not important to reach a definitive 
conclusion as to why or how incumbency affects parties in government. It is important 
to recognise that participating in a coalition government, as far as can be ascertained, 
has a negative effect on future electoral chances and that parties recognise this fact and 
incorporate it into their decision making197 • Therefore, the "shadow of the future" 
means that attaining office has negative consequences, and that these negative 
consequences may not be distributed evenly amongst coalition partners. 
In summary, this section has presented a broad schema of analysis on government 
formation. It encompasses a multi-level framework that conceptualises the process of 
government formation and has looked at specific variables that impact upon the process. 
The findings of this section are organised into a Table of assumptions (Table 3 .1 
l below). This Table seeks to make the assumptions more recognisable and emphasis15 
195 Rose, and Mackie, T.T.(1983), "Incumbency in Government: Asset or Liability" in, Daalder, H., and 




their interdependent nature. Additionally, the Table summarises the multi-level analysis 
of the theoretical schema which looks at arenas and at intra and inter-party interactions. 
When these general assumptions on government formation are combined with 
the earlier assumptions on the number, size and ideological position of parties, it is 
possible to model scenarios that reveal the elements that promote each type of formation 
outcome. Important in each scenario is the assumption of costs and benefits from the 
perspectives of wing third parties, centre third parties, and major parties. The following 
section combines the party system assumptions with the general assumptions on 
government formation and models particular outcomes based on the earlier analysis. 
~ 197 Strom, 1990, p.46. 
'-
Table 3.1: General Assumptions on Government Formation 
1. Government formation takes place in three inter-dependent arenas, 
(a) Parliamentary 
(b) Electoral 
(c) Internal Party. 
2. Political parties interact within the electoral and parliamentary arena and, 
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(a) The parliamentary arena is characterised by parties which fulfil three roles to 
form, support, or oppose a government. 
(b) The electoral arena is characterised by inter-party co-operation and 
competition. 
3. Political parties seek to attain the following specific goals in each arena, 
(a) Policy influence in the parliamentary arena 
(b) Vote maximisation in the Electoral arena 
( c) Cohesion in the Internal Party arena. 
4. A party does not need to be in government to maximise policy influence. 
5. Each of the arena specific goals are both resources and constraints in the other 
arenas. 
6. Political parties are comprised of, 
(a) Factions, whose goal is to implement their own policy into government 
policy 
(b) Leaders, whose goal is to remain party leaders and attain government 
office. 
7. Parliamentary leade~ersonal goals may not coincide with their parties· goals. 
8. Parties consider future consequences in, 
(a) Time frames of one political cycle. 




The following formation outcomes combine a party system framework with the 
theoretical assumptions. When modelled (Table 3.2) it is possible to speculate on how 
each outcome effects the decision making process of the parties concerned. Implicit in 
this model is the earlier categorisation of the parliamentary arena, which divides them 
into: (a) those parties that comprise government 'G'; (b) those that support government, 
'S'; and (c), those that oppose government 'O'. An 'X' means no party exists in that 
position. The Table does not model all 26 possible outcomes in a five party system, as 
it makes the following logical assumptions: (a) parties with the largest differences in 
policy space cannot work together, (i.e. party A and party E); (b) third parties cannot 
form a single party minority government; ( c) grand coalitions only occur in exceptional 
circumstances198 ; and (d), no one party wins a legislative majority. 
198 Such as during a war or when there appears to be a high level of internal political turmoil, such as in 
an economic crisis or civil unrest. 
-------------------------
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Table 3 .2. Politically viable outcomes in a 5 party system with two major parties, two 
wing third parties and a centre third party, distributed along a polarised left/right 
continuum. 
1 G G G 0 0 
2 0 0 G G G 
3 G G s 0 0 
4 0 0 s G G 
5 s G G 0 0 
6 0 0 G G s 
7 s G s 0 0 
8 0 0 s G s 
9 G G X 0 0 
10 0 0 X G G 
11 s G X 0 0 
12 0 0 X G s 
Key: 0: Opposition, G: Government, S: Support, X: No party 
These 12 outcomes can be divided into three categories. Outcomes 1 and 2 are minimal 
winning coalitions with all coalesable parties choosing to be in cabinet. Outcomes 3 to 
6 are supported coalition minority governments, where one third party or all third 
parties ( on the same side of the political spectrum) decide to support a minority 
coalition government. Outcomes 7 to 8 are supported single party minority 
--- -··--·------ --------·------- ---- ------·--------- --···----·- ----· ·----·- --- - --- -· ·-·--- --···-······-- -- ---··-· ··------- --· --- . ·--···- ·--· ---- - -·-· -····-- -- - - -···-··-·----- -- - ---·-·------- - - - ----···-- --
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governments. Outcomes 9 to 12 reflect the situation where the centre party fails to gain 
any seats resulting in either a, minimal winning coalitions or supported single party 
minority governments. 
Each of these three categories of outcomes, mwc, supported coalition minority 
and supported single party minority governments, involve a different set of calculations 
by the actors as they impact in different ways on a party's goals and resources. The 
actors must take into account possible effects on policy influence, vote maximisation 
and cohesion, and whether to support, form, or oppose a government. By looking at 
each category of outcomes and in combination with the earlier analysis, it is possible to 
model the costs and benefits of each outcome on: ( a) the parties; and (b ), the leaders 
who represent them. 
Minimal Winning Coalitions 
The costs and benefits of participating in a minimal winning coalition affect each party 
in different ways. The main benefit for both types of third party is the acquisition of 
government office which allows the junior partner's parliamentary leaders to further 
their careers. However, every office occupied by a junior coalition partner means one 
less for the senior partner, or major party199• Thus, the ambitions of the major party's 
parliamentary leaders may be undermined, creating an environment of diminished 
loyalty that could affect cohesion within the parliamentary wing of the party and the 
party as a whole. 
199 This assumes that the government will not just keep increasing the number of cabinet positions in 
order to accommodate all senior partne?s MPs who feel they are in line for a promotion. If this were "'-
the case then the 'kudos' of a cabinet position would be devalued as a cabinet post's value in many 
respects lies in its scarcity. 
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Balanced against the loss of office for the major party is an increase in control 
over the junior members of the coalition. The "carrot" of office can also be a "stick" in 
that the threat of removal can influence ministers to take on the senior partner's policy 
wishes as a means of maintaining their position. Not only can office be used to 
influence a junior partner's policy position, it can also influence party loyalties. For 
example, if a major party is close to a legislative majority, it can "buy" votes with 
offices. This may undermine the cohesion of third parties, and improve their own 
chances of maximising votes and policy influence in the next political cycle. 
Another cost of mwc for junior partners is the doctrine of collective cabinet 
responsibility. Any policy decided on in cabinet is regarded as unanimously endorsed 
and supported by government. This means that a junior party may appear to reflect and 
support policies which may then undermine its popularity and future vote maximisation. 
Admittedly, the same argument can be made that policies introduced and passed by 
junior partners can hurt a senior partner. However, it must be remembered that policy 
maximisation for a senior partner entails primarily passing legislation. Policy 
maximisation for a junior partner on the other hand primarily entails amending and 
stopping legislation, before trying to pass their own. 
Participation in a coalition constrains all parties from differentiating themselves 
along policy lines, and reduces the multi-party system (as modelled here) into 
essentially a two block system. One of the causes of this is the inability of each 
coalition member to criticise their partners. The major party benefits the most from this 
situation as it is always going to attract criticism from the Opposition, and to a lesser 
degree from supporting parties. 
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The effect of incumbency has already been discussed, and research suggests that 
governments generally lose support from one election to the next200 . Therefore, 
associating with government in an mwc is likely to also reduce a junior party's share of 
the votes. Further, depending on the size of the party, the negative affects of 
incumbency may be very costly if a party is on, or close to, a set threshold for 
parliamentary representation. Additionally, incumbency costs are especially important 
for all third parties as any votes they lose will more than likely be received by the 
nearest ideological party (i.e., normally, their potential coalition partners). 
Another element which can cause a loss of electoral support for junior partners 
is the reduction in publicity from inter-party competition. In a coalition, competition 
between parties is largely taken away from the public eye, kept behind closed doors, and 
replaced with the impression of co-operation. This may give rise to the perception or 
reality of consensus politics, but creates an environment where the separate identity of 
both partners is brought into question. For example, if the policy compromises by the 
major party are seen as too great then "tail wagging the dog" allegations may be made. 
However, if the junior partners have no policies to call their own, then allegations can 
be made that they are selling out or being controlled by their senior partner. 
Overall, the costs and benefits of mwc are distributed unevenly in favour of the 
major party. What it gives up in office, it more than gains in negotiation leverage on 
policy matters. This implies that for major parties, policy maximisation is enhanced by 
coalitions, while for centre and third parties, it is undermined to some degree. 
Admittedly, the power behind policy maximisation is based on the number of 
parliamentary votes a party holds. This number is the same regardless of government 
membership. However, by entering into government, third parties exchange a degree of 
200 See Rose and Mackie,1983. 
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policy influence for office. This suggests another conclusion that playing a supporting 
role outside government may mean policy influence can be maximised to a higher level. 
Minority Governments: Supported Single Party and Supported Coalition 
Minority government can also be looked at in terms of costs and benefits for all three 
party types: wing third parties, centre third parties and major parties. A minority 
coalition supported by a third party brings with it the costs discussed above regarding 
the interaction between junior and senior coalition partners. In one respect, having to 
rely on a supporting party may create a more consensual atmosphere between coalition 
partners that facilitates a better working environment. However, at a fundamental level, 
the problem still remains for both parties within the coalition to keep their electoral 
identities separate whilst working together. 
An important factor in the calculation of costs and benefits for parties 
contemplating supporting a minority government is where they are placed in the party 
system. A wing third party supporting a major/centre third party coalition is in a 
weaker position than a centre party supporting a major/wing third party coalition. In the 
first situation, the wing third party is trying to drag the coalition further left or right 
(depending on its ideological position). But the centre party is trying to pull the core 
patiy towards the centre, a far easier road to travel in modem mass politics. 
Therefore, in any minority coalition a tension exists between the junior coalition 
partner and the supporting party that needs to be mediated by the major/senior coalition 
partner. In this case, the senior coalition partner is more likely to side with its junior 
partner if it is a centre third party as: (a) they share "office" together; and (b ), the centre 
party has an alternative "government" if it wishes. Therefore, the wing third party's 
----------- --------------------- - ---- - -------------------------------- ----------------- -----
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policy maximisation ability is limited because: (a) the centre party can bring down the 
government if it tries to pull the major party too far left or right; and (b ), voting with the 
Opposition could result in a loss of future vote maximisation by acting with political 
rivals and allegations of acting irresponsibly. 
In the case of a wing third party/major party coalition government then, the 
centre party is again in a strong position. By staying out of a formal coalition it has 
mitigated the problems of: (a) maintaining its own identity; (b) removing the influence 
of the core party over its own parliamentary leaders through office; and ( c ), removing 
the possibility of losing votes through incumbency costs. Additionally, it has kept the 
possibility open of passing legislation with the Opposition. This is not tantamount to 
bringing the government down, as a centre third party can still support the government 
they have voted against in matters of confidence and supply201 • 
Another type of minority situation is a supported single party government, 
where both the centre third party and the wing third party support the major party. The 
difficulty for the major party in this environment is how to maintain its identity when 
maximisation of office does not necessarily reflect a high level of policy maximisation. 
However, as with the situation where the major party is in a coalition with the centre 
third party (supported by a wing third party: see outcome 5 and 6 of Table 3.2), the 
major party is more likely to side with the centre wing party, as that party has the 
alternative to form a government with the Opposition. Another factor which may 
influence consensual relations is the maximisation of "office" for the core party's 
parliamentary leaders. The ability to further a political career may increase one's 




The final outcome to be analysed is where no centre party exists, and the party 
system is comprised of two wing third parties and two major parties. In this situation, 
the decision for a third party is whether to support a minority government or form af 
mwc. The arguments for supporting a government have already been discussed 
previously in one fom1 or another. Specifically, they are: (a) a third party can maximise 
its policy influence just as well from outside cabinet as within, and possibly more so as 
\1 ~ 
the major party cannot influence leaders with office pay-offs; (b) they can maintain their I' 
identity to a higher degree, as t~ force the media to label them by th~ir party name, as 
opposed to being called the junior coalition partner, or government; and ( c ), if a third 
party believes any loss of electoral support for the major party is to their advantage, then 
playing a supportive role is rational as the negative incumbency affect will work in their 
favour. 
The costs of supporting a governn1ent are largely carried by a party's 
parliamentary leaders as opposed to their party per se, as the leaders cannot further 
their careers by occupying high office, whereas the party can still influence policy. On 
the other hand, the major party holds all office positions and can distribute them to its 
parliamentary leaders, thereby decreasing one obstacle to the maintenance of party 
cohesion. 
This conclusion has brought together theorising on governn1ent formation in 
general, and combined it with a particular party system in order to speculate on the 
likely costs and benefits to parties from participating in or supporting government. The 
costs and benefits have been framed in terms of specific short term effects relating to 
the realisation of goals in the parliamentary arena, and the maintenance and ability to 
maximise goals in the electoral and internal party arena. 
~ 201 Admittedly, a centre party passing legislation with the opposition may cause a crisis for government, 
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The resulting cost/benefit analysis indicates, that in many cases the argument for 
playing a supporting role to a minority government is possibly the best way in which to 
maximise goal attainment in all arenas, as parties appear to pay a price for accepting 
office in terms of future vote maximisation. Additionally, third and centre parties 
appear to pay a higher price in terms of internal party cohesion and policy maximisation 
by choosing the mwc option. 
The cost/benefit analysis shows that the variables that affect government 
formation interact in highly complex ways, and that the individuals making the 
decisions may think of their own careers as much as their party's immediate futures. 
When this is the case, attempting to prescribe which outcome option is the most likely 
becomes both problematic and reliant on detailed knowledge of individual politicians, 
and not just their party's negotiating position. However, despite these caveats, the 
earlier model indicates that within the boundaries of this thesis's theoretical framework, 
minority governments can be a viable choice for all parties concerned. 
but in mature systems it should not bring the government down. 
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Chapter 4 
Members of Parliament and Their Perceptions 
The preceding chapter modelled a relationship between a party system ( and one which 
closely reflected the situation in New Zealand) and government formation theory. This 
chapter goes one stage further and transforms the earlier theoretical suggestions into a 
questionnaire written specifically for those individuals who form governments - the 
MPs themselves. Overall, the findings in this chapter support the earlier theorising and 
reveal previously umecognised factors influencing government formation. Briefly, the 
most significant findings in this chapter are: ( a) the importance of ministerial direction 
in the implementation of policy and its effect on the cost/benefit evaluation between 
supporting a government or participating in a coalition; (b) the potential problems major 
parties may have with cohesion due to inter-caucus alliances; (c) the role collective 
cabinet responsibility (CCR) plays in a coalition and its validity in MMP; and (d), the 
part policy plays in each party's coalition negotiation strategies and how it is eroded by 
other goals such as party cohesion and future elections. 
The Study 
120 MPs were written to either requesting an interview in Wellington in the second and 
third weeks of February 1999, or in Christchurch at a mutually convenient time. Given 
that the period in Wellington was timed to coincide with the first week of parliament in 
the New Year, it was anticipated that MPs would be more willing to participate as their 
schedules would be more flexible. Fortunately, this appeared to be the case and the 
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author interviewed 39 MPs in Wellington over a two-week period and another 9 in 
Christchurch during the same month202 • Table 4.1 below breaks down the MPs 
according to party and list/constituent type. 
Table 4.1 Interviewed MPs by Party and Status 
Party Type MP MP Total No. 
(list) ( constituent) Interviews. 
(no. party MPs) 
Major 
Labour 6 13 19 (37 ) 
National 6 7 13 (44) 
Sub total 32 ( 81) 
Third/ 
Independents 
NZF 4 1 5 ( 9) 
Alliance 1 3 4 (12) 
ACT 1 1 2 ( 8) 
United 0 1 1 ( 1 ) 
Independent/;Uj 4 0 4 (39) 
Sub total 16 ( 39) 
Total 21 27 48 (120) (40%) 
Methodology 
Personal interviews were chosen over other data collection methods such as a content 
analysis or a mail administered questionnaire for three main reasons204 . First, personal 
interviews afford the researcher greater flexibility in the questioning process, thereby 
allowing additional information to be uncovered via probing supplementary questions. 
Second, any terms that are unclear can be clarified. This ensures a higher level of 
202 See the Bibliography for a full list of the MPs interviewed. 
203 Mauri-Pacifica has not been identified as a party as they were not a registered party during the 
interview period. 
204 Kane, E., (1993), Doing Your Own Research, Marion Boyars, London, UK., p.52. 
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uniformity in terminological comprehension. Finally, personal interviews allow the 
researcher to control the interviewing situation ensuring that questions are discussed in 
the same order and that respondents do not consult one another before giving their 
responses. 
The choice of the personal interviews method proved effective, as it quickly 
became apparent that MPs had a lack of familiarity with some of the terms, even 
though these had been simplified as much as possible. For example, in question two 
(see appendix 1), some MPs were confused about the differences between a single party 
minority government and a minority coalition, and some were unclear as to what 
constituted a grand coalition. These problems were easily solved and confirmed the 
author's choice of not collecting data through mail questionnaires. 
Another important consideration is how well the 48 interviews reflect the 
opinions of MPs as a whole205 • Overall, the 48 MPs interviewed represent just 40 % of 
all MPs. With this number of respondents (which includes a high number of opinion 
leaders, i.e., 4 leaders and 5 cabinet ministers) the data presented in the following 
chapter indicates to a significant degree the opinions of MPs as a whole. Admittedly, 
the conclusions would be even stronger if more MPs had been interviewed; however, it 
must be acknowledged that this is the first study under MMP that has collected data via 
face-to-face interviews and achieved a 40% contact rate within the target group. 
Another advantage that resulted from interviewing such a large section of the 
target group was the high level of "triangulation"206• The methodological rationale for 
triangulation is based upon the belief that data generated from multiple sources 
complements and supports itself by creating "overlaps" on a particular suggestion or 
205 Church, S., (1998), Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Stability in New Zealand, 
Christchurch, University of Canterbury, Thesis: Phd, p.383. 
206 Kane, ibid. 
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topic and leads to firmer conclusions. Stylistically, the questionnaire followed a "funnel 
sequence"207 structure, where questions were asked on general themes that become 
progressively more specific. The rationale behind funnelling is to guide the respondent 
onto a theme by introducing a general topic, and then allowing the interviewer to ask 
more detailed questions. This approach allowed the interviewer to prompt the 
respondent and gain a greater insight into MP perceptions. 
Many of the conclusions and opinions in this chapter are reinforced by direct 
quotes. In the interviews it was stressed that everything said was confidential unless 
individuals agreed to being quoted. This allowed MPs to talk openly and was one of the 
reasons why a great deal of valuable information was recorded. The author would like 
to thank all MPs who agreed to interviews for their time, and extends even greater 
thanks to around 30 plus MPs for their candour. 
The questionnaire presented in this thesis finds some precedent in a recent Phd 
thesis by Stephen Church208 • However, a direct comparison between the two studies is 
methodologically inappropriate. First, Church incorporated results from face-to-face 
interviews with results from mail questionnaires which is, at least, a difficult exercise 
and at worst methodologically inappropriate. Second, Church notes in one section that 
"it is necessary to be careful in interpreting these results, as the aforementioned ranking 
also happens to be the order in which each factor was presented in the survey11209, and 
therefore may suffer from the "donkey vote" factor210. Finally, two of Church's 
207 Frankfort-Nachmis, C., and Nachmias, D., {1996), Research Methods In The Social Sciences, Arnold, 
London, p.260. 
208 Church, S., (1998), Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Stability in New Zealand, Christchurch, 
Canterbury University, Thesis; Phd. 
209 Ibid., p.402. 
21° Fortunately, in this questionnaire there was no evidence of "donkey voting" in any of the results, as 
there is no correlation between the order in which the factors appear in the questionnaire and the order 
in which factors were ranked by MPs. 
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questions that may have been applicable to this study211 did not offer the respondents 
enough options. Therefore, when this study altered these questions to make them 
stronger methodologically, it also made a direct comparison between the studies 
inappropriate. 
Format and Presentation 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts (see appendix 1 ). The first section 
elicited opinions on the past experiences and future expectations of MPs. As well as 
looking at which factors should be important in government formation negotiations and 
which factors were important in 1996. The second section sought to discover how MPs 
perceived the costs and benefits of coalitions and minority governments. The third and 
final section presented a scenario where respondents were asked to indicate what type of 
government they preferred and why. 
4.1 The Questionnaire: Findings and Results 
4.1.1 Past Experiences and Future Perceptions. 
1) Do you think the experience of coalition and minority governments between 
1993 - 1999 was exceptional, or a good indication of how governments will 
operate under MMP? 
• exceptional D 
• good indication D 
• poor indication D 
• don't know D 
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Figure 4.1 
Although, the graph appears to indicate no clear pattern of opinion, in many respects the 
terms a "poor indication" and "exceptional" (i.e., unusual and not likely to be repeated) 
could have very similar meanings, with exceptional being a somewhat stronger form of 
poor indication212 • Therefore, it is possible to say that 27 out of 48 MPs (or 56%) 
believe that the experience of the last 6 years is umepresentative of coalition and 
minority governments in the future. This opinion sterns from the steep learning curve 
many MPs acknowledge has taken place over the last six years in preparation for, and 
the first two years of experience ofMMP. 
212 The inclusion of two words which have similar meanings was done to methodologically strengthen 
this question, as Church in his thesis had the positive choice "good indication" but not a negative 
choice. Therefore, those respondents who might read exceptional as a positive choice would have had 
no suitable response if they believed the last 6 years had been exceptionally bad. 
2) What type of government do you consider is the most likely under MMP in the 
longer term (i.e. the next decade)? 
Please rank from 1 (most likely) to 5 (least likely). 
• single-party majority• 
• grand coalitions • 
• majority coalitions • 
• minority coalitions • 
• single party minority• 








Question two produced strong indications as to what type of government MPs 
believed would occur in the longer term. For those outcomes ranked first, 35 (70%) of 
respondents ranked majority coalitions as the most likely type of government in the 
longer term. This was followed by minority coalitions 8 (17%), then single party 
minority government 3 (6%), and single party majority governments and grand 
coalitions ranked lower still at fourth and fifth respectively. These results generally 
correspond to those of Church in that majority coalitions were overwhelmingly chosen 
by MPs. However, one significant difference is that this thesis places minority 
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coalitions ahead of single party minority governments. One reason for this could be the 
acceptance that future governments need to include independents and very small parties 
(as reflected in the minority coalition government run by National since the coalition 
with NZF terminated). 
4.1.2 Government Formation Negotiations: The Ideal 
3) From the following list of factors, PLEASE RA.NK IN ORDER what you consider 
should be the chief factors in government formation negotiations. 
• Future Elections 
• Office for career advancement 
• Personality clashes 
• Policy 
• Other ---
• Party cohesion 
• Trust 
• Office for resources 
~ Other ---
4) For those factors you ranked 1st and 2nd in question 3 could you explain what impact 
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Questions three and four uncovered what MPs believed should be the chief 
factors in government formation negotiations. Question three gave some broad factors 
to focus on, whilst question four allowed the respondents to explain their choices. In 
the interview respondents were informed that they "should not feel constrained by the 
listed choices" and that they should make use of the two "other" options available. 
Admittedly, very few did use the "other" options and if they did so it was to say, "doing 
what is best for the country", which on prompting became "doing what is best for the 
country as reflected by our policy". However, by employing this approach it was 
possible to find out why certain factors were important to MPs, and more importantly 
how they interacted and affected each other. 
In question three the overwhelming first choice by 38 MPs (79%) was policy. 
On its own this result is not particularly meaningful as each MP may have different 
levels of commitment to policy vis-a-vis the other factors in a negotiation or even 
different ideas of what policy the party is committed to. Therefore, it was not until 
question four that the "policy" response was put into context. Broadly, policy is seen to 
impact on coalition fomrntion negotiations by defining which parties can and cannot go 
into coalition together. That is, a general consensus emerged that parties need to have a 
significant overlap in core policies in order to "travel" in the same direction towards 
similar goals. For example Jim Anderton said, "You will not have any coalition if you 
don't have some close association on policy, because if you have two parties that are 
going in different directions in terms of policy, they should never get together in the 
first place" ( interview 1/2/99). 
The follow-up prompt questions were: (a) "how much of a party's core policy 
needs to be in common with a possible coalition partner?"; and (b ), "what is expected to 
occur if too much compromise is made?". The answer to the first question was difficult 
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to quantify as the replies "a lot" and "significant" reflect different levels to different 
people. It can be surmised however, that MPs believe parties must have similar 
thoughts on at least government intervention in the economy and social welfare 
directions in order to coalesce. For example both parties must believe in greater social 
spending and then negotiate a mutually satisfactory level of increase. 
The second follow-up question produced more revealing results, and highlighted 
the connection between the third and fourth ranked factors of party cohesion and future 
elections. MPs perceived that when a party makes what has come to be regarded as 
"too many" policy concessions or is seen to have "too much" policy in common, then 
party cohesion and future election prospects are undermined. Therefore, MPs are aware 
that any compromise in government formation negotiations has ramifications within the 
parliamentary party and the party at large. The following dialogue underlines this 
finding and should be taken as indicative of what MPs believe: 
Question: Do you have to be careful not to leave the founding 
philosophies of the party in a negotiation? 
Absolutely, otherwise the party will fall apart. 
Question: Is that more important than thinking about a future election? 
Well there won't be a future election if you don't have a party, will there? 
Jim Anderton (interview 1/2/99) 
Interestingly, Winston Peters ranked future elections and party cohesion as his 
first and second choices saying, "The obvious one is future elections, that is where your 
mandate is going to be derived from" (interview 18/1/99). Additionally, John Carter, 
whilst not having the same concern about future elections, did agree that policy was 
constrained by party cohesion: 
Question: Do you think when you are giving a policy away that it may be 
hard to bring someone into line because of what you have conceded? 
Absolutely, all those things come into it. They are factors and not just in 
caucuses, there are "party people" who as a consequence of the 
arrangements made in the last coalition, resigned from the National 
party. 
John Carter (interview 10/2/99) 
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The second most highly ranked factor after policy was trust. This difficult to 
define factor was seen as a vital element in any agreement and relates to the individuals 
in a negotiation as opposed to the party they represent. For example, Helen Clark said 
that trust, "comes from the level of personal relationships that develop and politics in 
New Zealand is very tribal" (interview l 7 /2/99). Gerry Brownlee said something 
similar, "Personality and trust go hand in hand" (interview 5/2/99). Additionally, many 
MPs saw trust as something that had to be brought to the negotiation table whilst others 
believed that the implementation of "processes" before and after an election could aid 
and perhaps mitigate a lack of trust. Michael Cullen reflected this school of thought 
when he said, "I think it's a matter of getting the processes right. You probably should 
get those right before an election rather than during an actual negotiation" (17/2/99). 
However, in the final analysis the perceived untrustworthiness of a negotiator 
was seen as "overcomeable" if the option of forming a government was in question (i.e., 
if the situation dictates that trust must be offered and accepted then it will be). This idea 
was a pragmatic acceptance that a party's power is based on its parliamentary numbers 
in combination with its options. Therefore, a party would try and coalesce with a 
suspected "untrustworthy" individual representing a given party if they believed it gave 
them more policy influence. John Carter neatly summarised this reality when he said, 
--- -------------- -------------------------- --------
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"trust is just one of those things that is there, that's commonly understood. It's like 
buying a car from a car salesman, at the end of the day you trust him to a degree of 
some sort or another" (interview 10/2/99). 
To summarise, the responses to question three and four identified what factors 
MPs believed should be important to government formation negotiations and indicated 
how they interacted with each other. As Figure 4.3 indicates, policy was the first 
ranked choice followed by trust, party cohesion and future elections. The two most 
important findings in this section relate to the effect policy is seen to have on 
negotiations. First, a party's overall policy package reflects its philosophy and indicates 
where it wishes to take the country in terms of economic direction and government 
intervention. This policy package initially defines which parties may be compatible, 
(i.e., it delineates possible parliamentary partners). 
The second finding relates to the actual negotiations themselves and indicates 
that policy whilst mooted as the most important factor in government formation 
negotiations, is actually unden11ined and constrained by other factors. For example, 
MPs acknowledge the reality that factors such as party cohesion and future elections 
must be considered simultaneously with policy proposals. Otherwise, they will not 
have a party to implement any policies or the party will be in the powerless position of 
Opposition. Additionally, MPs acknowledge that the implementation of policy relies to 
a large degree on building a relationship with others and that trust is an essential 
element in that relationship. 
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4.1.3 Government formation Negotiations: The reality of 1996 
5) From the same list of factors, PLEASE RANK IN ORDER what you consider to 
have been the chief factors for each party, in the 1996 government formation 
negotiations. 
• Office for resources • Future Elections 
• Party cohesion • Office for career advancement 
• Personality clashes • Policy 
• Trust • Other 
• Other ---
6) For those factors you ranked first and second in question 5, could you explain how 
they affected the negotiations ( i.e., what options they undermined/promoted). 
The Perceptions of all MPs on other Party's Criteria in 1996 
Table 4.2 
MPs Perceptions of their Own Party's Criteria in 1996 
Table 4.3 
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In questions five and six, each party was discussed separately, beginning with 
the respondent's party and then moving onto whichever party the respondent wished to 
discuss. The responses to this section indicated what MPs believed were the major 
factors in the 1996 government formation negotiations. They also allow analysis of 
what parties perceived were important to them, and what parties thought about each 
other. A third of respondents refused to discuss other parties at all, whereas another 
third were willing to discuss one other party. The remaining third had no problem 
discussing all parties. One point that must be made is the reticence of non-Labour MPs 
to discuss at all, as reflected in Table 4.2. This skew has obvious methodological 
implications in that the opinions of non-Labour MPs may be under represented to some 
degree in the results. 
National Party MPs 
In question five, National MPs chose policy as the chief factor in the 1996 negotiations; 
however, as has already been discussed policy does not provide a great deal of insight 
as it means different things to different MPs and their parties. The responses to question 
six indicated that National's aim in 1996 was to maintain power at a reasonable policy 
cost in order to protect the policies it had already put in place. This was revealed by the 
linking of policy with the second most highly ranked factor, that of "gaining power". 
Sir Douglas Graham put it succinctly when he said, "we had certain policies that we 
believed in and we wanted to make certain that they were followed ... whether you say 
that equates with power, no matter what, is another way of putting it, but nobody comes 
to parliament to be in Opposition" (interview 16/2/99). This sentiment was echoed by 
over 75% of all MPs interviewed, as the following quotes illustrate: 
\ 
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Politics is about power, and you are powerless in Opposition, and if you are not 
in power you cannot control the policy initiatives you have put in place. 
Eric Roy (interview 17 /2/99) 
Power, power they (National) don't think about very much else except being in 
government. 
Helen Clark (interview 17/2/99) 
They would get into bed with the devil to get power, they had no scruples. 
Neil Kirton (interview 16/2/99) 
National's "trading policy to protect policy" strategy may appear a 
contradiction, but as Bill Birch pointed out, "an elected government's primary role is 
administration" (interview 16/2/99). Therefore, if a party already has a great deal of 
preferred legislation in place, administration of standing legislation becomes more 
important than . implementation of new legislation. Additionally, the coalition 
agreement signed with NZF stated that if for any reason an agreement on policy could 
not be reached, then the status quo should remain213 . This stipulation favoured 
National, as for the previous six years it had determined what constituted the status quo. 
Another element which must be mentioned in this "power and policy" strategy 
was the place "office" played in the negotiation. If one conceptualises the primary goal 
as power to facilitate policy continuation, then the distribution of executive office 
becomes another currency to achieve this goal. In this respect, National was far more 
willing to "purchase" power by giving the junior partner more positions than its 
representation in parliament warranted. The following excerpt from an interview with a 
National MP reflects this suggestion: 
213 The Coalition Agreement, section 5.1, p.7. 
\ 
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I think we were successful and the others weren't, is because we held pretty 
tightly onto ( established) policy but gave away significant opportunities for the 
other party to be in cabinet and to be recognised disproportionately in the 
executive process. 
Question: You compensated for policy by giving them office? 
Yes, better offices, you name it we did it. 
Anonymous National MP 
After policy and power, the next most highly ranked factors were personality 
clashes, trust and future elections. Many National MPs had anticipated that Bolger and 
Peters could not work together (i.e., that there was very little trust in the relationship 
with NZF). Other anticipated problems were future elections, as National MPs were 
afraid that an association with NZF could lose them future electoral support. However, 
these factors - personality clashes, trust, future elections and even party cohesion - were 
arguably peripheral concerns for National in 1996. The primary goal was to remain in 
power and National adopted a pragmatic approach to achieve this goal. As Sir Douglas 
Graham and others reiterated time and time again, you need to be in power to get 
anything done and being in Opposition leaves you powerless. 
Labour Party MPs 
Labour MPs cited policy as the chief factor for their party in the 1996 government 
formation negotiations, followed by trust, party cohesion and future elections. Many 
Labour MPs said they went into the negotiations with a firm set of policies that could 
not be abandoned. One Labour MP admitted that their party's negotiators had been 
"hard-nosed" in the meeting with NZF because "They were told to be. There was a 
very interesting meeting between caucus and the NZ Council. And we set down three 
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base lines we wouldn't move on" (anonymous Labour MP). This "hard-nosed" 
approach was confirmed by four NZF MPs when they expressed frustration over the 
1996 negotiations with Labour. 
The reasons for Labour's "hard-nosed approach" stemmed from concerns over 
party cohesion and future elections. There was a general belief amongst Labour MPs 
that a rebuilding phase had recently been completed after the "dark years of the 80s", 
and giving too much away in negotiations with NZF could undermine the party again. 
Information to support the above suggestion can be found in some of the reasons why 
Labour was unwilling to give Winston Peters the post of Treasurer. If Peters had been 
given the Treasury position in a Labour/NZF coalition, Michael Cullen would have 
missed out on the portfolio, or had the value of the finance portfolio undermined. If this 
had happened then problems within Labour may have boiled over as "it was not long 
after an attempt to unsettle the Labour leadership led by Cullen, therefore (more so than 
now) he was seen to represent one faction in caucus" (anonymous Labour MP). 
Therefore, in order to maintain the unity of caucus Michael Cullen had to have the 
treasury post, as internal party cohesion was of paramount importance to the Labour 
party214. 
New Zealand First MPs 
In line with all the other parties, eight out of the nine past and present NZF MPs 
interviewed chose policy as the main factor for their party in the 1996 negotiations. 
However, just as for National, NZF's commitment to policy was tempered by the 
pragmatic acknowledgement that you have to be in government to get anything done. 
~ 
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As Winston Peters pointed out, "what are you in politics for, some sort of sounding 
board or are you going to do something?" (interview 18/1/99). In addition to choosing 
policy, NZF MPs ranked three other factors as important in 1996: the necessity of office 
for resources, the need to gain experience, and the distribution of parliamentary 
numbers. 
The "office for resources" factor comes from the perceived "resource deficit" a 
third party has due to its small parliamentary size. NZF believed that the lack of 
resources allocated by parliamentary services undermines any third party's ability to 
research, write and assess policy within a coalition. Exacerbating this need was a 
perceived lack of trust between NZF and its coalition partner. As Peters said, "No 
minority party will ever take a position in a coalition government without putting 
themselves right next to the Treasury, because you never know what's going on 
otherwise" (interview 18/2/99). Information to support this statement comes from an 
unlikely source, Bill Birch. He said, "The fact was Peters wanted to be Treasurer, and 
the influence that it carries. And I can understand that. A party that was inviting itself 
into a coalition agreement wanted to have access to all the economic and fiscal advice 
of government; that's understandable" (interview 16/2/99). 
The factor of wanting to "gain experience in office" was another reason why 
NZF MPs were willing to swap policies for cabinet posts. As the following quote 
highlights, all NZF MPs with the exception of Peters lacked experience as MPs let alone 
as government ministers. As one NZF MP said, "we wanted to maximise our 
opportunity to get expertise as ministers, we wanted the experience of senior office for 
the good of the party. We215 didn't think about career advancement, we wanted the 
t-=,' 4 Some said it was because Winston Peters couldn't do the job, but Labour also had the option to 
' sideline this position with a finance portfolio as National did, thus this argument seemed weak at best. 
"'I\. f\ , ' 
. \,-"' i 
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knowledge and experience as quickly as we could" (anonymous). Unsurprisingly, non -
NZF MPs were not as charitable: they overwhelmingly believed NZF did not really 
have many policies, that they only wanted to advance their careers via office, and that 
Winston Peters wanted the treasury for personal career reasons. 
Another factor of central importance to NZF in the 1996 government formation 
negotiations was simply "the numbers". If NZF had formed a 54 seat minority 
coalition government with Labour, then Jim Anderton and the Alliance would have held 
the balance of power. This was unacceptable to many NZF MPs as they saw the 
Alliance as a "bunch of ning nongs" (sic) (anonymous). Furthermore, they did not 
believe that the Alliance's party cohesion was sufficiently strong as Jim Anderton did 
not "command that group of flakies" (sic) (anonymous). Lastly, many MPs from all 
parties noted that it would have been easier for Winston Peters to work with Jim Bolger 
(rather than Jim Anderton and Helen Clark) due to personality conflicts and gender 
issues. Whether this was true is difficult to ascertain, but that was the perception 
amongst 20% of interviewed MPs. 
In summary, the factors which MPs believed were important in the 1996 government 
formation negotiations appear on the surface the same for each party. On closer 
analysis however, they differ. This reflects and reinforces the results from questions 
three and four; that in reality policy is not always the central element in formation 
negotiations. As the above research has revealed each party in the 1996 government 
formation negotiations faced different constraints which defined their priorities. In each 
case the importance of policy appears to have been weakened by other factors. 
For example, policy for the National Party revolved around administering 
current legislation in order to carry out their mandate largely via ministerial direction. 
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Such things as party cohesion and future elections were not that important. As Bill 
Birch said, "I don't think future elections are even on your mind in a coalition 
agreement, you have just concluded an election and the next election is a long away" 
(interview 16/2/99). National's primary goal was to remain in power and the currencies 
of future policy and office gave them the flexibility to do so. Labour did not have this 
flexibility. They had to worry about party cohesion and future elections. For them the 
goal of attaining power was subordinate to the goal of maintaining a viable political 
force in the future . Finally, NZF wanted ministerial offices in order to gain much 
needed experience of government. Additionally, it wanted the new Treasury portfolio 
to redress the perceived "resource deficit" a third party faces. Therefore, like National, 
policy was balanced and perhaps subordinated by NZF's other goals. 
4.1.4 Costs and Benefits of Coalition and Minority Governments. 
The following section looks at the perceived costs and benefits of minority and coalition 
governments. The rationale behind this was to find the perceptions of MPs as a group, 
as well as to ascertain differences in perceptions between MPs from major parties and 
those from third parties. The questions were grouped into four topic areas, and although 
most of the questions could be answered with either a "yes" or "no", prompting always 
followed so that MPs had to justify their answers. It was through prompting that the 
greatest amount of information was gained, affording a valuable insight into the 
perceptions of the MPs interviewed. 
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Topic 1: Tliird parties supporting a minority government. 
1 - Putting aside differences in leadership and personalities, do you believe a third party 
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Figure 4.4 
The graph indicates that the vast majority of MPs believe a third party does not have 
more influence outside a government. The reasons given for this were first, when 
standing outside and supporting a minority government the supporting party only has 
the ability to stop and amend policy, but not influence policy formation. Second, if a 
supporting party does manage to get some policy through cabinet, it cannot control its 
implementation through the ministries. Significantly, all leaders, cabinet ministers and 
shadow cabinet ministers that were interviewed agreed with these reasons, as well as, 
the general conclusion that a third party has to be in government to maximise policy 
influence. 
Bill Birch was adamant on this point saying, "No, of course it doesn't (have 
more policy influence outside), it's a much more workable arrangement if you are in a 
coalition, you make compromises" (interview 10/2/99). Helen Clark was equally 
adamant . Her response to the question of whether one has to be in cabinet was clear, 
"Yes, absolutely. That's where I think the Alliance had the wrong end of the stick in the 
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approach they used to take. I think that they have now worked out that being part of 
government was very important. They used to say it didn't matter who was in 
government. Parliament can rule, but the executive rules" (interview 17 /2/99). 
Helen Clark's subsequent response suggested the strongest reason why a third 
party should consider participating in government: "The truth is so many things a 
government does, do not come to Parliament. So many things you can only achieve by 
virtue of holding executive office" (interview 17/2/99). This statement fits closely with 
Bill Birch's view that a great deal of policy can be implemented via ministerial direction 
without the need for legislation. Consequently, if this suggestion is applied to the 
question under discussion, the more policy implemented via ministerial direction the 
greater the need for a third party to be in cabinet. If the amount of legislation is reduced 
thanks to ministerial decisions, then the power to influence policy by a third party is 
also reduced. This holds true for both supporting third parties in the centre and third 
paiiies on the wings of the political spectrum. 
Another reason why supporting a minority government is not seen as optimal 
was suggested by Ron Marks, Winston Peters and Peter Dunne. They all saw the lack 
of resources for a third party as undermining their ability to evaluate and research 
legislation they may be asked to support216 • As Winston Peters said, "You wouldn't 
attempt to regulate government from the outside, you would be under an enormous 
disadvantage of lack of resources"( interview 18/2/99). Third parties rely very heavily 
on the information presented to them by the party they are supporting. In effect, this 
resource deficit forces a third party to trust the government it is supporting to a 
significant degree. 
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2 - Do you believe a third party can avoid associational costs at the following election 
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The replies to question two indicate that overall a majority of MPs believe a third party 
can avoid associational costs at the following election by supporting a minority 
government. However, MPs from third parties were almost evenly split on the issue. 
One third party MP, Rodney Hide, gave one of the frankest responses to this question. 
He believes that you cannot avoid associational costs in the long term, "as the public 
aren't that gullible". However, a large proportion of MPs who belong to major parties 
believe a third party can avoid associational costs by staying outside a government. 
Unsurprisingly, it appears that the type of party an MP belongs to significantly colours 
perceptions on this issue. 
~Both leaders felt that every party has a base level of needs for personnel and resources, whether you 
~ have one MP or five, and that the present allocation of resources doesn't acknowledge this. 
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3 - Is a third party able to maintain party cohesion better by supporting a minority party 
as opposed to joining a coalition? 
20 
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The graph indicates that the majority of MPs believe that a third party can maintain 
cohesion at a higher level by supporting a minority government. These two opposing 
opinions were based on two main beliefs. First, that being in power binds a third party 
together, with the example of the Greens leaving the Alliance as a somewhat tenuous 
example of what happens without the trappings of power. The second belief that power 
is actually a divisive force was based on the case of NZF splitting. Interestingly, the 
third party leaders had different opinions. One said that being in government increased 
party cohesion through the responsibilities of power, whilst another said the opposite. 
A third chose "don't know". Therefore one conclusion to be drawn is that one out of 
every two MPs agrees with this proposition. They believe that it is easier for a third 
party to maintain cohesion if it is not in a formal working relationship with another 
party, like that found in a coalition government. 
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As the graph indicates, the overwhelming perception amongst MPs is that a supporting 
third party needs the ability to criticise a government. Many of the responses were, "its 
critical", or "vital". When asked "why?" the common response was "branding". MPs 
believe that a supporting third party must criticise the government in order to maintain 
their branding and keep their "niche constituency". For example, Doug Graham said, 
"It's politically very necessary, if it becomes just a pale imitation (of the government) 
it's doomed" (interview 16/2/99). Peter Dunne was one third party MP who believed it 
was very important, but noted that the way in which a third party criticises the 
government is the key question. As he saw it, criticism has to satisfy the goal of 
highlighting your difference from the government without undermining a working 
relationship. Michael Cullen said something similar, in that he believed it was 
important, but could only work if both parties had agreed protocols to follow. In this 
respect, it appears a culture needs to develop amongst the parties and the media in order 
for "criticism" of this sort to help branding without creating government crisis and 
instability. 
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Topic 2: A single party mi11ority government. 
1 - Assuming a minority government can maintain its identity better than if it went into 
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Figure 4.8 
The responses to this question were evenly split for major party respondents. For those 
who said "yes" branding was an issue. For those who said "no" being solely to blame 
"when things went wrong" was a central concern. The second most frequent response 
was "don't know", and this seemed to be due to the lack of experience MPs have had 
with single party minority governments. Despite the apparent lack of a decisive trend, it 
was apparent that the question of identity was very important to MPs. For those who 
answered in the affirmative, the concern was that the single party minority government 
would get all the blame for unpopular reforms and that they would be seen as "weak" 
due to the high level of compromise this type of government was perceived to require. 
For those who answered negatively the belief was that any government that allows a 
party to present its own branding in isolation must be more advantageous than one 
having to take into consideration a coalition partner. 
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2 - A minority government has to look for a majority on a case by case basis, do 
you believe this is a strength or weakness? 
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The responses to this question also did not fit into any clear pattern. For example, MPs 
who chose majority government later on in the questionnaire would answer, "strength" 
while those who said they were supporters of MMP would say "weakness". Overall, 
the two biggest responses were "strength" and "both". Those who answered "both" 
believed it was better to have legislation slowed down as it is receives greater 
consideration. They also believed it was a weakness when legislation could not be 
passed quickly in response to sudden economic changes. For example, Bill Birch said, 
" ... in some cases it's a weakness, it could actually bring to a halt very important 
reforms, and reforms are generally unpopular" (interview 16/2/99). 
One surprising answer came from John Carter, the National Party Whip. The 
author anticipated that a whip would be against a case by case approach to legislation 
because of the extra amount of work involved, especially a whip in a minority coalition 
government. However, his response was, "A strength funnily enough, because we 
really do have to sit down and work hard on it. It's a pain in the backside, make no 
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mistake about that and a huge amount of work compared to when we were a single 
caucus" (interview 10/2/99). It appears John Carter has to deal with Realpolitik in an 
environment that may be adapting to an MMP culture. Another MP whose response 
summarises the opinions of many was Steve Maharey. He said, "I can see lots of pluses 
for a minority government having to build legislation case by case. But you have to 
have a pretty sophisticated culture for that, and I don't know whether we are going to 
have that in this country for quite some time" (interview 16/2/99). 
Topic 3: A junior partner within a majority coalition 
1- Is the influence a senior partner can have on a junior partner's MPs an 
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As the graph indicates, the majority of MPs agreed with this suggestion. When 
prompted as to why they agreed many pointed to the case ofNZF and how National had 
"split" them by offering cabinet positions to NZF defectors. One senior MP intimately 
involved in the National/NZF divorce replied, "I'd never admit to that, but one always 
has to be mindful of the strategies and tactics of your partner. .. major parties forever and 
a day will deny that they undermine their junior coalition partner, (but) brand spanking 
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new parties that find themselves in a coalition with well established parties are always 
going to have this problem" (anonymous). 
2 - Do you believe the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility, as it is presently 
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The response to this question was fairly conclusive. A significant majority of those 
interviewed believed collective cabinet responsibility (CCR) as it is presently practised 
forces the junior coalition partner to support policy that it otherwise might not wish to. 
This question and the following one, elicited the most wide ranging responses and 
prompted MPs to discuss the cabinet manual, coalition agreements and constitutional 
matters. One MP who said "no" to this question was Winston Peters. He believes that 
the doctrine binds both partners equally as, "those things (policies) should be signed 
into the coalition agreement, so having signed the coalition agreement that question has 
already been confronted" (interview 18/2/99). In effect, he believes that the coalition 
document superseded the cabinet manua1217, and that National had subsequently acted in 
217 Although this is not explicitly set out in the Coalition Agreement, section 7 suggests that this 
document supersedes the Cabinet Manual, especially stipulation 7.3.d.x, p.8. 
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bad faith. The discussion on this topic led quickly to the next question on CCR and is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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Figure 4.12 
Overall the results are quite clear. A majority of major party MPs support the doctrine 
of CCR, whereas a majority of third party MPs believe the doctrine of CCR is not a 
valid practice in a coalition. For example, MPs such as Bill Birch, Doug Graham and 
Jonathan Hunt were very clear in their views and stated that there is no other way to run 
cabinet (i.e.,: decisions have to be made; they must be binding on cabinet; and, no 
member of government should publicly dissent). However, there were also significant 
numbers of MPs who said that while CCR is valid it needs to be modified. Also, there 
were significant numbers of MPs who said "no" but still believed CCR should be 
modified. In reality, these two groups are the similar, except that the first group does 
not perceive that "modifying" CCR actually changes the doctrine. 
Labour and the Alliance had the largest group of MPs who believed CCR should 
be modified. It appears that work is under way between the two parties to put in place 
processes that enable a junior coalition partner to stand outside of the government they 
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are a part of and criticise policy. For example, Jim Anderton's response to the question 
"So you can criticise the government you are part of?" was, "You don't have to criticise 
the government, you can criticise the policies" (interview 1/2/99). However, this 
perception would seem to draw a very fine line between government and policies, and if 
implemented would in effect replace CCR. 
Logically, Jim Anderton and others like him, do not believe that CCR (as it is 
presently practised) is a valid doctrine in coalition government. Michael Cullen also 
intimated that CCR is no longer a valid practice in coalition government when he said, 
"I think it (CCR) has to be regarded as somewhat looser. I don't think a junior partner 
can go out and directly attack a policy as wrong, that's rather strange. But it's perfectly 
legitimate to say we would rather have done this or that, but this is the best deal we can 
get for the moment, but our policy still remains x y z and that's what we told the public 
before the election" (interview 17/2/99). If a change did occur as suggested by Michael 
Cullen, then the doctrine would be effectively negated, as it is impossible to say CCR 
exists when each partner can publicly disagree with cabinet policy. 
An associated question that arose was whether a coalition agreement has 
precedence over the Cabinet Manual. It would appear from what happened in the 
NZF/National coalition that the Cabinet Manual has precedence, and is set in 
"constitutional stone". In reality, the Cabinet Manual is a document written by the 
cabinet secretary and largely based upon constitutional conventions which can be 
changed on the direction of the Prime Minister. Therefore, if a junior partner wants to 
balance the power basis within a coalition, the Cabinet Manual can be jointly altered by 
the coalition partners to ensure that the written executive procedures complement and 
not undermine the coalition document. 
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In summary, when these answers are combined with the previous answer, the 
resulting conclusion is that 69% of all MPs interviewed believe CCR forces a junior 
partner to support policy it may not wish to. It also shows that 66% of MPs from major 
parties are quite happy with this and see CCR as a valid practice. Unfortunately, this 
perception is not held by 69% of MPs from third parties who believe CCR is not a valid 
practice in coalition government. Therefore, the responses to these two questions 
indicate that there is an area of contention between potential junior and senior partners. 
Its nexus is an FPP generated and refined process that has been continued under MMP. 
Topic 4: The senior party in a majority coalition. 
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Figure 4.13 
This graph shows that opinion on this question is almost evenly split. However, those 
who answered in the affirmative gave compelling reasons why senior parties may find 
party cohesion more problematic in the future. The most obvious reason why cohesion 
is affected by a coalition comes from the resentment some major party backbenchers 
have about the lack of advancement opportunities. One National backbencher, in 
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response to this question replied, "Yes, let's face it there is a huge amount of pain when 
you see first timers get portfolios and you don't. .. and then your PM sings the praises of 
coalition MPs who have been given that opportunity!" (anonymous interview). 
A second reason can be attributed to the discontent backbenchers feel from 
being superseded by their junior coalition partner. A number of National MPs 
expressed discontent about having to deal with NZF in the first instance and then having 
their own proposals turned down by cabinet only to see similar proposals from the NZF 
caucus given consideration. More than one National MP indicated that this situation 
played a significant part in Jim Bolger's removal. The comment was that if he had been 
"closer to his own caucus" then he would not have been replaced. 
The third and most significant finding regarding cohesion reveals why a senior 
party may find cohesion harder to maintain in a coalition: the possibility of inter-caucus 
solidarity. Two Labour MPs said, "I might find a closer alliance as a backbencher MP 
to somebody in the minority party than I might do to someone in my own party" 
(anonymous interview). This attitude was elaborated on in the questionnaire's last 
section, and the following interview excerpts highlight how inter-caucus solidarity has 
the potential to weaken senior party cohesion. 
I'd want a majority coalition, because I want to work with people on the 
left of me on certain issues ... (if) we are looking at a caucus that has 
grown inside the Labour party by another 7 people, those 7 people are to 
the right faction of our party, then I am going to want a minority partner 
to the left of me. 
So you are saying the internal distribution of power in the Labour party 
would push you to a position of wanting the left involved, otherwise you 
are going to be rolled by the right of your party? 
Yes 
So you are thinking in policy terms as opposed to party terms? 
yes (anonymous interview) 
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2- Do you believe that a coalition government shares the responsibility for unpopular 
policies evenly between the junior and senior partners. 
II) 
C. 










m Third party 
II Major Party 
This question was aimed at discovering whether MPs believe there is a systemic 
disadvantage in terms of responsibility for either coalition partner. The results indicate 
that 21 MPs who had an opinion believe responsibility is shared unevenly between 
coalition partners. For ex amp le, members of third parties ( or potential junior partners) 
who answered "no" believed they were unfairly treated and received most of the blame 
for unpopular policies. Similarly, members of main parties who also answered "no" 
believe that senior partners receive most of the blame218• 
More specifically, of the 10 National MPs who gave an opinion, 7 said "no" and 
believed that the senior partner takes the blame for unpopular decisions. The 16 Labour 
MPs who gave an opinion on the other hand, were evenly split on the issue. Thus, one 
conclusion to be drawn is that National's coalition experience has led them to believe 
that the senior partner in a coalition takes more responsibility for unpopular decisions. 
The other MPs are evenly split on the issue or simply don't know. 
218However, one woman National MP said she believed that junior partners "got the rough end of the 
stick". 
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In summary, this section highlighted some of the important perceptions regarding the 
costs and benefits of supporting a minority government or joining a coalition 
government, both from the perspective of MPs as a whole and according to party types. 
The most important findings in terms ofthis study are: (a) the necessity for a third party 
to participate in a coalition to maximise policy influence; (b) the importance for a 
supp01iing party to be able to criticise the government; ( c) major parties believe CCR is 
still a valid practice in coalition situations, but junior partners see it as a means of 
forcing them into supporting policy they may be unhappy with; and (d), the problems 
faced by all parties in maintaining cohesion. 
4.1.5 The Scenario: MPs Choose Coalition or Minority Government 








C D E 
4 45 13 
RIGHT 
Choose one party from the scenario above which you think best reflects your 
party's ideological position as perceived by voters and the media as well as yourself. 
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From the above scenario, taking into consideration the parliamentary 
representation of each party and the individual MPs themselves, what type of 
government outcome would you prefer and why ( i.e., majority coalition, minority 
coalition, single party minority etc) ? 
MP's Preferred Government Type 











The results shown in Figure 4.15 show the type of government MPs preferred from this 
particular scenario. Most MPs thought the distribution of parliamentary seats in the 
scenario was one that might in fact occur after the next election. However, this was not 
its intention. The parliamentary numbers were chosen so that both National and Labour 
MPs had the same scenario to work with (i.e., so that both could form a variety of 
government types if they so wished). The biggest problems MPs had with this question 
were the party positions on the five-point left to right ideological scale. A number of 
MPs from both main parties attempted to say they could not answer the question as 
"their" party included the centre. However, when the phrase "as perceived by voters 
and the media as well as yourself' was restated their initial reticence disappeared. 
Overall, 24 of the 46 MPs (52%) who answered this question preferred a 
majority coalition of either A/B/C or C/D/E. The main reasons given for this were: (a) 
that it is better to have a parliamentary majority so that "your" legislation can go 
through the house; (b) because disagreement over policy is kept behind closed doors; 
and (c), a majority government has the greatest pool of MPs from which to choose a 
cabinet. The above reasons would seem to indicate that MPs favour a majority coalition 
125 
government. In many ways, this attitude reflects the long histories of most MPs under 
the FPP electoral system. 
Of the 24 MPs who chofse a majority coalition government, only 3 came from l 
National. National's other 9 MPs chose minority government of some form, either a 
single party minority government (6) or a minority coalition D/E (3). The reasons given 
for the minority options preference stretched from the magnanimous "it gives more 
flexibility to the smaller parties" (anonymous interview), to perhaps the more realistic 
response, "our experience has shown it's much more workable not having a detailed 
coalition agreement" (anonymous interview). Additionally, a large proportion of 
National MPs believed that smaller parties have more influence inside a coalition, 
therefore why let them in? When this is combined with the belief that a minority single 
party government is more "workable" because they have all the cabinet posts, a pattern 
emerges. This pattern supports the conclusion that National's experience over the last 
two years has led it to believe it is better for a major party to run a minority government, 
as it maximises policy influence at the expense of the minor parties. Furthermore, this 
conclusion is consistent with N ational's pragmatic focus on the maximisation of power 
in order to maintain the status quo and maximise policy influence. 
Labour Party MPs preferred a majority coalition government of A/B/C (for the 
reasons suggested earlier), or a minority coalition A/B. The A/B preference was based 
on the belief that in order to do well in the next three or four terms, a relationship has to 
be nurtured with the Alliance, and that the centre party C will not exist in any 
significant numbers. In fact, a number of Labour MPs indicated that even if Labour 
won an outright majority it would like to work closely with the Alliance219 . However, 
when prompting respondents on what they meant by "working closely" it became 
219 Although, these same MPs acknowledged that that was unlikely under MMP. 
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apparent that this ranged from "consultation" to cabinet posts. In other words the 
details of such an arrangement were vague. 
One prompt question that was put to all major party MPs who chose to coalesce 
with a third party to their left or right, attempted to uncover the degree of power they 
perceived a wing third party ( i.e., one that is ideologically placed on the outside of a 
major party) had in the scenario. Without exception, the responses indicated that a wing 
third party is perceived to be lacking in any significant power. The following interview 
excerpts from a senior Labour Party MP illuminates this point: 
Question: One would anticipate that with 13 seats, party 'A' has a strong 
hand, but the reality of the situation is that if they bring down a 
government, they are only helping the right, so their strength is really 
very minimal. 
That's absolutely right, and that has been the case in Sweden. They did 
bring down the government in 1990. 
Question: And did the electorate see them as irresponsible? 
That's right. 
Question: So really the Alliance or any 1ving party has minimal power? 
Yes, but its not in the interest of the large centre party to rub that in. 
(anonymous interview) 
Although these sentiments reflect the general attitude many MPs have about wing third 
parties, it has to be qualified to some extent. If any third party (i.e., wing or centre) 
decides to bring down the government on an issue of populist appeal, then the outcome 
is anticipated to be positive for that third party. This point was made a number of times 
by senior MPs from all parties. Thus, the power of all third parties to influence a 
government from the outside rests with their ability to threaten an election. However, 
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this threat is seen as empty unless the major party implements, or tries to implement, 
policy that is very unpopular. 
MPs from both wing and centre third parties agreed with this logic, 
acknowledging the relative powerlessness of their position. Presumably, this is one 
reason why they believe it is better to be inside a coalition as opposed to supporting a 
minority government. Rodney Hide, an ACT MP and one of the better placed 
individuals to comment on this situation said "You would think we have more power by 
being outside the government, because here we are; we have done no deal; we don't take 
responsibility for the government, but at the end of the day there is only one thing that 
you can do and that's put a gun to their head and shoot them and that's a big 
step ... causing an election is a big deal" (interview 8/2/99). 
The limited power of a wing party stems from it only having one party to 
support or coalesce with. However, as was noted by six MPs this is not true for a centre 
third party in a situation where it can theoretically form a government with major parties 
to their right or left. This additional option allows a centre party to defeat a government 
it may have been supporting formally or informally without holding an election. It can 
then participate in the formation of another government, or allow another government to 
be formed. 
This increase in options directly correlates to an increase in negotiating power, 
and means a centre third party is more powerful than a wing party even, if it has less 
parliamentary seats. A wing third party has the ability to defeat policies favoured by the 
government without bringing it down ,and therefore has a certain amount of influence 
or negotiating power. However, this tactic has to be used very carefully otherwise the 
wing party can make its closest ally look like a "lame duck" administration and 
negatively affect both parties' chances at the next election. 
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In summary, the results discussed in this section reinforce the conclusions drawn 
from earlier sections and indicate that there is a commonality of perceptions amongst 
significant numbers of MPs. It also suggests that each party has a preferred type of 
government outcome, and the type of party an MP belongs to (i.e., whether you are in a 
third party or a major party) influences which type of government is preferred. This 
section also highlights the perceived powerlessness of wing parties vis-a-vis major 
parties. Collectively, the findings of this section in combination with previous section, 
allow certain conclusions to be reached about government formation in New Zealand. 
These conclusions are presented in the following section. 
4.2 Conclusion 
The results from the questionnairts first section indicated, that MPs believed minority ( 
and coalition governments between 1993 and 1999 have been exceptional or a poor 
indication of how governments will operate under MMP. When this is compared with 
the 1996 findings of Church, it appears that MPs have changed their minds. In 
Church's study the majority of MPs believed that the three years between 1993-1996 
were a good indication of how minority and coalition governments would operate under 
MMP. This suggests that the first two years of MMP has created a steep learning curve 
for New Zealand's parliamentarians and that they do not anticipate making the same 
mistakes twice. Neither do they believe MPs will learn to act more suitably in the 
future. 
The answers to the second question in this section revealed another change in 
attitudes. While Church's surveys put majority coalitions as the most likely government 
outcome in the future, this study indicates the number of MPs considering minority 
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options has increased. When this is seen in conjunction with responses from the 
scenario in section four, it is possible to say that minority options are more likely in the 
future. This trend would probably appear even stronger if more National MPs had been 
interviewed vis-a-vis Labour and third party MPs, as MPs from National seemed far 
more likely to choose a minority option of some description. 
The second section looked at what should be important in coalition formation 
negotiations and what was important in the 1996 negotiations. Unsurprisingly, policy 
was chosen as the most important factor overall. However, each party prioritised policy 
in a substantially different way. This research suggests that MPs believe policy should 
be the focus in coalition formation negotiations, but the experiences from 1996 
indicated that in reality policy goals were undermined by many other factors. For 
example, in 1996 Labour had to keep very closely to its promised election mandate, 
fearing future electoral losses. Labour was also constrained by the need to maintain a 
high level of party cohesion that precluded swapping policy for office. National did not 
have these constraints and was focused on gaining the government benches; it swapped 
future policy and office to protect six years of policy change. In retrospect, it appears 
NZF chose to ignore party cohesion and future elections in order to gain office (i.e., for 
experience, or possibly individual career advancement). 
Therefore, the 1996 experience indicates that policy was not the most important 
factor in the coalition negotiations and that: (a) a party's recent internal history has a 
great bearing on negotiations due to the constraints it places on its present bargaining 
position; (b) whether or not a party is in government, and how long it has been part of 
government, has a significant impact on the negotiations; and (c), the level of 
pragmatism within a party regarding the acquisition of power is vitally important to the 
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flexibility of a bargaining position and the prioritising of policy goals vis-a-vis other 
goals. 
The responses to the third section of the questionnaire revealed many of the 
trade-offs parties make when considering coalition or minority governments. The first 
question received a very clear response confirming that policy influence can only be 
maximised from inside a coalition. The reasons for this are compelling. Within a 
coalition, a third party has the ability to affect legislation as it is being created and then 
guide it through the ministries. Also, within a coalition a third party has more 
resources220 which is an important consideration. It appears that third parties in New 
Zealand operate under a resource deficit when in parliament. However, the most 
compelling reason to participate in government comes from the majority party's ability 
to implement policy by ministerial direction, thereby minimising the power of the house 
and the significance of a third parties' parliamentary representation. 
MPs also believe that a third party needs to criticise a government in order to 
maintain its branding. This question was asked from the perspective of a third party 
supporting a minority government, and the answers reveal that it is critical for third 
parties to differentiate themselves from their closest rivals. Intuitively, it would seem 
that a third party needs to worry more about branding when in a coalition as it has a 
bigger problem with maintaining its own identity. However, this necessity for a third 
party to maintain its identity has not yet developed into a culture whereby criticism of a 
senior partner can be made without causing problems with working relationships and 
government stability. In this respect a proper MMP culture has yet to develop amongst 
parties and the media. 
220 These resources refer to the logistical support provided by the public service. 
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This subject connects with another theme, the doctrine of collective cabinet 
responsibility. Overwhelmingly, MPs believe CCR forces a third party to support 
policy it does not want to, but nonetheless they believe it is still a valid practise in 
coalition government. These perceptions appear to run counter to the earlier acceptance 
that a third party needs to maintain its branding, as the doctrine of CCR is a mechanism 
by which the senior partner can dominate its junior partner. Therefore, MPs believe that 
a third party must remain a distinct political force, but are unwilling to change the old 
FPP structure of executive government to accommodate that change. This observation 
must, of course, take into account the moves by Labour and the Alliance to construct a 
format that allows a third party to be part of a majority coalition government yet 
distance themselves from some policy outcomes. 
The final theme in section three was party cohesion, with three questions 
eliciting similar perceptions from all party types. Unsurprisingly, the perception 
persists that a third party has to be extremely careful about party cohesion within a 
coalition. The most significant finding, however, was the problem the major parties 
may have with cohesion due to inter-party caucus alliances. For example, if the left 
wing of the Labour party decides to work with the Alliance caucus, then Labour party 
cohesion is weakened. This introduces another element into the coalition versus 
minority government assessment, namely, that if a party's own backbenchers work with 
a coalition partner's caucus against their own, then that party's parliamentary hierarchy 
is undermined. 
The final section revealed that most MPs still desire a majority coalition, as it 
makes passing legislation easier or more efficient. If this preference is combined with 
party types, it is possible to conclude that: third parties whilst accepting the problems 
with branding and CCR, would still prefer to be in a majority coalition as they 
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maximise policy influence, gain office and resources. For major parties the same 
conclusion cannot be reached. The responses to the scenario and earlier questions 
indicate that Labour MPs prefer majority coalition government whereas National MPs 
prefer minority options. The difference in preferences between the two major parties are 
attributable to the history of the parties themselves. Labour realises that it has a 
problematic relationship with the left and right wings of its party and that the Alliance is 
a necessary part of any future. 
This understanding is reflected in the proposed changes to executive 
government structures that will enable the Alliance to be part of a coalition and still 
maintain its branding. This situation has found acceptance within Labour despite the 
realistic perception that a third wing party has very little power even with significant 
parliamentary numbers, unless it can threaten to cause an election on an issue of 
significant public popularity. National, on the other hand, does not see its future tied to 
any other party. It has experienced MMP from the government benches which has 
given it the view that minority options can work. 
As this chapter has shown, the format of the questionnaire was loose enough to 
allow MPs to give detailed responses, while still being focused enough to keep them on 
the same themes. This allowed the perceptions of MPs to be explained in detail and has 
led to some important findings such as the differences between major parties and third 
parties, and differences between Labour, National and NZF. Additionally, the results 
from the questionnaire have highlighted which factors are deemed important in 
government formation negotiations and the different priority individual factors were 
given within each party. The next chapter examines these findings in the light of earlier 
theoretical notions, in order to test their accuracy, to see if amendments are required, 
and finally to make some recommendations. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Theory Meets Practice 
One of the goals of this study was to reflect~ the reality of general government 25 
formation. Another goal was to improve our understanding of New Zealand's political 
situation under MMP. Browne and Dreijmanis believe that to achieve such a goal an 
isomorphism has to be created between the analyst's conceptualisation and those of the 
actors in the real context221 . The author believes an acceptable level of isomorphism 
was reached by achieving a 40% contact rate with the actors themselves, and by then 
using the resulting empirical information to re-evaluate the inductive theorising. In this 
chapter, the findings are summarised and indicate the accuracy and inaccuracy of the 
theoretical framework and suggests suitable amendments. 
As has been noted, a major goal of this thesis was to reflect reality. Another 
important motivation was the perceived need to extend the theoretical research on 
general government formation and in particular, the current, political environment in 
New Zealand. Both these bodies of literature have gaps that need to be addressed, and 
this study has in some small way attempted to fill them. The process to achieve these 
aims began with the research proposition: 
11That the introduction of NfMP in New Zealand is likely to result in an increase in the 
number of single and multi-party minority governments". 
221 Browne and Dreijmanis, 1982, p. 338 
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The literature on government formation theories and specific minority theories was 
reviewed in order to uncover the most significant explanatory factors. This resulted in 
the identification of five components that were then employed in the construction of a 
theoretical framework on government formation. The framework was then used to 
generate a series of explanatory propositions in order to perform a cost/benefit analysis 
on specific types of government outcomes. The fourth chapter went one stage further, 
and transformed the theoretically derived propositions into a questionnaire that was 
administered to the group of individuals who constitute governments, the MPs 
themselves. 
Specifically, the study gave solid support for the argument that minority 
outcomes are more likely because: 
(a) the relative powerlessness222 of wing third parties allows major parties to 
control outcomes and achieve goal maximisation in the parliamentary, 
electoral and internal party arenas; 
(b) coalitions have negative consequences for all third parties as they have 
difficulty maintaining branding; and, 
(c) controlling cabinet allows a major party to implement policy via ministerial 
direction and therefore maximise policy influence. 
5.1 A Retrospective: The Literature Review 
The literature review considered government formation theorists from different 
methodological backgrounds, focusing on how they explained both general government 
222 Relative when compared to a centre third party. However, wing parties still have the ability not to 
support legislation or commit themselves to support the major party on its inside if the Governor 
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formation and minority outcomes in particular. The literature review found five key 
factors which were considered the most important explanatory variables in government 
fonnation. The five factors were: (1) unitary actor and intra-party considerations; (2) 
policy space modelling; (3) formation arenas; ( 4) conceptions of the Opposition; and, 
(5) conceptions of time. Each one is briefly re-examined. 
(])Unitary actor and intra-party considerations. Pridham (1986) and Luebbert (1986) 
were among the first to question the unitary actor assumption in government formation 
theory. The findings of this study suggest they were correct to doubt the utility of the 
concept. The results of the questionnaire indicate that political parties should not be 
seen as unified groups, but rather as a collection of factions held together in a coalition. 
This was clearly reflected in discussions on party cohesion and from the information 
MPs offered on the 1996 formation negotiations. Therefore, any meaningful explanation 
of government formation that reflects reality must consider intra-party variables, and the 
effect it has on coalition formation negotiations through factors such as party cohesion 
and inter-caucus alliances. 
(2) Policy Space Modelling. Laver and Budge (1992) challenged the value of policy 
based modelling in a comprehensive study. Their study indicated that policy has a 
reasonably simple impact on negotiations and that a party's policy position was non-
static. The answers to the questionnaire indicated that: (a) each party has a different 
commitment to the amount of policy it is willing to trade in order to gain power;· and 
(b ), while policy is important, it is only one of many factors that must be considered in 
formation negotiations. Therefore, policy based modelling has minimal indicative 
General invites that party to form a government. However, this type of behaviour from a wing third 
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power because parties have non-static policy positions. Additionally, the suggestion 
that policy has a reasonably simple impact on negotiation was not supported in this 
study. 
(3) Formation Arenas. The literature review revealed that both formal and comparative 
theorists believe that the parliamentary arena is the most important arena when 
explaining government formation outcomes. However, the results of the questionnaire 
indicate that MPs take a more holistic view, as they consider factors from other arenas 
such as party cohesion and future elections. This confirms the value of an organising 
framework that encompasses all three arenas ( electoral, internal party and 
parliamentary) when explaining government formation outcomes. 
(4) Conceptions of the Opposition. The notion of the Opposition has only been 
superficially categorised in the literature223 . It usually refers to all non-governmental 
parties as the Opposition. This conceptualisation was undermined by the results of the 
questionnaire, where MPs clearly thought that a supporting party (whether it be a centre 
third party or a wing party) is not part of the Opposition even if it criticises the 
government. A third category is necessary to accurately describe parties which support 
a minority government on an informal basis. Therefore, the terms to be used in a multi-
party parliament with a minority government should be: government party, Opposition 
. d . . 224 parties an supportmg parties . 
party would appear to be counter productive to its goal maximisation in all arenas. 
223 With the notable exception of Strom and Lubbert. 
224 see p.73 for the discussion on the range of support a third party can pledge. 
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(5) Conceptions of Time. The most recent theories on government formation 
conceptualise time as dynamic, as reflected in the works of Rommetvedt (1994) and 
Narud (1996). They discuss decision making as taking place under past and future 
considerations. This concept was examined in the questionnaire (see Q:5 and 6). In 
response, MPs indicated that past experiences and future elections played a significant 
part in their evaluation of particular government outcomes. This thesis confirms the 
conceptualisation of time as a dynamic element in government by identifying future 
constraints and past experiences as variables in government formation negotiations. 
In summary, this thesis found that the five areas of focus were not sufficient to 
adequately explain government formation. For example, policy spaced modelling was 
confirmed as a relatively worthless exercise. The conceptualisation of formation arenas 
needs to be altered to include the electoral and internal party arenas, and (supporting) 
parties need to be described separately from traditional Opposition parties. The only 
components to be confirmed by the study were the dynamic conceptualisation of time 
and the non-unitary nature of parties, as suggested by the most recent literature. 
Therefore, this study's overall results go beyond those of the existing literature, 
identifying new variables and suggesting new avenues for conceptualising existing 
variables. 
Another theme of the literature review concerned the motivation of political 
parties through the variables of policy and office. It was concluded that "both formal 
and comparative theorists now largely agree that policy motivations provide a better 
explanation of the driving force behind political parties" (refer p. 17). The findings of 
this thesis suggest that while policy and office are important motivations for political 
parties, other motivations can be equally as important, such as maintaining internal 
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cohesion and the pragmatic attainment of power. It is too simplistic to reduce the 
motivations of political parties to a policy and office dichotomy. In reality, the 
motivations of political actors goes beyond these two factors and may change over time 
and be different for each party. 
5.2 A Retrospective: General Assumptions 011 Government Formation 
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter Three and summarised in Table 5 .1 
formed the basis for the questionnaire. By comparing each assumption with the 
subsequent empirical results, it becomes possible to evaluate the key theoretical 
propositions. For example, the arenas organising principle of assumption 1 which 
stated that "government formation takes place in three interdependent arenas", was 
broadly confirmed by the results of the questionnaire in Q:3 - 6 (refer to Figure 4.3). 
The responses to these questions indicate that policy, future elections and party 
cohesion were the most important factors in government formation negotiations. This 
confirms the usefulness of assumption 1. As policy relates to the parliamentary arena, 
future elections relates to the electoral arena and cohesion relates to the internal party 
arena. Therefore, this study provides strong support for the notion that government 
formation is a process that results from the interaction of interconnected arenas. 
Assumption 2 (a) was not directly addressed in the questionnaire225 but was 
indirectly confirmed by the 1998-1999 minority coalition National government. During 
this period United and ACT did not consider themselves as part of the Labour led 
Opposition. However they were also not part of government. Rather, they saw 
225 This was due to the limited time for each interview, thus some assumptions were validated via other 
research methods, such as observation and analysis ofreality. 
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themselves as an informal section of government. The evidence therefore suggests that 
the 1999 New Zealand parliament is characterised by parties that fulfil three roles: (a) 
the government, comprised of National and independents; (b) the supporting parties, 
comprised of ACT and United; and ( c ), the Opposition comprised of Labour, Alliance, 
NZF and a number of independents. 
Table 5.1: General Assumptions on Government Formation 
1. Government formation takes place in three inter-dependent arenas, 
(a) Parliamentary 
(b) Electoral 
( c) Internal Party 
2. Political parties interact within the electoral and parliamentary arena and, 
(a) The parliamentary arena is characterised by parties which fulfil three 
roles to form, support, or oppose a government. 
(b) The electoral arena is characterised by inter-party co-operation and 
competition. 
3. Political parties seek to attain the following specific goals in each arena, 
(a) Policy influence in the parliamentaiy arena. 
(b) Vote maximisation in the Electoral arena. 
( c) Cohesion in the Internal Party arena 
4. Each of the arena specific goals are both resources and constraints in the 
three arenas. 
5. A party does not need to be in government to maximise policy influence 
6. Political parties are comprised of, 
(a) Factions, whose goal is to implement their own policy into 
government policy 
(b) Leaders, whose goal is to remain party leaders and attain 
government office 
7. Parliamentary leaders personal goals may not coincide with their parties 
goals. 
8. Parties consider future consequences in, 
(a) Time frames of one political cycle. 
(b) incumbency costs 
Assumption 2 (b), "the electoral arena is characterised by inter-party co-
operation and competition", can also be observed in the current political environment. 
For example, an election obviously entails competition between parties in a democratic 
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system. However, less obvious is the amount of co-operation that can occur between 
competing parties who believe it is advantageous to work together. An example of co-
operation comes from the 1996 election where National chose not to stand an opposing 
candidate against United's Peter Dunne in the Ohariu-Belmont electorate. He pledged 
to support National if it formed a government. More information to confirm this 
assumption can be seen in the compromises National and ACT made for the 1999 
election. For example, National have indicated that it will not be standing a candidate 
in Wellington Central against ACT's Richard Prebble226 . 
Assumptions 3 and 4 were addressed in the interviews when MPs were asked to 
indicate what factors they considered were important in government formation 
negotiations, and how they impacted on each other. It was found that MPs considered 
that future vote maximisation in the electoral arena was affected by the implementation 
of policy in the parliamentary arena. Both were affected by the need to maintain 
internal party cohesion (as shown in Labour's negotiation stance with NZF in 1996). 
Therefore, the results of the interviews confirmed the perception that goals in one arena 
can become constraints in another. 
The question227 based on assumption 5 generated one of the most valuable 
findings in the thesis. Assumption 5 stated "a party does not need to be in government 
to maximise policy influence". This suggested that a supporting party could extract just 
as much policy influence outside of government by its ability to vote down and support 
legislation in parliament. The findings from the questionnaire indicate that this 
assumption was, in fact, incorrect (see Figure.3.4 ). A third party must be in cabinet if it 
wants to maximise policy influence. There are two main reasons for this. First, the 
226 Luke, P., (1999), "ACT gives Nats free run in Christchurch seat", in The Press, May 3, p. 11. 
227 Topic 1, Question 1: Putting aside differences in leadership and personalities, do you believe a third 
party has more policy influence over a government by remaining outside a coalition? 
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executives' ability to implement policy via ministerial direction means a third party 
must be at the cabinet table if it wants to influence policy as it is being formed. Second, 
any policy a third party may want to implement has to be monitored via the cabinet 
table to ensure that the ministries and ministers do not quietly undermine it. 
The results of the questionnaire also found support for assumptions 6 and 7, 
which were addressed in the factor "office for career advancement" (Q:3 and 5) in 
responses to Topic 4 Q:1. Assumption 6 (a) suggested that "political parties are 
comprised of factions ... ". This was confirmed by those MPs who indicated that they 
would form inter-caucus alliances to get "their" (that is their faction's) policy 
implemented. It was further illustrated by the internal problems surrounding the 
treasurer's position in Labour in 1996 and by the removal of Jim Bolger as PM in 1998. 
Assumption 6 (b) which suggested that "political parties are comprised of leaders who 
wish to remain party leaders" and 7 "that parliamentary leaders goals may not coincide 
with their party's goals", were not confirmed to any substantial degree. However, 
despite the difficulty in determining these assumptions, they would seem to be logically 
important variables in government formation. Government formation negotiations are 
primarily controlled by party leaders and their personal ambitions may impact on their 
decision making ability. 
Assumption 8 (a) that "parties consider future consequences in time frames of 
one political cycle", was examined in Q:3-5, where responses indicated that MPs do 
have an eye to the future. For example, in answer to Q:5, Labour MPs appeared to be 
thinking in terms of at least one political cycle when they chose a "hard-nosed" 
bargaining style in 1996. The associated assumption 8 (b) that "parties consider future 
consequences in incumbency costs", was not confirmed to any significant degree. 
However, if future elections are a factor when a party is considering forming a minority 
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government or a coalition majority government, then by definition, a party is 
considering the incumbency cost of each particular outcome. This assumption whilst 
not directly confirmed by the results of the questionnaire, should be considered an 
important factor in government formation. 
In summary, the assumptions on general government formation were largely confirmed 
by the results of the questionnaire, with the exception of assumption 5 which incorrectly 
stated that "a party does not need to be in government to maximise policy influence". 
The importance of this finding should not be under estimated, as it heavily influences 
the subsequent cost/benefit analysis and brings about a re-evaluation of the optimal 
governn1ent outcome for major and minor parties. Additionally, within government 
formation literature this variable has not previously been identified, despite its 
importance to government formation theory in general. Furthermore, in terms of the 
New Zealand situation, this variable is vitally important as the executive has 
considerable powers to implement policy via ministerial direction without parliament 
being notified228 . 
5.3 Cost/benefit Modelling and the Empirical Results 
The above theoretical assumptions were applied to the twelve most likely outcomes in a 
party system framework that reflected the situation in New Zealand229 . Additionally, 
the results were modelled in cost/benefit terms. The twelve outcomes were then 
discussed in two categories, minimal winning coalitions (mwc) and minority outcomes, 
228 Cave, S., (1999), "Parliament casts its eye over 'private' laws", in The National Bulletin, February 19. 
229 That is a party system comprised of two main parties and two or three third parties distributed over a 5 
point scale. 
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which encompassed both single party minority governments and coalitions. The theory 
section also modelled the costs of any given situation in comparison to its benefits, and 
then indicated what outcomes were optimal for both major and minor parties. However, 
the conclusions in this section need to be revised in light of the changes to the general 
assumptions on government formation. 
The Revised Costs/Benefits Analysis of Minimal Winning Coalitions (mwc) 
The findings of the questionnaire largely confirmed the factors parties must consider 
when considering a mwc (as presented in Chapter Three). However, the earlier 
conclusion that "playing a supporting role outside government may mean policy 
influence can be maximised to a higher level"(p.83), needs amending in light of the 
empirical findings. By uncovering the importance of cabinet participation in relation to 
policy influence maximisation, the conclusions on mwc in cost/benefit terms have 
changed. The previous conclusion that a third party can maximise policy influence 
whilst supporting a minority government appears incorrect. The reality is that a third 
party requires a formal coalition to maximise policy influence. Therefore, the revised 
conclusion, and an important finding of this thesis, is that a third party does not 
exchange office for policy influence in a mwc. In reality, gaining office is the only way 
for it to maximise policy influence due to the pivotal position cabinet plays in 
implementation of policy. 
Despite this change, the suggestion that mwcs decrease major party cohesion due 
to the allocation of scarce offices to the junior partner, appears to be accurate (p.119). 
The accuracy of this was confirmed in the responses to Topic 4.Q:1 where an MP stated 
that they felt "a huge amount of pain" (p.120) at seeing portfolios going to a coalition 
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partner. Also, other National backbenchers voiced their discontent at how the NZF 
caucus appeared to have more say in cabinet than they did. In addition, the 
identification of possible inter-caucus alliances between coalition partners and its 
negative affect on party cohesion was another significant finding of this thesis. This 
variable had not previously been identified as important in government formation 
literature. 
The other important finding on mwc was the role collective cabinet 
responsibility plays in the cost/benefit analysis between senior and junior coalition 
partners. This thesis modelled CCR as primarily a cost to the junior party, as it must 
publicly support policy it may not wish to (p.82). The results of the questionnaire 
confirmed this perception (p.116), and revealed that the majority of MPs are aware of 
the effect of CCR, but do not perceive it as a problem. This finding is significant, as it 
confirms that CCR is a significant cost for third parties and infers that this constitutional 
convention founded under FPP is inconsistent with the present MMP environment. 
Interestingly, the same conclusion appears to have been reached by Labour and the 
Alliance, as both parties are discussing how the doctrine can be amended to mitigate its 
affects on a junior coalition partner. 
The amended conclusion to the cost/benefit analysis is that a third party has 
more to gain in a mwc as: (a) it can only maximise policy influence and achieve its goal 
in the parliamentary arena by joining a coalition; and (b ), the attainment of executive 
office furthers the careers of its MPs. These two benefits more than compensate for the 
possible loss of party cohesion due to a senior partner's influence, the possible loss of 
identity due to the doctrine of CCR (if it hasn't been altered), and the loss of its ability to 
criticise the government. 
145 
Due to findings on CCR and the amending of assumption five, the revised 
conclusion on a mwc is that a senior partner does not benefit in a majority coalition. 
When a major party allows a third party into the executive, it loses a degree of policy 
influence which is in tum gained by the third party. Additionally, the doctrine of CCR 
(which favours the major party in a coalition) is not an entrenched constitutional law 
and can be amended. Therefore, the only benefits for a senior party in a mwc are: (a) 
having the ability to undermine the junior partner through offering office pay-offs; and 
(b ), stopping a potential source of criticism. In the final analysis, neither of these 
overcome the costs of mwc for major parties. 
The Revised Cost/Benefit Analysis of Minority Governments 
It was suggested in Chapter Three (p.84) that operating a single party minority 
government would be problematic as a high degree of compromise would be required. 
This could cause the governing party to lose its identity if it failed to implement its 
mandate. However, after considering the findings of the empirical study it appears that 
this statement also needs amending. For a major party, a single party minority outcome 
or a minority coalition with a centre-third party, may be the preferred option as it 
increases the chance of goal attainment in all three arenas. In these situations, a major 
party can ignore wing third parties and maximise its policy influence through 
ministerial direction, thereby maintaining its own identity at a higher level, and 
maximising its cohesion by giving out all executive offices to its own MPs. 
In summary, the results of the questionnaire reversed the conclusions to the earlier 
cost/benefit analysis. By applying the empirical results, the optimal choices for a major 
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party (the party which largely controls government formation negotiations) are minority 
outcomes. By forming minority governments, whether single party or coalition, a major 
party has the ability to maximise goal attainment in all arenas, especially in a single 
party minority government where it can implement policy via ministerial direction. 
Conversely, for third parties, especially wing third parties, mwc are the best option as 
they cannot hope to maximise policy influence from outside a formal government 
agreement. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The contribution of this thesis lies in four principle areas. First, an important insight 
into the opinions of New Zealand's political decision makers was obtained. To the best 
of the author's knowledge, this thesis is the first study to personally interview 40% of 
MPs on government formation. Second, an improved explanation was suggested on 
how government formation variables interact. Important factors in formation 
negotiations go beyond policy/office considerations, and include such factors as party 
cohesion and future elections. Third, a better understanding of the 1996 government 
formation negotiations was obtained: each party was constrained by a different 
combination of factors which affected their flexibility and ultimately resulted in success 
for National. Fourth, the study revealed the importance of three variables that are 
significant in government formation situations, namely, the effect of ministerial 
direction on policy influence maximisation, the possibility of inter-caucus alliances in a 
coalition and the effect of CCR on junior coalition partners. 
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Together, these four insights provide enough detail to confirm the research 
proposition "that the introduction of MMP in NZ is likely to result in an increase in the 
number of single and multiparty minority governments". The introduction of MMP, in 
combination with the existing party system, is likely to result in more minority 
outcomes. As the theoretical reasoning and empirical data indicate, these outcomes are 
most likely to be either single party minority governments (in the absence of a centre 
third party) or minority coalitions (with a centre party). Indeed, minority outcomes may 




Elite Survey: Respondents Copy 
Section 1 
1) Do you think the experience of coalition and minority governments between 1993 -
1999 was exceptional, or a good indication of how governments will operate 
underMMP? 
0 exceptional 
• good indication 
• poor indication 





2) What type of government do you consider is the most likely under MMP 
in the longer term (i.e. the next decade)? 
Please rank from 1 (most likely) to 5 (least likely). 
• single-party majority • 
• grand coalitions • 
• majority coalitions • 
• minority coalitions • 
• single party minority • 
• don't know / can't say • 
3) From the following list of factors, PLEASE RANK IN ORDER what you consider 
should be the chief factors in government formation negotiations. 
• Future Elections • Party cohesion 
• Office for career advancement • Trust 
• Personality clashes • Office for resources 
• Policy • Other ---
• Other ---
4) For those factors you ranked 1st and 2nd in question 3 could you explain what impact 
they should have on formation negotiations. 
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5) From the same list of factors, PLEASE RANK IN ORDER what you consider to 
have been the chief factors for each party, in the 1996 government formation 
negotiations. 
• Office for resources • Future Elections 
• Party cohesion • Office for career advancement 
• Personality clashes • Policy 
• Trust • Other 
• Other ---
6) For those factors you ranked first and second in question 5, could you explain how 
they affected the negotiations ( i.e. what options they undermined/promoted). 
Section 2 
The following section is aimed at discovering how you feel about the costs and benefits 
of coalitions and minority governments. 
Topic: Tltird parties supporting a minority government. 
1- Putting aside differences in leadership and personalities, do you believe a third party 
has more policy influence over a government by remaining outside a coalition? 
2- Do you believe a third party can avoid associational costs at the following election by 
supporting a minority government rather than joining a coalition? 
3 - Is a third party able to maintain party cohesion better by supporting a minority party 
as opposed to joining a coalition? 
4 - How important is the ability to criticise a government for a supporting party? 
Topic: A single party minority government. 
1- Assuming a minority government can maintain its identity better than ifit went 
into a coalition, are there any negative aspects of maintaining such an identity? 
2- A minority government has to look for a majority on a case by case basis, do you 
believe this is a strength or weakness? 
Topic: A junior partner within a ma]ority coalition 
1- Is the influence a senior partner can have on a junior partners MPs an important 
consideration for the junior partner? 
2- Do you believe the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility, as it is presently 
practised, forces the junior partner to support policy it might not wish to. 
3- - Is the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility a valid practice in coalition 
government? 
Topic: The senior partv in a majoritv coalition. 
1- Do you believe party cohesion is harder to attain and maintain within a coalition? 
2- Do you believe that a coalition government shares the responsibility for unpopular 
policies evenly between the junior and senior partners. 
Section 3 
A Possible Outcome With Parliamentary Numbers and Party Positions 
Party A B C D E 
& . . 
MPs 13 45 4 45 13 
LEFT RIGHT 
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Choose one party from the scenario above which you think best reflects your party's 
ideological position as perceived by voters and the media as well as yourself. 
Chosen Party • 
From the above scenario, taking into consideration the parliamentary representation of 
each party and the individual MPs themselves, what type of government outcome would 
you prefer and why ( i.e., majority coalition, minority coalition, single party minority 
etc)? 
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List of Interviews: In Chronological Order 
Name Party Status 
1- Mark, Ron NZF List 
2- Dalziel, Lianne Lab List 
3- Dyson, Ruth Lab List 
4- Anderton, Jim All Con 
5- Bloxham, Jenny NZF List 
6- Carter, David Nat Con 
7- Brownlee, Gerry Nat Con 
8- Moore, Mike Lab Con 
9- Dunne, Peter Unt Con 
10- Hide, Rodney ACT List 
11- Elder, Jack Ind List 
12- McCardle, Peter Ind List 
13- Anae, Arthur Nat Con 
14- Yates, Dianne Lab List 
15- Carter, John Nat Con 
16- Luxton, John Nat Con 
17- Batten, Anne Ind List 
18- Woolerton, Doug NZF List 
19- Brown, Peter NZF List 
20- Peck, Mark Lab Con 
21- Birch, Bill Nat Con 
22- Maharey, Steve Lab Con 
23- Kilion, Neil Ind List 
24- Fitzsimons, Jeanette All List 
25- Quigley, Marilyn Nat List 
26- Graham, Douglas Nat List 
27- O'Regan, Katherine Nat List 
28- Sutton, Jim Lab Con 
29- Vernon, Belinda Nat Con 
30- Clark, Helen Lab Con 
31- Barker, Rick Lab Con 
32- Young, Annabel Nat List 
33- Roy, Eric Nat List 
34- Newman, Muriel ACT List 
35- Gosche, Mark Lab List 
36- Cullen, Michael Lab Con 
3 7- Wong, Pansy Nat List 
38- Tizard, Judith Lab Con 
39- Barnett, Tim Lab Con 
40- Burton, Mark Lab Con 
41- Hunt, Johnathon Lab List 
42- Harre, Laila All List 
43- Peters, Winston NZF Con 
44- Grover, Frank All List 
45- King, Annette Lab Con 
46- O'Conner, Damien Lab Con 
47- Sutherland, Larry Lab Con 
48- Hobbs, Marion Lab List 
Bibliography 
Austen-Smith, D., and Banks, J., (1988), "Elections, Coalitions and Legislative 
Outcomes", American Political Science Review, vol. 82, no.2, June. 
Axelrod, R.,(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, USA. 
152 
Bergman, T., (1993), "Formation Rules and Minority Governments", European Journal 
of Political Research, vol. 23, no. 1, January. 
Bogdanor, V., (1983), Coalition Government in Western Politics , Heineman, London. 
Boston, J., etal, (1996), New Zealand Under MMP, Auckland University Press with 
Bridget Williams Books. 
Boston, J., and, McLeay, E., (1997), From Campaign to Coalition, Palmerston North, 
Dunmore Press. 
Bowler, S., Farrell, D.,& Katz, R.S., (eds), (1999), Party Discipline and Parliamentary 
Government, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, USA. 
Browne, E.C., and Dreijmanis, J., (eds.), (1982),Government Coalitions in Western 
Democracies, Longman, London. 
Browne, E.C., and Franklin, M.N., (1973), "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European 
Parliamentary Democracies', The American Political Science Review,- vol. 67, 
no.2, June. 
Browne, E.C. and Franklin, M.N., (1986), "Editors introduction: New Directions in 
Coalition Research", Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 4, November. 
Budge, I., and Herman, V., (1978), "Coalitions and Government formation: An 
Empirically Relevant Theory", British Journal of Political Science, 
vol., 8, no.4, October. 
Budge, I., and, Kernan, H., (1990), Parties and Democracy, Oxford University Press, 
USA. 
Budge, I., and Laver, M., (1986), "Office-Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition 
Theory", Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. XI, no.4, November. 
153 
Budge, I., Robertson, D., and Hearl, D., (eds.), (1987), Ideology, Strategy and Party 
Change: Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies, 
Cambridge University Press, Great Britain. 
Cabinet Office, (1996), Cabinet Manual, Department of the PM and Cabinet, 1996. 
Cave, S., (1999), "Parliament Casts Its Eye Over 'Private Laws"', in National Bulletin, 
February 19. 
Church, S., (1998), Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Stability in New Zealand, 
Christchurch, Canterbury University, Thesis: PhD 
Crombez, C., (1996), "Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and 
Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems", European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 29, no.l, January. 
Daalder, H., (eds.), (1997), Comparative European Politics, Pinter, Great Britain. 
Daalder, H., and Mair, P., (eds.), (1983), Western European Party Systems, Sage, Great 
Britain. 
154 
de Swaan, A.,(1973), Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal 
Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments After 
1918, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Dodd, L.,(1979), Coalitions In Parliamentary Government, Princeton University Press, 
UK. 
Downs, A., (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, USA. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., and Nachmias, D., (1996), Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences, Arnold, London, UK. 
Groffman, B.,(1982), "A Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation in Ideological N-
Space", Behavioural Science, vol. 27, no. 1, January. 
Hague, R., Harrop, M., Breslin, S., (1994), Comparative Government and Politics, Mac 
Millian Press, London, UK. 
Herman, V., and Pope, J.,(1973), "Minority Governments in Western Democracies", 
British Journal of Political Science, vol. 3, no.2, April. 
Hill, P.T., (1973), "A Theory of Political Coalitions in Simple and Policymaking 
Situations", American Politics Series, vol.1. 
Kane, E., (1993), Doing Your Own Research, Marion Boyars, London, UK. 
Laver,M.,and Budge, I.,(eds),(1992), Party Policy and Government Coalitions, 
Macmillan, London 
Laver, M., and Schofield, N., (1990) Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition 
in Europe, Oxford University Press. 
155 
Laver, M., and Shepsle, K.A.,(1990), "Coalitions and Cabinet Government", American 
Political Science Review, vol.84, no.3, September. 
Laver, M., and Shepsle, K.A.,(1990), "Government Coalitions and Intra-party Politics", 
British Journal of Political Science, vol.20, no.4, October. 
Laver, M., and Shepsle, K.A., (1996), Making and Breaking Governments, Cambridge 
University Press, USA. 
Laver, M., and Shepsle, K.A., (1999), "How Political Parties Emerged from the 
Primeval Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of 
Govermnents", in Bowler, S., Farrell, D.,& Katz, RS., ( eds), (1999), Party 
Discipline and Parliamentary Government, Ohio State University Press, 
Columbus, USA. 
Lijphart, A., (1981 ), "Power-sharing versus Majority Rule: Patterns of Cabinet 
Formation in Twenty Democracies", Government and Opposition, vol. 16, no. 4. 
Luck, D.S., (1999), "Act gives Nats free run in Christchurch seat", in The Press , May 
3,p.11. 
Luebbert, G.M.,(1983) "Coalition Theory and Government Formation in Multiparty 
Democracies", Comparative Politics, vol. 15, no.2, January. 
Luebbert, G. M., (1984), "A Theory of Government Formation", Comparative Political 
Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, July. 
Lutz, D.S., and Williams, J.R., (1976), "Minimum Coalitions in Legislatures: A review 
of the evidence", American Politics Series , vol. 3. 
Mc Leay, E., (1996), "Forming a Government", presented to the Australian Study of 
Politics Group, 18th Annual Conference. 
156 
Mershon, C., (1999), "The Costs of Coalition: A Five Nation Comparison", in Bowler, 
S., Farrell, D.,& Katz, R.S., (eds), (1999), Party Discipline and Parliamentary 
Government, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, USA. 
Mitchell, P., (1999), "Coalition Discipline, Enforcement Mechanisms and Intra-party 
Politics", in Bowler, S., Farrell, D.,& Katz, R.S., (eds), (1999), Party Discipline 
and Parliamentary Government, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, USA. 
Moar, M., (1995), "Intra-Party Determinants of Coalition Bargaining", Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, vol.7, no. 1, January. 
Narud, H.M.,(1995), "Issue Saliency, Policy Distances and Coalition Bargaining", West 
European Politics, vol. 18, no. 2, April. 
Narud, H.M.,(1996), "Electoral Competition and Coalition Bargaining in Multiparty 
Systems", Journal Of Theoretical Politics ,vol. 8, no 4, November. 
New Zealand Government, (1996), Coalition Agreement, Government Publishers 
Wellington. 
Panebianco, A., (1988), Political Parties: Organisation and Power, Cambridge 
University Press, Great Britain. 
Peterson, R.L., and De Ridder, M.M.,(1986), "Government Formation as a Policy 
Making Arena", Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no.4, November. 
Pridham, G.,(1986), Coalitional Behaviour in Theory and Practice, Cambridge 
University Press, Great Britain. 
Riker, W.H., (1962), The Theory Of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, 
London. 
157 
Rornmetvedt, H., (1994), "Norwegian Coalition Governments and the Management of 
Party Relations", Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 17, no.3. 
Rose, and Mackie, T.T.(1983), "Incumbency in Government: Asset or Liability" in 
Daalder, H., and Mair, P., (eds.), (1983) Western European Party Systems, Sage, 
Great Britain. 
Sartori, G., (1976), Party and Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, N.Y. 
Schofield, N.,(1993), "Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments", 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 23, no. 1, January. 
Schofield, N.,(1997), "Reflections: Coalition Politics and Representative Democracy", 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 31, no.1-2, February. 
Sened, I.,(1996), "A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence", Journal of 
Politics, vol. 58, no. 2, May. 
Sjoblom, G.,(1968), Party Strategies in a Multiparty System, Studentlitteratur Lund, 
Sweden. 
Strom, K.,(1984), "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies", 
Comparative Political Studies, vol.17, no.2, July. 
Strom, K., (1986), "Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia", 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. XI, no. 4, November. 
Strom, K., (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge University 
press, UK. 
Strom, K., (1994), "The Presthus Debacle: Intra-party Politics and Bargaining Failure in 
Norway", American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no 1, March. 
Strom, K., (1997), "Democracy accountability, and coalition bargaining", European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 31, no.1-2, Feburary. 
158 
Strom, K., Budge, I., and Laver, M.J., (1994), "Constraints on Cabinet Formation in 
Parliamentary Democracies", American Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 
2, May. 
Van Neumann and Morgenstern, (1947), Theory of Games and Economic behaviour, 
Pub. Princton, University Press, USA. 
Van Roozendaal, P.,(1992), Cabinets In Multi-Party Democracies, Thesis Publishers, 
Amsterdam. 
Warwick, P.V., (1996), "Coalition Government membership in West European 
Parliamentary Democracies", British Journal of Political Science, vol.26, no. 4, 
October. 
Wood, S., and McLean, 1.,(1995) "Recent Work in Game Theory and Coalition 
Theory", Political Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, December. 
